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THE LAW AND POLITICS OF THE CHARLES TAYLOR CASE
CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH*
Abstract
This article discusses a rare successful prosecution of a head of state by a
modern international criminal court. The case involved former Liberian president
Charles Taylor. Taylor, who was charged and tried by the United Nations-backed
Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL'), was convicted in April 2013 for planning
and aiding and abetting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious
international humanitarian law violations. He was sentenced to 50 years
imprisonment. The SCSL Appeals Chamber upheld the historic conviction and
sentence in September 2013. Taylor is currently serving his sentence in Great
Britain.
This article, from an insider who worked as an interim court-appointed defense
attorney during the opening of the trial in The Hague in June 2007, is the first to
comprehensively evaluate this significant international case since it concluded. I
expose the numerous controversies that dogged the trial of Liberia's former
president-from the questions that arose about how best to sequence peace for
Liberia andjustice for Sierra Leone following the prosecution's initial unveiling of
his judicially sealed indictment through to concerns about whether he should be
tried in the heart of Europe, as opposed to Africa, to the completion of appeals. I
conclude that the trial offormer President Taylor is significant for the SCSL because
he was the most powerful suspect to be indicted by the court. Although it may be
too early to draw definitive conclusions, a key lesson that we can derive for
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international criminal justice is that the indictment of a sitting president for
international crimes may sometimes help loosen his grip on power, thereby enabling
his subsequent prosecution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The trial of the former president of Liberia, Charles Ghankay Taylor, by the
United Nations-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL"), was remarkable
in at least four respects. First, it was the only case involving a non-Sierra Leonean
before the SCSL. All the other men prosecuted by the tribunal were Sierra Leoneans.
They were charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced for crimes that they planned and
committed against their own people in their own home country. Taylor, on the other
hand, was from neighboring Liberia where he is alleged to be responsible for even
worse crimes than those for which he was eventually charged in Sierra Leone. I But
Taylor, like all the other rebel leaders who participated in Liberia's dirty war, was
never prosecuted in his native country because the parties to that conflict effectively
granted themselves amnesty.2 Rather, he was implicated by the SCSL for supporting
Foday Sankoh, the leader of a rebel army called the Revolutionary United Front
("RUF"), to foment a war in Sierra Leone in which numerous serious atrocity crimes
were committed. Sankoh and Taylor allegedly made "common cause"3 to help each
other take over their respective countries for personal and political gain.
Second, as a criminal trial, the case against Taylor was inevitably complicated.
He reportedly never set foot in Sierra Leone during the time the offenses for which
he was charged were perpetrated.4 This meant that the prosecution's burden to prove
his case, when compared to the other SCSL cases, was going to be doubly difficult.
Indeed, for most of the pre-trial and trial phases, the success of the case against
Taylor appeared to hinge primarily on two expansive and controversial modes of
criminal liability in international criminal law-Joint Criminal Enterprise ("JCE")
1. 2 TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMM'N, REPUBLIC OF LIBER., CONSOLIDATED FINAL REPORT
151-72 (2009) [hereinafter LIBERIAN TRC REPORT].
2. The Liberian TRC Report listed eight leaders of warring factions, two of whom have died, and
recommended that the living ones be prosecuted for committing atrocity crimes. Id. Taylor was at the
top of the list. But an institutional mechanism for prosecution, similar to the one for Sierra Leone, has
not to date been established in Liberia. Id. at 349. For an early scholarly work anticipating the need for
criminal accountability in Liberia for serious international crimes and a proposal for the expansion of the
SCSL's jurisdiction to cover international crimes committed there, see Chemor Jalloh & Alhagi Marong,
Ending Impunity: The Case for War Crimes Trials in Liberia, I AFR. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 53, 70 (2005).
3. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 23, 25 (Special
Court for Sierra Leone May 18, 2012), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/6662-19559
[hereinafter Taylor Trial Judgment]. See also Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01 -A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment (Special Court for Sierra Leone Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01 -A- 1389.pdf.
Commentary on the Taylor trial in respect of specific issues began following the trial judgment in both
the blogosphere and in academic journals. See, for examples of the latter, the thoughtful articles by Simon
Meisenberg, Laurel Baig, Kai Ambos, Ousman Njikam, Kirsten Keith and Kevin Jon Heller all of whom
participated in a special 2013 symposium issue on the Taylor Trial in the Journal of International
Criminal Justice (Vol. 11, Issue 4).
4. War Crimes Court Finds Charles Taylor Guilty, AIUAZEERA (Apr. 27, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/201242693846498785.html.
5. For a critique of how the prosecution controversially pleaded JCE at the SCSL, see Wayne
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and command responsibility6-- neither of which requires the suspect to directly
commit the acts in question. The task for the tribunal's prosecutors was how, using
those two and other forms of criminal participation such as instigating or ordering,
they could link Taylor in Liberia to the offenses carried out by the RUF and its
collaborators on Sierra Leonean territory. Interestingly, although they managed to
secure Taylor's conviction for planning and aiding and abetting crimes in Sierra
Leone, the prosecution failed to prove JCE and command responsibility. The
inference could reasonably be drawn that the prosecutors over played the centrality
of his role in their narratives of the Sierra Leonean conflict.
Third, although Presidents Blaise Campaord (Burkina Faso) and (the now late)
Muammar Gaddafi (Libya) were apparently subjects of initial prosecutorial
investigative interest for training, arming, and otherwise financially supporting the
RUF,7 Taylor was the only sitting African president indicted by the SCSL (even
though he was no longer in power when he was actually arrested, prosecuted and
convicted).8 He was thus the first leader to be held criminally responsible for
international crimes committed in another African State.9 This later served as fuel
for his argument that his trial was political.'" Yet, the judges rejected his claim that
the prosecution selectively and vindictively prosecuted him based on improper
political motives and in order to simply advance the U.S. foreign policy interests in
Africa. They also rejected the contention that he was discriminatorily singled out for
prosecution, effectively painting his argument as an attempt to politicize his case
and to deflect his own responsibility."
Jordash & Scott Martin, How the Approach to JCE in Taylor and the R UF Case Undermined the Demands
ofJustice at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY:
THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 96, 109-17 (Charles Chemor Jalloh ed.,
2014).
6. See Harmen van der Wilt, Command Responsibility in the Jungle: Some Reflections on the
Elements of Effective Command and Control, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY:
THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 144-158 (Charles Chernor Jalloh ed.,
2014) and Sandesh Sivakumaran, Command Responsibility in the Sierra Leonean Conflict, in THE SIERRA
LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 128-143 (Charles Chemor Jalloh ed., 2014). A provocative literary approach can be found in Ren6
Provost, Authority, Responsibility, and Witchcraft: From Tintin to the SCSL, in THE SIERRA LEONE
SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159-
180 (Charles Chemor Jalloh ed., 2014).
7. The Impact of Liberia's Election on West Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr., Global
Human Rights & Int'l Operations of the Comm. on Int'l Relations, 109th Cong. 150, 157 n.1 (2006)
(statement of David M. Crane, Former Chief Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone).
8. Crane has alleged that Gaddafi was an "unindicted co-conspirator" of Taylor's and that he did
not indict him and Campaor6 only because of evidentiary issues. On top of that, indicting two more West
African heads of state would have undermined the work of the Sierra Leone tribunal. The Prosecution
later revealed that, in fact, it had less than a tenth of the evidence it had against Taylor against Gaddafi
and Campaord-hardly the basis for a strong case. See id at 157 n. 11; Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note
3,1176.
9. The Taylor Trial, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html (last visited Mar. 1,2015).
10. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 11173-74.
11. Id. 1111l81-84.
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All others tried by the SCSL were leaders of rebel, militia, or other
organizations. But, the eight SCSL convicts drawn from the RUF, 2 the Civil
Defense Forces ("CDF"), 13 and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
("AFRC")I4 cases were part of the command structure of those entities. They each
either committed the crimes personally or were found to have exercised defacto or
dejure authority over the subordinates who perpetrated them. Thus, before Taylor's
arrest, the highest profile politician that the SCSL charged was the former deputy
defense minister, Sam Hinga Norman (who later died before judgment was
rendered).' 5 Taylor's head of state status and the fact that he had, by the time of his
indictment, gained notoriety for the abuses that his forces committed against
civilians in Liberia where he ascended to the presidency in August 1997,16 made him
the most "famous" person before the SCSL. As the perceived "godfather" of the
RUF, the stature of Taylor's case grew after Sankoh and his ruthless number two,
Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie, died before they could be tried. ' 7 In other words, with
the apex of the rebel organization unavailable due to Sankoh and Bockarie's deaths,
Taylor became the last person standing. He inevitably gained in symbolic
importance as a figure-rightly or wrongly-the prosecution could exaggeratingly
blame most of the RUF depravations even though the Office of the Prosecutor was
12. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5892-5892; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
Sentencing Judgment, (Apr. 8, 2009), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5930-5930; Prosecutor
v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A, Judgment (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/6098-6098.
13. Prosecutor v. Fofana, SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment, 11 1, 80-81 (Aug. 2, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4914-19301; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Judgment on the Sentencing of Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa, 11 59-63 (Oct. 9, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5001-5001; Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A,
Judgment, 8 (May 28, 2008), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5564-15137.
14. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 1 164-72 (June 20, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4852-1271 1; Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T,
Sentencing Judgment, 111 88, 108, 116, 135 (July 19, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4895-12838; Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A,
Judgment, 117-8 (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/5315-14250.
15. Prosecutor v. Norman, SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on Registrar's Submission of Evidence of
Death of Accused Samuel Hinga Norman and Consequential Issues, 13-18 (May 21, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4774-4774 (finding that the Court lost its jurisdiction over
Norman and that the case against him was legally extinguished or terminated upon his death). Norman's
trial was controversial amongst the SCSL judges as well elsewhere. See Lansana Gberie, The Civil
Defense Forces Trial: Limit to International Justice?, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS
LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 624-641 (Charles Chemor
Jalloh ed., 2014).
16. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 8.
17. Though Sankoh died in custody of natural causes on July 9, 2003, Bockarie was murdered,
allegedly on Taylor's orders on May 5, 2003. This led to the withdrawal of their SCSL indictments in
December 2003. Prosecutor v. Sankoh, Case No. SCSL-2003-02-PT, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8,
2003), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/1093-1093; Prosecutor v. Bockarie, Case No. SCSL-
2003-04-PT, Withdrawal of Indictment (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/i094-
1094. See also Profile of Republic of Sierra Leone, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/sierraleone/82282.htm (last updated Mar. 2007).
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ultimately unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that-as William Schabas
aptly put it-Taylor was the "guiding spirit," "evil genius," or "mastermind" who
"manipulated the war throughout the 1990s."' I
Finally, in a still controversial decision that made his case even more unique
amongst the SCSL trials, Taylor was the only suspect tried in the heart of Europe at
The Hague in the Netherlands, away from the seat of the tribunal in Freetown, Sierra
Leone. 9 The decision to change the venue of his trial was taken ostensibly for
security reasons."0 Some critics, especially many from the local civil society,
including myself, vehemently contested this rationale.2 The critics argued that
Taylor-who was no longer in power-could not be a threat to an entire sub-region,
and that even if he was, it would have been far better, and certainly less costly, for
security to be bolstered in Sierra Leone and Liberia rather than move the SCSL's
most important case away from the alleged victim communities most affected by his
crimes." Similarly, Taylor was the only convict to be imprisoned outside Africa-
in the United Kingdom-where he is as of this writing serving a fifty-year
sentence.23 In contrast, all the others prosecuted by the SCSL for atrocity crimes
were detained in Rwanda.24 Taylor's repeated requests to be sent to Kigali or
somewhere else in Africa for family reasons, cultural affinity, and other similar
considerations have not gained any traction. For this reason, absent a fundamental
18. William A. Schabas, Charles Taylor Judgment Suggests a More Modest Level of Participation
in the Sierra Leone Conflict, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/20l2/04/charles-taylor-judgment-suggests-more.html.
19. See The Prosecutor vs. Charles Ghankay Taylor: Transfer of the Trial to The Hague, SPECIAL
COURT OF SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE,
http://www.rscsl.org/Taylor.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
20. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court President Requests Charles Taylor
be Tried in The Hague (Mar. 30, 2006) (on file with the Press and Public Affairs Office of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone).
21. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-0 I-PT, Civil Society Amicus Curiae Brief
Regarding Change of Venue of Taylor Trial Back to Freetown, 1111 3-4, 13 (Mar. 9, 2007),
http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/4652-4652.
22. See Taylor, SCSL-2003-0 I-PT, 1111 3-16 (pointing out correctly that Taylor had resided in
Nigeria freely, before his arrest and transfer to the SCSL, and that both the legislative and executive
branches of the Sierra Leonean government and civil society preferred his trial in Sierra Leone; further
highlighting that no public evidence had been produced to justify labelling him a threat to security in
West Africa).
23. See Charles C. Jalloh, Prosecutor v. Taylor Case Report, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 58, 58 (2014).
Taylor's recent request to be moved from the United Kingdom to Rwanda was denied by the Residual
Special Court for Sierra Leone. See In the Matter of Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-
ES, Decision on Public with Public and Confidential Annexes Charles Ghankay Taylor's Motion for
Termination of Enforcement of Sentence in the United Kingdom and for Transfer to Rwanda (Jan. 30,
2015), http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/9091.
24. On October 31, 2009, all eight SCSL convicts were transferred to Mpanga Prison, just outside
Rwanda's capital Kigali, to serve their punishment. Since then, there have been several contempt cases
prosecuted by the SCSL. In the few instances resulting in convictions and jail time in the cases involving
witness tampering, the convicts have served their sentences in Sierra Leone. This explains the qualifier.
See generally, Press Release, Rwanda Ministry of Info., Sierra Leone Special Court Convicts Arrive in
Rwanda to Begin Prison Sentence (Oct. 31, 2009), available at
http://www.rscsl.org/Clippings/2009/2009-1 1 /pc2009-11-2.pdf.
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change of circumstances, he will most likely live the remainder of his natural life in
Britain.
This article examines the law and politics of the trial of former Liberian
president Charles Taylor. The paper is intended to introduce non-experts to the case
involving one of Africa's most notorious warlords and its controversies. Towards
that end, it aims to offer the first complete assessment of the trail of legal and
political controversies that came to characterize this high profile international trial
from the premature release of a sealed indictment for Taylor by SCSL prosecutors
in summer 2003 through to the disposition of final appeals in fall 2013, It exposes
and analyzes key legal, practical and other challenges that should offer lessons for
the prosecution of current or former heads of state in other international criminal
courts. Furthermore, because the article comes from an insider who was privileged
to work as court-appointed duty counsel during the opening of this fascinating case,
it is submitted that it makes an original and substantial contribution to the
international criminal law literature.
Although not without its difficulties, many of which will be discussed later on,
the Taylor trial was the jewel in the SCSL's crown. It is also one of the most
symbolically important cases in modem international criminal law. The reason is
simple. Prior post-Nuremberg attempts to prosecute heads of state or government
by the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
and Rwanda ("ICTR") and the permanent International Criminal Court ("ICC") have
implicated political figures of a similar standing. But almost all those trials have
been marred by practical issues, procedural irregularities, or other obstacles. Some
of the cases faltered because states lacked the political will to arrest the suspect (as
in the ICC indictment of President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan)25; or after entering into
a plea bargain with the ICTR prosecution, the accused tried to recant his guilty plea
(Rwandan Prime Minister, Jean Kambanda)26 ; or the defendant died before his
judgment was rendered (former Yugoslav President, Slobodan Milo~evi6, at the
ICTY).27 In contrast, with the exception of a major hiccup at the beginning of his
trial and another which bookended its completion, the Taylor trial proceeded
smoothly. Today, despite the fact that each stage of his indictment, trial, and
conviction was marked by high legal and political drama, the Taylor case stands as
one of the better examples of a complex but successful trial of a former head of state
by a modem international criminal court. This underscores the wider significance
of the trial and makes it even more worthy of further inquiry by international
criminal lawyers.
25. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Cooperation of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir's Arrest and Surrender to the Court, Jj a-
c (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc I 759849.pdf.
26. See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 11 34-46 (Sept.
4, 1998), http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-23/trial-
judgements/en/980904.pdf; see also Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-23-A, Judgment, 49-
95 (Oct. 19, 2000), http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-23/appeals-
chamber-judgements/en/0 01 9.pdf.
27. Press Release, Statement by the ICTY Prosecutor, The Hague (Mar. 11, 2006).
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The successful completion of the Taylor case is in many ways a credit to a range
of actors, who acted locally and globally: from the SCSL itself to the government
and people of Sierra Leone, and from foreign governments such as the United States
to the United Nations and local African and international civil society. The latter
became the champion of the victims of the Sierra Leone conflict, refusing to stand
by and let the Taylor trial be bargained away for reasons of political expediency, a
possibility that seemed real when he was offered asylum in Nigeria with the
blessings of African leaders and powerful western states in return for his resignation
from the presidency of Liberia.28 His trial is a testament to the potentially valuable
role that international criminal tribunals can make to the enhancement of regional
and global security, especially in the aftermath of horrific conflict and mass atrocity.
The article opens with a brief background into the origins and rise of Charles
Taylor in Part 11. Part III then discusses how Taylor got enmeshed in the Sierra
Leone conflict. This later led to his downfall, including his indictment, arrest, and
prosecution by the SCSL for the commission of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as
discussed in Parts IV, V and and VI. In Part VII, I conclude by summarizing my
key arguments and step back and reflect on the wider implications of his case for the
SCSL and international criminal justice more generally.
II. THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF CHARLES TAYLOR
Although he had briefly held a position as a senior government bureaucrat in
Liberia, hardly anyone outside Taylor's home country knew of him before 1989. He
was virtually unknown among the public in Sierra Leone. Yet, in the span of a few
years, his name was to be etched into the consciousness of all Sierra Leoneans as the
rebel leader from neighboring Liberia who threatened that "Sierra Leone would taste
the bitterness of war."29 In making good on that threat, he subsequently helped to
bring a vicious war to Sierra Leone. To Liberians, he moved from being a somewhat
known politically ambitious figure in exile to either a loved or hated rebel leader,
and eventually, democratically elected president.
Born in the small town of Arthington, Montserrado County, in northwestern
Liberia on January 28, 1948, Taylor by his own account came from a modest
background.30 He hailed from a large family, the third of eleven children, born to a
mother who was a former girl servant and a father who was a Baptist school
28. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 119.
29. See id. [ 2335 (Although Taylor denied making this infamous statement during his trial, the
Trial Chamber found otherwise. That this phrase, which is recalled by many Sierra Leoneans, captured
the national imagination is proved by the fact that it is usually repeated either verbatim or in essentially
the same formulation).
30. Id. 113.
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teacher.3 He began his early career following in the footsteps of his father as a
teacher.32 However, he quickly moved on to become an accountant.
33
He then pursued tertiary training at two small private colleges in Massachusetts,
United States, where he received an associate degree in accounting in 1974 and a
bachelor's degree in economics in 1976. 34 In the eight years between his arrival in
the United States in 1972 and his return to Liberia in 1980, Taylor and several of his
Liberian compatriots founded the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas
("ULAA").35 The apparent goal of the ULAA, which exists to this day, was to help
bring about peaceful and democratic change in Liberia.
36
Taylor's foray into helping create the ULAA while studying in the United
States appears to mark the beginning of his planned involvement with Liberian
politics. He assumed the ULAA chairmanship in 1979. 37 In that capacity, and at
the invitation of the government of President William Tolbert, he returned to Liberia
in January 1980.38 His arrival coincided with the successful coup d'6tat by Master
Sergeant Samuel Kanyon Doe just four months later. 39 Taylor joined the Doe
government as a Director General of the General Services Administration and
Deputy Minister of Commerce.
40
About three years later, he abandoned that junior cabinet position after the Doe
regime charged him with embezzlement. 4' He fled to the United States where he
was arrested in June 1984, following an extradition request by Liberian authorities. 42
He was held, pending return to his native country, until November 1985, when he
allegedly escaped from prison and returned to West Africa. 43 Taylor's version of
that account is that he was released from the Plymouth County House of Correction
by American officials. 44 They looked the other way while he left the country, via
Mexico, a story that initially appeared to be corroborated by documents obtained
under a freedom of information request by The Boston Globe newspaper but that
now seems to have been disavowed by the reporter who broke the story. 45 In any
31. Id.; Transcript of Record at 24357-59, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Trial (July 14,
2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Record-July 14, 2009], available at
http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/Charles Taylor/2009-07-14/21666.
32. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1J 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. 5.
36. Id. The ULAA website can be found here: http://ulaalib.org/.
37. Id.
38. See id. 1 6; Transcript of Record-July 14, 2009, supra note 31, at 24384-85.
39. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 6.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, Jill 6-7.
44. Transcript of Record at 24517-20, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T, Trial (July 15, 2009)
[hereinafter Transcript of Record-July 15, 2009], available at
http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/CharlesTaylor/2009-07-15.
45. Bryan Bender, Former Liberian Dictator Charles Taylor had US Spy Agency Ties, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/01/17/mass-escapee-tumed-liberian-
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event, it seems plausible that it was with the blessings of the U.S. government, which
was embarrassed by reports of corruption in Liberia and the Doe government's
flagrant violations of human rights, that he returned to West Africa to effect a regime
change.
46
Be that as it may, after leaving the United States, Taylor and several others
founded the National Patriotic Front of Liberia ("NPFL") in C6te d'lvoire. 47 The
NPFL took advantage of the mounting disaffection with the Doe dictatorship and
the Liberian government's ruthless crushing of the coup by Thomas Quiwonkpa to
attract many dissident fighters to its cause.48 The NPFL operatives subsequently
took up military training in Libya in 1987. 49 They thereafter returned to the sub-
region via Burkina Faso.5" With the launch of a military attack from the Ivorian side
of the border into the town of Butoa in Liberia on December 24, 1989, Taylor and
approximately one hundred "special forces," set off a civil war that would eventually
engulf Liberia and several countries in the Mano River basin of West Africa,
including Sierra Leone, Guinea, and C6te d'lvoire itself, which had served as the
launching pad for the initial NPFL incursion into Liberia. 51
Within a few months, Taylor and his fighters marched from the Liberia-C6te
d'Ivoire border to the capital Monrovia, recruiting many anti-Doe activists to the
NPFL.5  However, it was a splinter group, the Independent National Patriotic Front
of Liberia led by Prince Johnson, not the NPFL, which eventually caught and
savagely tortured and murdered Doe in early 1990.11 In the meantime, in the regions
of the country that the NPFL forces captured, Taylor and his followers established
the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly government.5 4 He served as head
of that government until 1996, when the first Liberian civil war ended with the
conclusion of the Abuja Accord in 1996, and democratic elections were
subsequently held. Taylor, running as the National Patriotic Party candidate in
July 1997, won the presidential elections reportedly with 75% of the vote and two-
thirds of the seats in the legislature. 56 The official vote count was never formally
released.
5 7
But Taylor's apparent electoral triumph and assumption of power in August
1997 did not restore peace to Liberia. Partly because of his policies, including his
failure to smoothly transition from rebel in the bush to chief of state occupying the
dictator-had-spy-agency-ties/DGBhSfjxPVrtoo4WT95bBl/story.html.
46. See Transcript of Record-July 15, 2009, supra note 44, at 24517-23.
47. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1117, 22.
48. LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 152.
49. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1I 7.
50. Transcript of Record at 24592-93, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01 -T, Trial (July 16, 2009),
available at http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/Charles Taylor/2009-07-16.
51. Id. at 24603-08.
52. LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 158.
53. Id. at 158.
54. Id. at 157.
55. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 118.
56. LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 164.
57. Id.
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presidential Executive Mansion, Liberia foundered.58 According to the Liberian
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the reality of his election as head of state did
not dawn early enough on Taylor for him to succeed.59 He carried on the usual
"antics" of a "warlord," adopting disastrous policies that antagonized key domestic,
regional and international constituencies.6" His "authoritarian" rule was marked by
"poor governance, administrative malfeasances, corruption, intimidation and
intolerance of opposition, threats, torture, terroristic acts," and routine extrajudicial
and summary executions.61 This would later give rise to Liberia's second war. The
conflict only ended after Taylor was forced to step aside, largely due to
developments in neighboring Sierra Leone.
III. THE FALL OF CHARLES TAYLOR
A. Sankoh, Taylor, and the Origins of the Sierra Leone Civil War
Ironically, Taylor did not fall from grace because of his war making in his
native Liberia. Instead, it was his meddling in Sierra Leonean affairs that ultimately
led to his downfall. That involvement originated from his association with RUF
Leader, Sankoh, whom he met in Libya. They agreed to help each other's projects
to take over Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively.62 Indeed, according to the Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, when Taylor's forces first invaded
Liberia in December 1989, the NPFL included many Sierra Leonean fighters in its
ranks.63 Sankoh, who was one of them, was a key commando. 6 He helped plan and
carry out attacks against strategic Liberian government military positions.6 ' He thus
put his Libyan guerilla training to use in anticipation of his war in Sierra Leone.66
He would bank on Taylor to return the favor just a few years later, and as a part of
this, shared with the NPFL a captured Armed Forces of Liberia military camp, Camp
Naama, to train around three hundred RUF fighters known as Vanguards.67 The
Vanguards later played a pivotal role in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Sam Bockarie,
Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, and Augustine Gbao were Vanguards, all of whom-
along with Sankoh and Taylor-were later charged by the SCSL. 6 8
58. Id. at 164.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 167.
62. 3A WITNESS TO TRUTH: REP. OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM'N
97 (2004) [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT].
63. Id. at 94-95.
64. Id. at 100.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 101.
67. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3; SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 101-02.
68. See The Prosecutor vs. Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/RUF.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
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Similarly, on March 23, 1991, a group of between forty and sixty fighters
attacked the remote village of Bomaru in the Kailahun District in eastern Sierra
Leone near the Liberian border. The bulk of the attackers were drawn from the
NPFL.69 Indeed, it was apparently a matter of frustration for Sankoh that, even after
grandly claiming responsibility for the Bomaru attack on the BBC Radio as the first
salvo of the RUF, which at that point had issued an ultimatum to then-Sierra Leonean
President, Joseph S. Momoh, to leave power or face a revolt, the government in
Freetown attributed responsibility for the invasion solely to Taylor and the NPFL. 7 0
The Momoh government, which had permitted the Economic Community of West
African States ("ECOWAS") fighter jets to bomb NPFL positions in Liberia from
the Lungi International Airport near Freetown, the Sierra Leonean capital, ignored
the RUF for a long time before it formally recognized it as an independent force to
reckon with.7
To the Momoh government, the RUF was in effect the Sierra Leonean wing of
the NPFL.72 In retrospect, with the subsequent findings of the SCSL in its judgments
and the work of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian truth commissions, this might have
been an exaggeration. Nevertheless, throughout much of the Sierra Leone war,
Taylor and Sankoh rebels collaborated even if they had different agendas. For
Taylor, the military and political alliance with the RUF helped to not only achieve
tactical objectives such as fighting common enemies in Sierra Leone, including
dissident Liberian groups such as ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K that had organized
against him with the Momoh government's help,73 but it also enabled him to exploit
the country's diamonds for private accumulation.74 The RUF, which often captured
territory and mined diamonds with forced civilian labor, exchanged its precious
stones for arms primarily through Monrovia.75 Liberia, which was not a country
particularly well-known for diamonds, saw a remarkable increase in its official
diamond exports.76 Those exports might have since suffered a dramatic drop. In its
69. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, 1 112, 120-21; Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note
3, 1 2378 (concluding the "[t]he evidence unequivocally establishes that NPFL soldiers constituted the
large majority of the invasion force on Sierra Leone").
70. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1j 27.
71. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, 1140; see id. 1113. This seems to have justified,
in Taylor's mind, retaliation against Sierra Leone in addition to the fact that the government supported
and armed Liberian dissidents to form groups to fight against the NPFL. Id. 41,45.
72. See MICHAEL S. KARGBO, BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE,
1991-2001, 20-21 (Peter Lang AG, Int'l Academic Publishers eds., 2006).
73. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1130-31, 33-34.
74. See JANNA LIPMAN, CHARLES TAYLOR'S CRIMINAL NETWORK: EXPLOITING DIAMONDS AND
CHILDREN, 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, (Louise Shelley ed., 2009), available at
http://traccc.gmu.edu/pdfs/student research/Lipman PUBP 710 TOCTaylor/o27sDiamonds and C
hildrenFINAL.pdf. See generally Iryna Marchuk, Confronting Blood Diamonds in Sierra Leone: The
Trial of Charles Taylor, 4 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 87, 87-89 (2009).
75. See IAN SMILLIE ET AL., THE HEART OF THE MATTER- SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN
SECURITY 6, 47 (Partnership Africa Canada ed., 2000). See generally U.N. S.C., Report of the Panel of
Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306, Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra
Leone, U.N. DOC. S/2000/1195 (Dec. 20, 2000).
76. SMILLIE, supra note 75, at 48. See also 3 Mersie Ejigu, Post Conflict Liberia: Environmental
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heyday, much of the profits from the lucrative diamond trade allegedly went to
Taylor. 77 By the time he became president, he extended his influence into several
areas of the Liberian private sector including exploitation of natural resources, such
as timber.78 By the end of the 1990s, Monrovia had become a haven for many other
illicit activities involving drug, gun, and diamond runners using the capital as their
home base.
79
During the early part of the Sierra Leone conflict, until the Liberian fighters
and the Sierra Leonean rebels fell out and turned on each other sometimes because
of sharp disagreements on the means and methods of warfare, the NPFL forces
reportedly carried out much of the atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone.8"
Indeed, it is estimated that up to 1,600 of the 2,000 fighters comprising the initial
invasion force from Liberia were NPFL rebels.8' Together with their RUF
collaborators and a smaller cadre of combatants from Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast,
and Gambia, they used tactics of terror and not only murdered and raped, but also
amputated civilians, including babies as young as six months old.82 With Taylor's
human, material, and other logistical support, and the successive Sierra Leonean
government's inept handling of the war, the rebels quickly captured much territory
in the two war fronts that they had opened in eastern and southern Sierra Leone.83
Soon, although their fortunes changed sometimes, the RUF had the upper hand.
The NPFL and RUF fighters also burned villages and looted property.8 4 The
catalogue of their hair-raising horrors included alleged acts of cannibalism,
decapitation of civilians, forced enlistment and drugging of children to fight, the use
Security as a Strategy for Sustainable Peace and Development, FESS WORKING PAPERS (2006),
available at http://www.fess-global.org/WorkingPapers/post conflict_liberia.pdf. See generally Report
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C. M.P. from David Pratt, M.P.,
Nepean-Carleton, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis (Apr. 23, 1999).
77. SMILLIE, supra note 75, at 48.
78. GLOBAL WITNESS, TIMBER, TAYLOR, SOLDIER, SPY: How LIBERIA'S UNCONTROLLED
RESOURCE EXPLOITATION, CHARLES TAYLOR'S MANIPULATION AND THE RE-RECRUITMENT OF Ex-
COMBATANTS ARE THREATENING REGIONAL PEACE 6, 12 (June 2005) (submitted to the U.N. Security
Council), available at https://globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/TimberTaylorSoldierSpy.pdf.
79. Abdul Tejan-Cole, A Big Man in a Small Cell: Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, in PROSECUTING HEADS OF STATE 205, 209 ( Ellen L. Lutz & Caitlin Reiger eds., 2009).
80. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, 11 239-42. See also Taylor Trial Judgment, supra
note 3, 1 32.
8 1. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 120.
82. Catherine E. Bolten, The Memories They Want. Autobiography in the Chaos of Sierra Leone,
44 ETHNOLOGIE FRANCAISE 429, 430 (2014), available at http://kroc.nd.edu/sites/default/files/EF-
published%20article.pdf.
83. See Chronology of Sierra Leone: How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL,
Apr. 1998, available at http://www.africa-confidential.com/special-
reportl/id/4/Chronologyof Sierra Leone.
84. Jamie O'Connell, Here Interest Meets Humanity: How to End the War and Support
Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207,
213 (2004).
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of human entrails at check points, and the slitting open of pregnant women to settle
bets on the sex of the fetus. 85
By the time the Sierra Leone conflict was formally declared over in January
2002, it was estimated that approximately 75,000 people had been killed, thousands
more victimized, and hundreds of thousands more displaced.86 Even the belated
comer to the Sierra Leone conflict, the U.N. Security Council, passed a Chapter VII
resolution deploring Liberia's active support of the RUF war.87 It determined that
Taylor's assistance to the RUF constituted a threat to international peace and
security and thereafter imposed sanctions on Liberia.
88
Following two successive coups in Freetown, first by the National Provisional
Ruling Council ("NPRC") in April 1992 under Captain Valentine Strasser, and later
by Lt.-Colonel Julius Maada Bio in 1996, a transitional democratic election was held
in Sierra Leone.89 The RUF was invited to participate but declined, preferring
instead to continue the war and to punish civilians through a savage amputation
campaign dubbed "Operation Stop Election."9 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, a retired
Sierra Leonean bureaucrat from the United Nations who contested as the Sierra
Leone People's Party candidate, won.9' His main campaign promise was to end the
war, 92 music to the ears of the war weary population.
Kabbah immediately set about negotiations with the RUF. With the facilitation
of the Ivorian government, which played host to the first serious ceasefire talks
between the government and the rebels, he concluded the Abidjan Accord on
November 30, 1996. 93 The agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, granted
status of political movement to the RUF and its members and a limited amnesty
against prosecutions as well as foreshadowed the need for a national unity and
reconciliation commission.94 But even though some felt that this would mark the
85. Seeid at214.
86. J. Andrew Grant, Salone's Sorrow: The Ominous Legacy of Diamonds in Sierra Leone, in
RESOURCE POLITICS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 251, 252 (Matthias Basedau & Andreas Mehler eds.,
2005). Statistics are hard to come by, and of what there is, there is conflicting information. A leading
American human rights NGO has estimated the total number of deaths at 50,000 while the number of
displaced was put at I million. See Human Rights Watch, Sierra Leone-Getting Away with Murder,
Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone, HRW Report, July 1999. A U.N. Report estimated
70,000. See also MARY KALDOR & JAMES VINCENT, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM EVALUATION OFFICE, CASE
STUDY: SIERRA LEONE: EVALUATION OF UNDP ASSISTANCE TO CONFLICT-AFFECTED COUNTRIES
(2006). 1 opted for the 70,000 figure in the U.N. report in Charles C. Jalloh, Assessing the Legacy of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT
FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5, 1-19 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014).
87. S.C. Res. 1343, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (Mar. 7, 2001).
88. Id. paras. 5-6.
89. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, J 31, 39-40.
90. Id. 39.
91. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, at 40; see March 1996, SIERRA LEONE NEWS,
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews0396.html (last visited Mar. 1,2015).
92. See Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 40; see also March 1996, supra note 91.
93. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 40.
94. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, R.U.F.-S.L., art. 1, 13-14, Nov. 30, 1996, available at
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end of the war, that accord proved to be a ploy for Sankoh to regroup and rearm his
men who were, at the time, close to military defeat with the help of South African
mercenaries-as President Kabbah lamented much later. 95 The agreement collapsed
shortly thereafter. 96 The civil war resumed.
B. The AFRC Coup and the End of the Sierra Leone War
In the meantime, widespread dissatisfaction in Sierra Leone Army ("SLA")
ranks grew to a boiling point. President Kabbah had continued the prior NPRC
government establishment of local militias to provide security at the communal
level.97 This was prompted by doubts about the loyalty of some SLA forces, a
phenomenon that caused locals to label them sobels: soldiers by day, rebels by
night.98 The creation of a parallel militia implied a lack of trust in the army.
Consequently, on May 25, 1997, a group of mutineers overthrew the Kabbah
Government.99 A few days later, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
("AFRC") assumed power in Sierra Leone and invited the RUF to form a coalition
government.' 00 Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who was sprung from a notorious
national maximum-security prison where he was incarcerated, became president. 0"
Kabbah escaped to neighboring Guinea, where he set up a government in exile in
Conakry. 10 2  From there, he directed his deputy defense minister, Sam Hinga
Norman, to consolidate the different traditional hunters from various tribal groups
in Sierra Leone to form a civil defense militia. 103 Theirjob was to continue the fight
against the AFRC/RUF and to restore his government to power.' 
04
But the international community refused to recognize the illegal AFRC/RUF
regime. As part of this, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone in
October 1997."05 ECOWAS negotiated a six-month peace plan, aimed at the early
return of constitutional governance to Sierra Leone, which collapsed nearly
immediately.0 6 In early February 1998, working with the CDF militia, ECOMOG
http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.
95. H.E. ALHAJ AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH, Two DECADES OF CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY IN
SIERRA LEONE: A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 3 (Institute for Security Studies ed., 2012), available at
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep201212Apr.pdf.
96. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 40.
97. Id. 142.
98. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 198.
99. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 1 42.
100. Id. 142-43.
101. 2 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SIERRA LEONE: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER, MUTILATION,
RAPE, NEW TESTIMONY FROM SIERRA LEONE 3(A), I1 (1999) [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE: GETTING
AWAY WITH MURDER (1999)], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99-
02.htm#Pl42_28430.
102. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 248.
103. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 42; SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 248.
104. SIERRA LEONE: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (1999), supra note 101.
105. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 44.
106. JULIUS MUTWOL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: INSURGENT
MOTIVATIONS, STATE RESPONSES, AND THIRD PARTY PEACEMAKING IN LIBERIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA
LEONE 252-53 (Cambria Press ed., 2009).
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forces expelled the junta from Freetown, 1°7 and on March 10, 1998, Kabbah was
reinstated. °8 The fighting continued. However, due to several peace initiatives and
the government's two-track political and military strategy to ending the war, peace
talks resumed in Togo in May 1999.9 A comprehensive peace agreement was
negotiated after several weeks. " 0 President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh signed it at
Lom6, Togo on July 7, 1999 ("Lomd Accord"), and although aspects of it discussed
further below proved to be controversial, it did provide a basic foundation for the
final end of the war.I I
The Lom Accord obliged the parties to an immediate ceasefire, provided for
the transformation of the RUF into a political party, and required the demobilization
of combatants." 2 There were also power-sharing provisions, including four senior
cabinet and fourjunior cabinet posts for the RUF, with Sankoh receiving the putative
position of vice president and chairman of the country's mineral resources
commission and others in the rebel organization appointed to the remaining
positions." 3  In lieu of prosecutions, the Lom6 Accord also mandated the
establishment of a truth commission for victims and perpetrators of human rights
violations to tell their stories.' " In probably the most derided provision, which
expanded the scope of a similar clause that first surfaced in the Abidjan Accord, the
agreement also granted a blanket amnesty to Sankoh personally and all other
combatants and their collaborators." 5  They were promised immunity from
prosecution for all their depraved actions throughout the war." 6 If this was the bitter
pill that had to be swallowed for the sake of peace, so be it, the Kabbah government's
logic went. It was a decision that, even after parts of the Lom6 Accord collapsed, the
president and his supporters continued to defend as necessary at the time. The
United Nations and several African and powerful Western States, including the
United States, endorsed the agreement.II
But, in a move that surprised participants, a last minute caveat was hastily
entered during the signing of the agreement by Ambassador Francis G. Okelo, the
U.N. special representative, at the talks. The United Nations, which was road testing
a new policy on amnesties, declared its understanding that no amnesty would apply
in respect of any international crimes committed during the conflict."' That
107. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 148.
108. Id.
109. SIERRA LEONE: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER (1999), supra note 101.
110. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, R.U.F.-S.L., July 7, 1999, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/lomeaccord.html [hereinafter Lomd Peace Agreement].
Ill. id.
112. Id. arts. 1, 111, XV, XVI.
113. Id. art. V.
114. Id. art. VI.
115. Idart. IX.
116. Id.
117. Id. at Annex 1.
118. U.N. S.C., Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, para. 22, U.N. Doc. S/200/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). Many have described this statement as a
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decision, which effectively limited the amnesty to the domestic crimes committed
under Sierra Leonean law, would later prove to have been an important one. It
provided the foundation for the legal conclusion by the SCSL Appeals Chamber that
none of the accused persons before the tribunal in Freetown were entitled to any
form of immunity from prosecution because a State, such as Sierra Leone, could not
bring "into oblivion and forgetfulness a crime, such as a crime against international
law, which other States are entitled to keep alive and remember." 119
In May 2000, a renegade faction of the RUF operating in northern Sierra Leone
disarmed and held hostage around five hundred U.N. peacekeepers. 120 Several of
the peacekeepers were murdered.121 This angered many Sierra Leoneans, including
the Kabbah government, which saw it as a repudiation of core aspects of the Lom&
Accord. 12 2 Some civil society organizations and parliamentarians came together and
organized the largest rally in the country's history with over 100,000 participants. 1
2 3
They marched to Sankoh's residence to say enough was enough. 124 Everyone was
sick of the malevolent behavior of the RUF. In the chaos that followed after the
demonstrators arrived at Sankoh's house, in the posh West End of Freetown, some
shots were fired into the crowd, seemingly by the rebel leader's security detail. 125
Twenty-two unarmed protesters were killed while fifteen were wounded.
126
Government forces placed Sankoh under arrest.127 He was subsequently detained at
an undisclosed location.
C. The Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
With the combination of pressure for criminal prosecutions, coming from
human rights groups within and outside Sierra Leone, a fed-up Kabbah wrote a letter
to the United Nations in June 2000 requesting international help to establish an
independent special court to try the "RUF leadership" and their "accomplices" and
"reservation." But that may not be an accurate description as that term is understood in treaty law. The
United Nations was not a party to the treaty and was instead a witness and moral guarantor to it. See id.
23-34.
119. Prosecutor v. Kallon, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, 67, 88 (Mar. 13, 2004). The Appeals Chamber position was
reiterated, inter alia, in Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. 14-AR72, Decision on Lack of
Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lom6 Accord (May 25, 2004). For thoughtful
commentary on the implications of these decisions, see Leila N. Sadat, The Lom Amnesty Decision of
the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT
FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 311-24 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014).
120. Taylor Trial Judgment, supra note 3, 67.
121. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 358.
122. See Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Pres. His Excellency the President's Address to the Opening of the
Fourth Session of the First Parliament of the Second Republic of Sierra Leone (June 16, 2000), available
at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Speeches/kabbah-061600.html.
123. SIERRA LEONE TRC REPORT, supra note 62, at 412.
124. Id.
125. Id. at435,437.
126. Id. at 435-36.
127. Id. at 444-46.
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"collaborators."' 128 The U.N. Security Council acceded to the request., 29 It thus
adopted Resolution 1593 asking the Secretary-General to negotiate a treaty with the
government of Sierra Leone to establish an independent tribunal to prosecute those
most responsible for the atrocities.' 
30
Following relatively smooth negotiations compared to the Cambodia Tribunal,
in January 2002,131 the United Nations and Sierra Leone signed the first bilateral
penal treaty' 32 between the United Nations and one of its member states to establish
an ad hoc tribunal. This treaty created a special court to prosecute those bearing
greatest responsibility for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, specified in Articles 2 to 4 of the
Statute of the SCSL, and several offenses under Sierra Leonean law relating to abuse
of children and arson mentioned in Article 5.33 The Secretary-General described it
as a sui generis court with a mixed jurisdiction and composition.'34 The tribunal,
which was the first modem one to be based in the country where the crimes were
committed since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, was to be funded by donations,
last for three years, and began operations towards the end of 2002.135 It would go
on to prosecute several individuals, from the RUF, AFRC, and CDF warring factions
and, at the height of its operations, had two trial chambers and an appeals chamber
hearing several joint trials. 136 In a symbolic act, which seemed to advertently or
128. Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the U.N., Letter dated June 12, 2000 from the
Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786, Annex (Aug. 10, 2000).
129. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
130. Id. atJill 1,3.
131. Compare Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, ICRC (Jan. 16, 2002),
https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/605?OpenDocument, with Enemies of the People: Interview: David
Scheffer of Cambodia Tribunal; Monitor, PBS (July 12, 2011), available at
http://www.pbs.org/pov/enemies/khmer rouge tribunal update.php#.
132. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone,-on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter U.N. &
Sierra Leone Agreement]; see also Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
133. U.N. & Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 132, arts. 2-5.
134. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court
for Sierra Leone, 19, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
135. See The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Its History and Jurisprudence, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE: RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
For more on the jurisdiction of the SCSL, see generally Charles C. Jalloh, Special Courtfor Sierra Leone:
Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 395 (2011). Discussion of the SCSL's deeply problematic
"greatest responsibility" personal jurisdiction can bc found in Charles C. Jalloh, Prosecuting Those
Bearing "Greatest Responsibility ": The Lessons of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 96 MARQ. L. REV.
863 (2013). As to the fascinating issues including the U.S. foreign policy stances that affected the
ultimate form the SCSL would take, see David J. Scheffer, ALL THE MISSING SOULS: A PERSONAL
HISTORY OF THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 296 (2012). For a wide comprehensive study of the tribunal's
legacy after completion of its work, see generally Charles C. Jalloh, ed., THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL
COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIM INAL LAW (2014).
136. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND RULES 516 (Goran Sluiteret al. eds.,
2013).
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inadvertently underscore the importance of his trial, Taylor was the only accused
person that the SCSL tried alone. 13
7
IV. THE CONTROVERSIAL INDICTMENT AND ARREST OF CHARLES TAYLOR
A. SCSL Indicts Charles Taylor; Nigeria Offers Safe Haven
On March 7, 2003, at the SCSL prosecution's request, Judge Bankole
Thompson approved a seventeen count indictment against Taylor.138 The indictment
was accompanied by an arrest warrant and request for the suspect's arrest and
transfer. 3 9 The documents were placed under seal. On June 12, 2003, the chamber
formally granted a request unsealing them.14
0
The first indictment against Taylor charged him with individual criminal
responsibility pursuant to Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the SCSL Statute. 141 Under
Article 6(1), the prosecution alleged that Taylor, by his acts or omissions, planned,
instigated, ordered, committed, aided and abetted, or otherwise participated with
Sankoh in a common plan involving the crimes charged in eighteen counts. 142 In
addition to, or in the alternative, pursuant to Article 6(3), the prosecution claimed
that Taylor was criminally responsible as a superior for the crimes alleged in the
indictments. 143 The prosecution averred that he knew, or had reason to know, that
his subordinates in the RUF and the AFRC/RUF coalition were about to carry out
the crimes, or had done so, but that he failed to take the necessary measures to
prevent the acts or to punish the perpetrators.144
Taylor's indictment was amended twice, first on March 16, 2006, and again on
May 29, 2007.14 The final version on which he was tried contained a total of three
international crimes and eleven counts. 46 In five counts he was charged with crimes
137. Id.
138. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 1 32-59 (Mar. 7, 2003),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/003/SCSC-03-0l-1-001.pdf; Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-Disclosure (Mar. 7,
2003), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/003/SCSL-03-01-1-003.pdf.
139. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Order for the Disclosure of the Indictment,
the Warrant of Arrest and Order for Transfer and Detention and the Decision Approving the Indictment
and Order for Non-Disclosure (June 12, 2003),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/006/SCSL-03-0 1 -l-006.pdf.
140. Id.
141. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 6(1), (3).
142. Id. art. 6(l); Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 26.
143. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 6(3); Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 27.
144. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment, 27.
145. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Prosecution's Application to
Amend Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment (Mar. 16, 2006),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/074/SCSL-03-0I-l-74.pdf, Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment
(May 25, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/255/SCSL-03-01 -PT-255.pdf.
146. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment
(May 29, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/255/SCSL-03-01-PT-263.pdf.
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against humanity, punishable under Article 2 of the SCSL Statute, namely: murder
(Count 2); rape (Count 4); sexual slavery (Count 5); other inhumane acts (Count 8);
and enslavement (Count 10). 14 7  Five other counts charged what are typically
referred to as war crimes, or in more technical jargon, violations of Common Article
3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, which are punishable under
Article 3 of the SCSL Statute, 148 namely: acts of terrorism (Count 1); violence to
life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder (Count
3); outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6); violence to life, health and physical or
mental well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment (Count 7); and pillage
(Count 11). 14' Finally, the last count alleged his commission of other serious
violations of international humanitarian law, punishable under Article 4 of the
SCSL Statute, and in particular, conscripting or enlisting children under the age of
fifteen years into armed forces or groups or using them to participate actively in
hostilities (Count 9).15 None of the charged crimes involved any of the Sierra
Leonean offenses in Article 5 of the SCSL Statute.1
5 1
In terms of geographic and temporal scope, the prosecution alleged that the
crimes underlying the counts were committed between the beginning of the temporal
jurisdiction of the SCSL on November 30, 1996 and the end of the Sierra Leone
conflict on January 18, 2002.152 Yet, during the trial, the prosecution presented
much evidence that dated back to the period just before the beginning of the war in
March 1991. That material was not generally used when determining his individual
responsibility. The locations pleaded in the Indictment covered five of Sierra
Leone's largest districts from north to south and east to west, namely: Bombali,
Kailahun, Kenema, Kono, Port Loko districts, the Western Area, as well as the
capital Freetown.' 53
147. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 2; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on
Prosecution's Application to Amend Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case
No. SCSL-2003-01 -1, Decision on Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
148. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Protocol 11 Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, art. 3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 3.
149. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Prosecution's Application to Amend
Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on
Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
150. SCSL Statute, supra note 132, art. 4; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1. Decision on
Prosecution's Application to Amend Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case
No. SCSL-2003-01 -I, Decision on Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
151. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Prosecution's Application to Amend
Indictment and on Approval of Amended Indictment; Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01 -1, Decision on
Prosecution Motion Requesting Leave to Amend Indictment.
152. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment
(May 29, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/255/SCSL-03-01 -PT-263.pdf.
153. Id.
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B. The Question of Peace for Liberia versus Justice in Sierra Leone
Taylor's indictment was first made public by the SCSL prosecution on June 4,
2003.154 He had travelled to Accra, Ghana to attend peace talks that had been
convened in the hope of ending the brutal civil war prevailing in Liberia at the
time. 155 The SCSL prosecutor, David Crane, arranged for the indictment to be hand-
delivered to the Ghanaian High Commission in Freetown as well as transmitted
directly to the Foreign Ministry in Accra.' 56 Crane requested the Ghanaian
authorities to arrest Taylor and transfer him into the custody of the SCSL. 5 7 He also
issued a press release announcing the indictment.' 58
The publication of the Taylor indictment was a big surprise to Ghana, host of
the Liberian peace talks, as well as to the Government of Sierra Leone which had a
last minute warning of it when Crane gave a courtesy telephone call to the acting
president, Vice-President Solomon Berewa, who warned him that "it would be a
matter of indiscretion to serve the indictment on Charles Tylor at that summit
meeting, and such action would create huge embarrassment for President Kabbah
[who was attending the Accra meeting] and confusion in the entire meeting."'59 It
was considered a public embarrassment for the Ghanaian and other ECOWAS
governments which were not aware of it in advance. President John Kufour of
Ghana, the chair, felt betrayed by his international community partners for springing
a surprise on his government when negotiations had made great progress-
something that might have angered him even more given Berewa's disclosure that
"finding an exit strategy for Charles Taylor to vacate the Presidency of Liberia" was
even on the summit agenda. 6 Those delicate negotiations, which were taking place
154. Clarence Roy-Macaulay, Sierra Leone Court Indicts Liberia Leader, GUARDIAN (June 4,
2003), available at https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/163/29115.html (quoting
Prosecutor David Crane).
155. Abdoulaye W. Dukuld, West Africa: Taylor at Accra Peace Talks: "'Honourable Exit or
Extended Mandate?, " ALLAFRICA (June 4, 2003), http://allafrica.com/stories/200306040021.html.
156. James L. Miglin, From Immunity to Impunity: Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, 16 DALHOUSIE J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 26 (2007).
157. See Davan Maharaji, Liberian President is Sought on War Crimes Indictment, L.A. TIMES, June
5, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jun/05/world/fg-indict5.
158. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone the Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of David
M. Crane Chief Prosecutor (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter Press Release of David M. Crane's Statement],
available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-060503.pdf. See also Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01 -1, Order for the Disclosure of the Indictment, the Warrant of Arrest and
Order for Transfer and Detention and the Decision Approving the Indictment and Order for Non-
Disclosure (June 12, 2003), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/006/SCSL-03-01-1-
006.pdf.
159. SOLOMON E. BEREWA, A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNANCE LEADERSHIP, CONFLICT AND
NATIONAL BUILDING IN SIERRA LEONE 181 (2011); PRISCILLA HAYNER, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN
LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE 8 (2007), available at
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Liberia-Negotiating-Peace-2007-English 0.pdf; Kathy
Ward, Might vs. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone Special Court, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 8
(2003).
160. BEREWA, supra note 159, at 182; Lansana Gberie, Jarlawah Tonpoh, Efam Dovi & Osei
Boateng, Charles Taylor: Why Me?, NEW AFRICAN MAGAZINE, May 2006, 4-5; Transcript of Record at
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as serious fighting occurred on the outskirts of Monrovia between Taylor forces and
other factions, were considered by many states as the best hope for the restoration
of peace to war torn Liberia.161
Not surprisingly, except perhaps to Crane, who seemingly made a calculated
decision to leak the indictment apparently even before securing a judicial order to
that effect, President Kufour refused to act on the warrant. 62 Instead, after some
initial confusion as to whether they had even received an official copy of the
indictment let alone had time to study or act on it, he gave Taylor his presidential
aircraft to fly him home to Liberia.163 The Accra Ceasefire Agreement was signed
by the Liberian Government and two other factions on June 17, 2 00 3 .64 For various
reasons, including the military and political pressure on Taylor and perhaps even the
indictment, he agreed to resign from the Presidency of Liberia several months later
on August 11, 2003.165 He took up residence in Nigeria, believing that by agreeing
to exit the political scene under African Union and ECOWAS led political
arrangements, he would be spared ultimate prosecution at the SCSL. 1
66
The political fallout from the indictment was immediate. Some diplomats
condemned Crane's actions as ill-timed and nat've, a form of obstructionism that
could stand in the way of peace in Liberia where a humanitarian catastrophe was
taking place and where Taylor was still an influential player.'6 7 The other side of
the story, from the SCSL side, was that justice had to be served on behalf of the
people of Sierra Leone. Interestingly, similar arguments about tribunal prosecutors
jeopardizing the prospects for peace among warring parties were to be echoed many
years later in the Uganda and Darfur situations after the ICC's first prosecutor, Luis
Moreno-Ocampo, secured arrest warrants for elusive Lord's Resistance Army rebel
leader Joseph Kony and Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir. "6' Such claims have
since become integral features of the peace versus justice dilemma for international
criminal courts albeit on a different permutation typically focusing on the same
instead of two different countries. In any event, in each of the Uganda and Sudan
situations, but for the international warrants, the parties likely would have reached
agreement to end the bloodshed. That is how the argument is usually presented in a
curious counterfactual that is by its nature hard to debunk.
31505, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01 -T (Nov. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Transcript of Record-Nov.
10, 2009], available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/Taylor/I ONovember2009.pdf.
161. See HAYNER, supra note 159, at 8.
162. Id.
163. Miglin, supra note 156, at 26-27.
164. Permanent Rep. of Ghana to the United Nations, Letter dated June 18, 2003 from the Permanent
Rep. of Ghana to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/2003/657 (June 18, 2003).
165. The Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed just days later, on August 18, 2003,
bringing an end to Liberia's 15 year civil war. See LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 169.
166. Transcript of Record-Nov. 10, 2009, supra note 160, at 31529-30.
167. See HAYNER, supra note 159, at 9-10.
168. See Charles C. Jalloh, Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, 9 INT'L. CRIM. L. REV.
(2009) 445,489491 (discussing the criticisms of the ICC in the Uganda Situation).
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Taylor, for his part, apparently agreed to resign so that a final Liberia peace
agreement could be concluded. He also played an important role during the RUF-
Kabbah negotiations of the Lomd Accord in the summer of 1999. The record is
unclear as to whether he agreed to resign Liberia's presidency before he was indicted
in Sierra Leone or afterwards. If the former, which can be supported by Vice-
President Berewa's contention that the issue of Taylor's exit was already on the
ECOWAS heads of states' agenda, the concern about the effect of unveiling an
indictment on a prospective prosecution would obviously be higher. It may perhaps
suggest that a promise of non-prosecution was used as a carrot. On the other hand,
if he agreed after the indictment was unveiled, it could suggest that the stick of
prosecution could be used to hasten the departure of a recalcitrant leader who could
otherwise jeopardize the chances of long-term peace.
Whatever the case, as Taylor dilly-dallied from resigning in the wake of the
publication of his sealed indictment, thousands more were killed near Monrovia. 169
He was probably seeking to stay on until he could secure the guarantees he felt were
necessary to secure his position, which according to him, was a promise that he
would not be prosecuted by the SCSL. 7 ° He would later testify during his trial that
had he known he would be apprehended and sent to the tribunal in Freetown,
contrary to the political deal sanctioned by African and powerful Western States that
his indictment would become "moot," he would not have resigned from Liberia's
presidency.' 7 ' He would have fought to the end. Although we will never know if
this would have actually happened, taking Taylor's statement at face value raises
some valid concern whether future rebels might refuse to sign agreements to make
way for peace because of the Taylor precedent. If so, even though each conflict
situation will probably be different in its own way and will have to be assessed in
light of its specificities, the implications for short term peace may prove to be dire.
The reality is that a political settlement, amongst warring adversaries, is often the
only real option for a final termination of bloody rebel-led conflicts in which neither
side is positioned to claim clear military victory.
On the other hand, much like the ICC prosecutor would later respond to those
who advanced the peace-justice argument after indictments for persons in Uganda
and the Sudan, Crane retorted that he had both the legal and moral obligation to
follow evidence of international crimes falling within his jurisdiction.172 To him,
with the indictment in place, it was important that anyone negotiating with Taylor
know his status as an alleged war criminal. This was obviously calculated to weaken
Taylor's bargaining position and to perhaps even render his relevance to a final
political settlement nugatory. Furthermore, in another point that was later echoed
by the ICC prosecutor, the SCSL prosecutor insisted that he could only fulfill his
responsibilities if the international community showed the political will necessary
169. Mutuma Ruteere, Liberia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford Univ. Press ed.,
2009).
170. Charles C. Jalloh, Charles Taylor and the Delayed Special Court for Sierra Leone Judgment,
JURIST (Feb. 23, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/charles-jalloh-taylor-scsl.php.
171. Transcript of Record-Nov. 10, 2009, supra note 160, at 31503.
172. Press Release of David M. Crane's Statement, supra note 158.
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to carryout arrests requested by the tribunal rather than giving "weak excuses." 173
He therefore urged all supporters of the SCSL to not further disappoint the people
of Sierra Leone.' 7
4
Crane seemed well-meaning and within his mandate as a prosecutor. However,
in retrospect, it appears that he went about the revelation of the Taylor indictment in
a way that rubbed many key states, especially crucial African partners, the wrong
way. He might have miscalculated the full diplomatic implications and the political
backlash that the announcement of the indictment would entail. Maybe, like
Ocampo's move much later on against President Al Bashir at the ICC, Crane felt
that the political tide had turned against Taylor, making it easy to secure his arrest.
If that was so, this proved to be a wrong assessment.
With hindsight, a more cautious rather than messianic approach would have
likely yielded faster results to get the concerned African states behind the idea of
arresting Taylor. Many of those same countries were already sick of Taylor's wars.
These included Nigeria, the regional superpower, which had expended much
political and military resources in an attempt to restore peace first to Liberia and
then Sierra Leone.'75 Privately, if not publicly, many of them would probably have
welcomed the chance to help apprehend and turn him over to the SCSL to answer
international crimes charges. Whatever the case, it seems that the SCSL indictment
helped to fast-track Taylor's political demise. It apparently served as a credible
threat to the alternative of his continuing a war he was not equipped to win against
insurgents in Liberia. The ICC prosecutor could have learned from the SCSL's
initial mishandling of the Taylor arrest warrant regarding how to avoid antagonizing
the African Union member states ("AU states") that were more likely to help him
secure Al Bashir's arrest. 7 6 To date, nearly six years after Al Bashir's indictment,
AU states have decided that none of them would arrest him and thereby refused to
turn him over to the ICC. "I Even though there is a legal obligation to do so under
the Rome Statute and in light of the decisions of the judges on the point, the
unfortunate effect has been that-at least for now-Al Bashir can call the Court's
bluff. This seems to be an example of how the ICC prosecution is reinventing the
173. Id.
174. Id
175. See LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at xxiv.
176. The Liberian TRC Report has argued that Crane's indictment of Taylor had the effect of
excluding him from the peace negotiations. See LIBERIAN TRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 169.
177. AU Chief Condemns Bashir Warrants, ALJAZEERA (July 27, 2010),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/07/2010726423699861.html. For scholarly assessments of
the Africa-ICC tension, including a discussion of the Al Bashir arrest controversy from multiple
perspectives, see Regionalizing International Criminal Law?, supra note 168; Charles C. Jalloh,
Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? Assessing the African Union Perspective on Universal
Jurisdiction, 21 CRIM. L. FORUM. 1 (2010). See also Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council
Referrals to the ICC and the Impact on Al Bashir's Immunities, 7 J. OF INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 333-352 (2009);
Dire Tladi, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Battle for the Soul of
International Law 34 SOUTH AFRICAN YRBK OF INT'L. L. 57 (2009); Dire Tladi, Cooperation, Immunities
and Article 98 of the Rome Statute: Confronting the Complexities of Interpretation, 11 J. OF INT'L. CRIM.
JUST. 199 (2013).
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wheel rather than learning from the rich experiences of the ad hoc tribunals that
preceded it.
C. Nigeria Asylum Unravels, the Noose Tightens Around Taylor, and the
Dramatic Arrest
The immediate impact of Crane's attempt to cajole or shame Ghana into
arresting Taylor was to delay instead of hastening his arrest. It would take another
three years, much diplomatic and other advocacy efforts, as well as changed
circumstances in Liberia, West Africa, and in U.S. foreign policy under the Bush
Administration before Nigeria would eventually surrender Taylor to the SCSL at the
end of March 2006.178 To be sure, amongst Sierra Leonean civil society, especially
war victim groups, there was popular support for Taylor's arrest. Similarly, in
Nigeria, Taylor's stay at a government-furnished mansion in the southern city of
Calabar became controversial, especially after a case was initiated in the local High
Court by two Nigerian businessmen who had been amputated by RUF forces in
Sierra Leone. 179 They argued that Nigeria could not harbor Taylor by granting him
asylum, and that by doing so instead of prosecuting or extraditing him to the SCSL
to face charges, their rights under the Nigerian Constitution and international law
had been violated. 8 ' Various local and international human rights groups intervened
in support.' 8' The court agreed to hear the matter and the government appealed.'82
Meanwhile, within some government circles in the ECOWAS region, political
pressure for Taylor's arrest slowly began to gain some momentum. 183 As one of the
conditions of Taylor's asylum in Nigeria, he agreed to stay out of Liberian
politics.8 4 But, by around the middle to late 2005, claims had emerged that he was
still seeking to meddle in politics not only in Liberia but in other countries in the
178. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone the Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Special
Court Prosecutor Desmond de Silva, QC Welcoming the Nigerian Announcement of the Transfer of
Charles Taylor (Mar. 25, 2006), available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-
032506.pdf.
179. See Babatunde Fagbohunlu, Challenging Taylor's Asylum in Nigeria, in INT'L JUST. AND
TRANSNAT'L REMEDIES 62, 64 n.1, (Open Society Foundation 2005) (stating "Suit No
FHC/ABJ/M/216/04 and Suit No FHCABJ/A/217/04 commenced by way of Originating Summons filed
by David Anyaele and Emmanuel Egbuna against Charles Taylor, the Federal Commissioner for
Refugees, the Eligibility Committee for Refugees, the National Commission for Refugees, the President
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the Attomey-General of the Federal Republic of Nigeria."),
available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/fagbohunlu.pdf.
180. Id. at 63.
181. Id. at 62.
182. ld at 63.
183. See Liberia: West African Leaders Callfor Review of Taylor's Asylum Deal, IRIN NEWS (Aug.
1, 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=55662.
184. Craig Timberg, A Warlord's Exile Divides His Hosts: Liberian Ex-President Charles Taylor
Doing Business as Usual in Nigeria, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/10/08AR2005100 801243_pf.html; Douglas Farah, A Protected Friend of
Terrorism, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/04/24/AR2005042400893.html.
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West Africa sub-region.'85 This included Cote D'Ivoire where, though this was
never proved, he was even alleged to have backed a coup plot.'86 The SCSL
Prosecutor later tried to link his activities to those of Al Qaeda, another assertion
that was never substantiated publicly.
Further afield, in Europe and the United States, various resolutions were passed
by Parliament and Congress respectively.'87 A prelude to this turn of events was
that, in late 2003, the United States announced a $2 million reward for information
leading to Taylor's capture.' 88 This was part of the Rewards for Justice Program,1
89
which the United States had been operating to encourage arrests of fugitives wanted
by ad hoc tribunals. But public announcement of the decision to include the SCSL's
star indictee in the mix was not backed with a serious diplomatic push for his
apprehension. It would take another two years, until the passage of the resolution in
Europe in February 2005'90 that similarly supportive action was taken by the British
parliament.191 All these resolutions urged the Nigerian authorities to send Taylor to
the SCSL. Still, despite their apparent political weight, the Bush Administration did
not say much until around January 2006, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza
Rice announced that the United States was keen to see Taylor transferred to the
SCSL. 192
At the level of the U.N. Security Council, which has the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peace and security, a travel ban had been placed
on Taylor and his senior associates by March 2001. 9 They had repeatedly and
flagrantly violated U.N. sanctions, including the illegal supply of arms, ammunition,
and other logistical and communications equipment to the RUF in Sierra Leone. 1
94
By the end of November 2005, the Security Council was ready to take a further step
by which it authorized U.N. peacekeepers to apprehend Taylor in the event he was
to return to Liberia. 95 The peacekeepers were to transfer him to the SCSL. 196 This
confounded Taylor, who wondered how he could be arrested when he was not even
185. Timberg, supra note 184; Farah, supra note 184.
186. Timberg, supra note 184.
187. Resolution on the Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Case of Charles Taylor, EUR. PAR. DOc.
P6 TA (2005)0059 (2005); H.R. Con. Res. 127, 109th Cong. (2005).
188. In $87.5 Billion Bill, $2 Million Bounty for Exiled Liberian, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/1 1/10/world/in-87.5 -billion-bill-2-million-bounty-for-exiled-
liberian.html.
189. REWARDS FOR JUSTICE, http://www.rewardsforjustice.net (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
190. Resolution on the Special Court for Sierra Leone: The Case of Charles Taylor, supra note 187.
191. U.N. Special Court for Sierra Leone, EARLY DAY MOTION 1375, H.C. (June 10, 2003),
available at http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2002-03/1375.
192. Felix Onuah, Wanted Liberian Warlord Disappears in Nigeria, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/28/AR2006032800390_pf.html.
193. See U.N. S.C. Res. 1343, para. 7(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 343 (Mar. 7, 2001).
194. Id. para. 2(b).
195. U.N. S.C. Res. 1638, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 638 (Nov. 11, 2005).
196. Id.; For commentary, see generally Micaela Frulli, A Turning Point in International Efforts to
Apprehend War Criminals: The U.N. Mandates Taylor's Arrest in Liberia, 4 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 351-
61 (2006).
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in Liberia. But, in retrospect, he realized it meant that the groundwork was being
laid.
The Nigerian government under President Olesugun Obasanjo, which had
initially insisted that it would not turn over Taylor to the SCSL (because it did not
want to be seen as reneging on an African Union and ECOWAS agreement to keep
Taylor), announced that it would honor a democratically-elected Liberian
government's request for it to do so. 197 This opened the door for a potential transfer.
The momentum for Taylor's arrest seemed inexorable. The time was coming. In
the meantime, Liberia held transitional elections as per the Accra Peace Accord.
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won the vote, becoming Africa's first female head of state. 98
On March 5, 2006, the new Liberian president, in a not entirely selfless decision
given her initial support to Taylor for the establishment of the NPFL, requested the
Nigerian authorities to turn over Taylor to her government. 99 She did so reportedly
because of unrelenting pressure from several of Liberia's crucial development
partners, including the United Nations, the United States, and the European
Union.20  On March 25, 2006, President Obasanjo informed Johnson Sirleaf that
Liberia was "free to take former President Charles Taylor into its custody,"'2 1 but
by not arresting Taylor, Nigeria raised questions about whether it was still seeking
to shield the suspect.
The final act in the Taylor arrest drama was Obasanjo's visit to Washington.
He was scheduled to meet with President George Bush at the White House on March
29, 2006.202 Just a couple of days before, on March 27, Nigeria, in an apparent face
saving ploy, had announced that Taylor had suddenly "escaped" from his villa in
Calabar.2 3 The United States warned of "consequences" if Taylor was not turned
over.2' The day before the White House meeting, it was made abundantly clear that
Bush would cancel the meeting with Obasanjo if the Taylor issue was not
resolved.2 5 Abuja, which had expressed dismay at the "persistent pressure" it was
receiving "to violate the understanding of 2003," reversed course. 2 06 Only hours
197. Onuah, supra note 192.
198. Ernest Harsch, Liberian Woman Breaks the 'Glass Ceiling,' AFRICA RENEWAL (Jan. 2006),
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/j anuary-2006/liberian-woman-breaks-%E2%80%98glass-
ceiling%E2%80%99.
199. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Liberia: President Requests Surrender of Taylor (Mar.
17, 2006).
200. Johnson-Sirleaf Describes Attempts to Come to Terms with Liberia's Violent Past, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Mar. 23, 2006), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa-jan-juneO6-liberia 3-23/.
201. See Statement by the Federal Government of Nigeria-Former President Charles Taylor to the
transferred to the custody of the Government of Liberia, Mar. 25, 2006. See also Bernard Hibbitts,
Nigeria to Hand over War Crimes Indictee Taylor to Liberia, JURIST (Mar. 25, 2006),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2006/03/breaking-news-nigeria-to-hand-over-war.php.
202. Dino Mahtani & Guy Dinmore, US Raps Nigeria As Liberian Warlord Vanishes, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 29, 2009), http://wwwft.com/cms/s/0/dff754e2-bebf-1 Ida-b 1Of-
0000779e2340.html#axzz3R5wz3 ROO.
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later, on March 29, Nigerian forces "found" Taylor at a remote border post close to
Cameroon. 207 He was arrested with sacks of money ($50,000), allegedly given to
him by Obasanjo, and immediately put under guard in a military jet and flown to
Monrovia. 21 0 Obasanjo met with Bush while Taylor was on his way to Liberia,
where he was arrested, upon arrival, by U.N. peacekeepers on the tarmac at
Monrovia's Robertsfield International Airport and transferred onto a U.N.
helicopter.209 He was flown to the SCSL premises at New England in Freetown.
21 1
Nearly the whole of Sierra Leone celebrated.
211
The prosecution was anxious to have Taylor arraigned. Taylor was not in a
rush. He had arrived with only the clothes on his back, so he insisted to the Defense
Office that his clothing be brought in from Nigeria.212 That was duly brought, at his
own expense, by one of his former chiefs of protocol who flew on the earliest
available flight.2" 3
On April 3, 2006, a date negotiated between the Defense Office and the Office
of the Prosecutor, a still visibly shaken Taylor was arraigned before Presiding Judge
Richard Lussick of Trial Chamber 1I and read out his charges.214 He pleaded "most
definitely.., not guilty."215 In later trial testimony, he would invite Obasanjo to tell
the truth about his so-called escape.216 He then explained that he had effectively
been duped by an African "brother." 217 Taylor, pressed as to reasons why, then
suggested that Nigeria might have given him up because of its hope to secure a
permanent seat on the Security Council, which was being discussed at the time, and
Obasanjo's desire to run for a third term in office without U.S. opposition. 218
V. CONTROVERSIAL PRELIMINARY ISSUES BEFORE THE CHARLES TAYLOR TRIAL
A. Taylor Claims Immunity from Prosecution
In the Taylor case, unlike most other international criminal trials, some of the
preliminary legal issues were raised before he was even arrested. The first of these
occurred when, as President of Liberia, he hired a Sierra Leonean lawyer, Terence
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artice/2006/03/26/AR2006032600 928 .html.
207. Amin George Forji, Nigerian Police Arrest Fugitive Liberian Warlord, OHMYNEWS (Mar. 30,
2006),
http://english.ohmynews.com/articleview/article-view.asp?article class-3&no=282501 &relno=I.
208. Transcript of Record-Nov. 10, 2009, supra note 160, at 31521-22.
209. Id. at31522.
210. Id.
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212. Id. at 31522.
213. See generally id.
214. Personal observation of this author, who was present in the courtroom, during Taylor's
arraignment. See also Transcript of Record at 4-13, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01 -T (Apr.
3, 2006), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/Taylor/3April2006.pdf.
215. Id. at 15.
216. Transcript of Record-Nov. 10, 2009, supra note 160, at 31523-24.
217. Seeid. at31517-21.
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Terry, to seek a quashing of the SCSL indictment.219 This was done even as Liberia
also planned, ultimately unsuccessfully, to pursue the arguably better alternative of
initiating legal proceedings against Sierra Leone at the International Court of Justice
("ICJ").220 The essence of Liberia's claim was that the SCSL's issuance of an
international arrest warrant against Taylor violated a fundamental rule of
international law which provided for Taylor's immunity, as a head of state, from
criminal proceedings in foreign criminal jurisdictions.22 1 Sierra Leone had also
violated the rule prohibiting it from exercising judicial power on the territory of
another state, in as much as Liberia was not a party to the United Nations-Sierra
Leone Agreement establishing the SCSL.222 As the tribunal was not a U.N. organ,
and also not an established international penal court, it could not impose legal
obligations on a third state like Liberia.223 But that process did not go far because
Sierra Leone's consent was required for the ICJ to have jurisdiction and was not
given.
224
On July 23, 2003, at the SCSL itself, Terry filed a motion submitting that
Taylor, who was a sitting head of state at the time the alleged crimes were
committed, was absolutely immune from any exercise of jurisdiction by the
SCSL.225 He relied on the ICJ ruling in the Congo v. Belgium (Arrest Warrant) case
to argue that the indictment was invalid under international law. 226 In that dispute,
the World Court had decided the question whether Belgium, by merely issuing and
circulating an arrest warrant for the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Abdoulaye Yerodia, had violated customary international law.227  Although the
Court determined that, due to the principle of sovereign equality, foreign ministers
and other high ranking officials such as heads of state were shielded from
prosecution before the national courts of other states, it identified four exceptions
under which such exercise of jurisdiction would be permissible. 22 As part of this,
219. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, at
3015 (May 31, 2004), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Taylor.pdf.
220. Id. at 3016. See also Charles C. Jalloh, Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes:
The Case of Charles Taylor at the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 8 ASIL INSIGHTS 9 (2004), available
at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/2 1/immunity-prosecution-international-crimes-case-
charles-taylor-special.
221. Immunityfrum Prosecution for International Crimes: The Case of Charles Taylor at the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 220.
222. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, at 3018, 3039.
223. Id. at 3039.
224. Press Release, Int'l Court of Justice, Liberia Applies to the International Court of Justice in a
Dispute with Sierra Leone Concerning an International Arrest Warrant Issued by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone Against the Liberian President (Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr = 1027&pt-&pl =6&p2= 1.
225. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Applicant's Motion made under Protest and
without Waiving of Immunity, 3 (July 23, 2003),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/024/SCSL-03-01-1-015.pdf.
226. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (DRC v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 121, 3
(Feb. 4), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf.
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the ICJ determined that an incumbent foreign minister or head of state may be
subject to prosecution before certain international penal courts, where such courts
possess jurisdiction.229 It cited as examples of this the ICTY and ICTR as well as
(at the time) the future ICC.23° Taylor's attorney submitted that because the SCSL
lacked the Chapter VII powers of the ICTY and ICTR, it was more akin to a national
court of Sierra Leone, and consequently, that it lacked jurisdiction over Taylor.23'
In resolving the preliminary motion, which was forwarded to the Appeals
Chamber, two questions were central: firstly, whether Taylor, who was at the time
of the decision no longer holding office as president, was entitled to immunity from
the legal processes of the SCSL; and secondly, whether the SCSL was a national or
international criminal tribunal. 232  The prosecution made both procedural and
substantive arguments. 233 It suggested, with regards to the former, that it was wrong
for Taylor to challenge the tribunal's jurisdiction before personally submitting to
it.234 On the merits, the prosecution argued that the SCSL, which was not part of the
Sierra Leonean judiciary and was created as an independent tribunal under
international law, could not be subject to the same limitations as the ICJ had found
applicable to the national courts of states such as Belgium. 235
In its decision on the motion, which has been controversial among
commentators since it was handed down, the Appeals Chamber denied the defense
motion. 236 It examined the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunal precedents, as well as the
rulings in the Arrest Warrant and Pinochet cases, alongside the briefs filed by
Amicus Curiae Phillip Sands and Diane Orentlicher. 237 It then concluded that "the
principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does not
prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal
tribunal or court." '238 In effect, the SCSL was an international criminal tribunal
exercising an international mandate over international crimes. The tribunal, being
international, therefore fell within one of the four exceptions that the ICJ had
identified.239 As a consequence, although no longer a president entitled to ratione
personae immunity after having left office, Taylor's official status as a sitting
president when the criminal proceedings were initiated was not a bar to his
prosecution. 240 His case was, therefore, properly within the SCSL's jurisdiction.24
229. ld. 58,61.
230. Id. 61.
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The Court notably failed to properly account for the germane issue of Liberia's third
party status to the bilateral treaty that had created the SCSL.
When Taylor eventually appeared before the SCSL, during his arraignment on
April 3, 2006, he again raised the question of his immunity. 242 He stated that he did
not recognize the court's jurisdiction since he believed his status entitled him to
immunity.2 43  Judge Richard Lussick reminded Taylor that he had previously
contested that issue and lost.24" As far as the judge was concerned, the matter had
been "thrashed out" by the Appeals Chamber.2 45 But Taylor was free to file motions
to revisit the issue after first pleading to the charges, which he thereafter did.
24 6
Interestingly, the defendant never again asserted immunity, even during the appeal
of his conviction. It seemed as if he realized that any further attempt to assert
immunity would not lead to a different outcome for his case. So he essentially gave
up the fight.
247
B. The Debate about Where to Try Taylor
After his arrest and arraignment, at the seat of the SCSL in Freetown, yet
another controversy arose in the Taylor case related to the venue of his trial.2 48 All
the other SCSL suspects were tried in the Sierra Leonean capital.249 But, even before
his initial appearance, Taylor knew that his case would be different. This was
confirmed when it was rumored that he would likely be transferred to The Hague.
For that reason, on the very first day that he appeared before the SCSL, Taylor
expressed preference to be tried in Sierra Leone.250 Taylor noted particular concern
about his fair trial rights and ability to obtain witnesses.2 ' The proximity of the
Immunity of Taylor: The Arrest Warrant Case Continued, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 645, 651 (2005); contra
James L. Miglin, From Immunity to Impunity: Charles Taylor and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16
DALHOUSIE J. L. STUD. 21 (2007); Micaela Frulli, Piercing the Veil of Head of State Immunity: The Taylor
Trial and Beyond, in THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA
AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 325-339 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014). See generally Annie Gell,
Lessons from the Trial of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, in THE SIERRA LEONE
SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY: THE IMPACT FOR AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 642-
62 (Charles C. Jalloh ed., 2014) (providing a post-trial completion analysis).
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SCSL to his home country, Liberia, where he had most of his family, was also
naturally important to him.
252
In fact, the day after Taylor's arrival in Freetown, the President of the SCSL
submitted requests to the Netherlands and the ICC to facilitate the relocation of the
trial to The Hague.2 53 At that point, the ICC had an empty courtroom without any
defendants. Under the SCSL Statute and Rules, the SCSL could sit outside Sierra
Leone whenever this would be necessary for the exercise of its functions.2 5 4 The
Dutch government immediately agreed to host the trial, provided certain conditions
could be fulfilled.2 55 This included acceptance by another state to host Taylor in the
event he was convicted. 256 The ICC, after carrying out internal consultations and
notifying its states' parties, none of which objected to the idea, also consented to the
use of its facilities. 257 A delay of several weeks then followed when no African or
other country volunteered to detain a convicted Taylor until the British government
offered to do so on June 15, 2006.258
While the security rationale offered for moving the trial seemed to have merit,
there was considerable pushback from it, especially from within the human rights
community in Sierra Leone and the United States. Matters were not helped by the
government appearing to contradict the SCSL position. Key officials, including the
vice president who had been Sierra Leone's minister of justice and attorney general
during the establishment of the tribunal, Solomon Berewa, stated publicly. that he
did not think security was an issue.259 But, he changed his mind just days later.260
It was unclear what motivated the new stance. It has been suggested that maybe
there was new information suggesting such threats were credible. 26 ' The more likely
scenario might have been that the decision had already been taken outside of Sierra
Leone, perhaps in Washington, which enjoys considerable influence driving the
official policies of Monrovia and the United Nations.
The views of the Liberian government, which was not a party to the SCSL
process as such, were also relevant, though complicated. On the one hand, the newly
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elected President Sirleaf was concerned about security, given that Taylor retained
some domestic political support in the country.262 On the other hand, his prosecution
at the SCSL was not her priority. 263 The business of governing Liberia was more
important than the fate of a single Liberian who happened to be a former enemy.
Yet, to rebuild Liberia, she needed foreign aid from friendly governments, especially
the United States. In the end, the compromise was that President Johnson Sirleaf
would request that Nigeria transfer Taylor to the SCSL. 21 She was unequivocal
that, for security reasons, she preferred he not be tried next door in Sierra Leone.
265
For the SCSL prosecution, whose work would have been considered a failure by
many in Sierra Leone and overseas if it did not get to try its number one suspect, the
movement of the key case to another venue seemed like a price worth paying in
exchange for Liberia's request for his arrest and transfer into its custody.266
At the U.N. Security Council, urgent consultations followed Taylor's arrest and
arraignment at the SCSL in order to resolve the conditions that the Dutch
government had imposed before it would accept the trial. In Security Council
Resolution 1688, which paved the way for Taylor's transfer to The Hague, the
Security Council determined that Taylor could not be tried in the West Africa
"subregion due to the security implications. ' 267 The decision also determined that
Taylor's "continued presence" in the sub-region was "an impediment to stability and
a threat to the peace of Liberia and of Sierra Leone and to international peace and
security. ' ' 268 It further noted that it was "not feasible for the trial of former President
Taylor to be hosted at the premises of the [ICTR] due to its full engagement on the
completion strategy. ' '269 This implied that some consideration was given to the idea
of trying Taylor somewhere else in Africa. Yet, the actual extent of that evaluation
is largely unknown.
We can accept that, under prevailing international law, the Security Council
does-and more normatively, should-enjoy wide discretion to make
determinations of what constitute threats to international peace and security. All the
more so because, as the ICTY Appeals Chamber confirmed in the Tadic case, the
262. Id. at 3.
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Sierra Leone, 31 March 2006, at 5 (Apr. 12, 2006) (on file with the Special Court for Sierra Leone's
Office of the Prosecutor), available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-
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U.N. body is often faced with fluid situations.270 It is thus generally better placed to
determine, as a political and legal matter under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
what amounts to threats or breaches to the peace and security of the world. 271 And,
equally importantly, it is better placed to determine what forcible and non-forcible
measures to take to redress such security concerns.272 That is, in many ways, the
essence of its mandate.
Nonetheless, the Security Council's determination that sending Taylor to the
ICTR or another African State was not feasible seems somewhat contestable. The
ICTR reportedly was quickly consulted.273 It replied to the Secretary-General that
it was engaged upon its completion strategy. 274 It is unclear whether further reasons
were given or whether further consultations took place. However, the fact that the
completion plan was in place did not mean that the SCSL needed to encumber the
ICTR in any significant way for the purposes of carrying out its single Taylor trial
in Arusha, or more to the point, that alternative arrangements could not have been
made for another trial venue in Tanzania. It is also unclear whether the Security
Council considered other African States, including those in west, east or even central
Africa, for the purpose of hosting the trial and whether it sought AU support for the
idea of an in continent trial. Working with the United Nations, one might have
expected that the SCSL could have more easily made arrangements for the Taylor
trial in an African country with closer proximity to Freetown. Even more
importantly, especially for a tribunal operating on donations and the goodwill of
states, the cost of such an undertaking would have also been cheaper for the SCSL
than the financial burden that later resulted from use of the ICC facilities.
In any event, based on what the public knows, a critical look at the security
rationale for moving the Taylor case casts serious doubt on its veracity. For one
thing, the SCSL had in its custody other personalities who enjoyed more popular
support in Sierra Leone.275 Yet, none of them were transferred out of Sierra Leone.
If anything, the threats from the supporters of Sankoh, the erstwhile leader of the
RUF who eventually died in custody, were probably greater than that of Taylor, at
least to Sierra Leoneans.276 Thousands of former RUF combatants, including
notorious commanders, roamed the streets of Freetown freely. Similarly, Norman,
the deputy minister, was seen as a national hero for leading the CDF against the
RUF.277 He too was detained at the SCSL facilities in Freetown.2 78 Although it is
true that after his arrest, the tribunal did briefly explore the prospect of transferring
270. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, 111 29, 31 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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him to the ICTR for security considerations,279 in the end, he was kept in the same
place of detention as Taylor and the rest of the other Sierra Leoneans. There were
no serious security incidents from troublemaker supporters. Yet, with Taylor, on
June 20, 2006, despite civil society's and his own attempt to forestall that decision
in the hope of remaining in Freetown, he was secretly transferred to The Hague.
280
Finally, without oversimplifying the matter, the SCSL was ensconced in a
"heavily fortified" compound with twenty-four hour security provided by hundreds
of seasoned U.N. peacekeepers. 281 Among the visible security was a high barbed-
wire fence, video surveillance equipment, metal detectors, guard posts with armed
soldiers, and even an armored personnel carrier. 282 On top of that, only a stone's
throw away from the SCSL building in New England were two of Sierra Leone's
largest army bases: Wilberforce and Murray Town Barracks. They too could
provide security backup. In other words, I am skeptical that-for all its significance
for Sierra Leoneans-less drastic measures than transferring Taylor out of Sierra
Leone were fully explored and first exhausted by the SCSL and the U.N. Security
Council before Taylor was sent to The Hague. Criminal justice, whether at the
national or international levels, aspires to give victims a measure of justice. That
justice is obviously better served and more likely better received, as the U.N.
Secretary-General has concluded in a review of best practices, if those victims get a
chance to see their alleged number one tormentor face justice. To the extent that
criminal trials bring closure, witnessing justice first hand is more likely to bring such
closure to the victims and their families.
On the other hand, to be fair to the SCSL, it is plausible that it had intelligence
through governments giving credible warnings about security threats that followed
Taylor's arrest and incarceration in Freetown. But, if any such a thing existed, the
information was never made public. Indeed, even as many Sierra Leonean
parliamentarians and civil society rallied against Taylor's transfer outside the
country, the SCSL failed to mount a robust effort to justify or explain the decision
to move the trial to the Netherlands. The lack of transparency exacerbated the
suspicions of the real motive behind the move, which was to get the defendant into
its custody without necessarily worrying about where he would be tried. In the end,
although there would have been some who breathed easier after the trial was moved
outside West Africa, many Sierra Leoneans were left frustrated with the decision to
take Taylor to Europe.283 It is unfortunate that, especially when combined with the
general lack of accessibility of his trial, the people in Sierra Leone and Liberia who
279. Id.
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were more likely to have been sobered by the lesson of seeing Taylor in the dock
were cheated of that opportunity. In short, to have maximized the impact of the
historic trial, the proceedings should have been held locally. This after all was said
to be a core advantage of the SCSL, sitting in the locus criminis, over its sister ICTY
and the ICTR-both of which had been criticized for their geographic distance to
the communities in whose names they were asked to render credible justice.
As a former SCSL and Sierra Leonean prosecutor Abdul Tejan-Cole has rightly
argued, the choice to move Taylor's case to Europe served not only to highlight the
complex politics involved in high profile mass atrocity cases, but also to blur the
line between the legal and political.284 Another Sierra Leonean lawyer, Alpha Sesay,
was even more critical. He suggested that transferring the trial of the star accused
outside the country undermined the "whole reason for having the Court in Sierra
Leone in the first place,"28 5 and in particular, deprived his alleged victims "of the
justice that they deserve." 2 I share in these views of my compatriots.
Other negative impacts of the change of venue of the Taylor trial can be
discerned. These include the manifold increase in the cost of the trial for the SCSL,
the complications that arose in dealing with witnesses who had to travel outside of
West Africa to testify, and the confusion and disagreements between the SCSL and
the ICC over who had responsibility for Taylor's conditions of detention. Many
additional controversies arose, including whether a video camera should record his
confidential meetings with his lawyers,287 whether he was entitled to family visits
paid by the SCSL,288 whether he was entitled to culturally appropriate African
instead of Dutch food alien to his Liberian palate,289 whether he should receive
conjugal visits from his wife,29 and so on. On top of all these, once the ICC had its
own cases, the SCSL was asked to move out.291 This forced the SCSL to relocate
mid-trial to the premises of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, where the case was
completed.292 These challenges added yet more avoidable delays and controversies
to the trial.
284. See Tejan-Cole, supra note 79, at 219-20.
285. Alpha Sesay, Liberia: Trying Charles Taylor: Victims' Justice Cannot Be Fully Achieved At
the Hague, ALLAFRICA (Apr. 19, 2006), http://allafrica.com/stories/200604190306.html.
286. Id.
287. Katy Glassboro, 'Turf War' Over Charles Taylor Case, 104 ACR 2 (2007), available at
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/turf-war-over-charles-taylor-case.
288. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01 -PT, Public Defence Application
Requesting Review of the Memorandum of Understanding Between the International Criminal Court and
the Special Court of Sierra Leone Dated 13 April 2006 & Modification of Mr. Charles Taylor's
Conditions of Detention, 3624 (Dec. 14, 2006).
289. Alexandra Hudson, ICC Enlists Expert Help to Cater for Taylor, GOOGLEGROUps (June 6,
2007, 1:06 PM), https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/croatian-news/g5Dz9bgYYsk.
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291. Charles C. Jalloh, Charles Taylor and the Delayed Special Court for Sierra Leone Judgment,
JURIST 7 (Feb. 23, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/02/charles-jalloh-taylor-scsl.php.
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VI. THE CONTROVERSIES AT THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF THE CHARLES TAYLOR
TRIAL
Both the opening and closing of the Taylor trial were highly dramatic affairs.
While the first was a result of a strategy that the accused had devised with his
provisional defense counsel, Karim Khan, the second can be attributed to his defense
team which failed to turn in the final trial brief when it was due. The latter situation,
which will be considered after discussion of the first, was then compounded by a
short-sighted decision of the majority of Trial Chamber II to reject Taylor's final
brief. This caused a disruption requiring the Appeals Chamber to intervene before
deliberations on his guilt or innocence could begin. The final dramatic scene, as the
curtain was drawn on the case, came from an even more surprising quarter: a judge.
A. The Dramatic Courtroom Walkout and the Ensuing Delay
Monday, June 4, 2007, was supposed to be the big day for the prosecution. All
openings of major trials are. It is typically a day for the prosecution to outline the
barebones of its case against the defendant, sometimes with great rhetorical flourish,
more for public than judicial consumption. The defendant and his lawyer generally
sit in the courtroom and listen to the allegations without much interruption, save for
exceptional circumstances. They would later get their turn to set out the defense
case, and commensurately, would enjoy the same courtesy. But, in the kind of
dramatic twist that came to characterize each stage of the Taylor case, when the
matter of Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor was called around 10:30 a.m. that
morning in ICC Courtroom I in The Hague, Khan gave a bombshell of an
explanation for his client's absence from the courtroom: Taylor was not coming to
court, and even worse, had no plans to return.29 3  Instead, in a letter Khan
passionately read out to the court, Taylor explained that he had been denied equality
of arms with the prosecution as well as adequate time and facilities to prepare his
defense as well as ability to consult the Court's Principal Defender, Vincent
Nmehielle. 94 As he believed he would not receive a fair trial, he would henceforth
not participate in a sham process. 95 He also fired Mr. Khan in favor of representing
himself personally.296
The problem for the judges was that Taylor was not in court. This meant that
barring proceeding without him or his being dragged into the courtroom, as the
prosecution suggested, the opening could not proceed. Instead of ordering that
Taylor be forced to court, which would have caused a problematic spectacle of a
defendant bound and gagged, the trial chamber sensibly responded with an order
293. See Transcript of Record at 242, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T (Jun. 4, 2007),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/-raylor/4June2007.pdf; see also David Pallister & Chris
McGreal, Taylor Boycotts War Crimes Trial, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2007),
http://www.theguardian.con/world/2007/ un/04/westafrica.libya.
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assigning Mr. Khan to represent the defendant.297 But he insisted that it would be
unethical for him to do so, even after he was threatened with contempt of court, as
this would mean that he had been forced upon the defendant who no longer wanted
his legal representation.298 Khan claimed that he was barred by both the SCSL code
of conduct for defense counsel and the rules of his national bar from accepting the
appointment once his services had been terminated by his client.299 The presiding
judge was not deterred, countering that "your Code of Conduct cannot override a
court order which I made a few minutes ago."3 ' The judge asked Mr. Khan to sit
down. She then invited the prosecution to continue with its opening statement, and
at that point, Taylor's defense counsel dramatically picked up his materials and
walked out of the courtroom.30 1 It was at that stage, consistent with SCSL and other
ad hoc tribunal practice that I was asked to take charge of the proceedings for the
duration of the opening statements and until replacement counsel was assigned.
30 2
The SCSL's American chief prosecutor, Stephen Rapp, then read out his
opening statement.30 3 I did not make any objections. After the prosecution opening
concluded, the chamber adjourned the proceedings, but not before inquiring into and
ordering that all of Taylor's complaints be swiftly addressed by the SCSL Registrar
and the Defense Office. 30 4 The latter prepared an internal report setting out its
independent views of the merits of the defendant's concerns, which then formed the
basis for resolution of the thorny issues. Taylor's risky gamble, which had been
largely forced by the short sighted decisions of the then SCSL Acting Registrar who
had failed to heed the Defense Office's warnings, had paid off.
In short order, by early August 2007, the Defense Office-which had now been
allocated more money for the Taylor Defense team-had found and assigned new
defense counsel for Mr. Taylor.3" 5 It was the kind of handsomely paid defense team
that the public defender's office had always internally insisted that Taylor needed to
receive a fair trial.306 All the more so given the size and complexity of his case and
its geographic divorce from the seat of the SCSL in Freetown and the locus commissi
delicti. Led by Courtenay Griffiths, an unassuming but "silver-tongued" British
Queen's Counsel with a baritone voice, the team would later prove its mettle
vigorously testing the prosecution case in the courtroom. Ironically, the new defense
297. Pallister & McGreal, supra note 293.
298. Richard J. Wilson, 'Emaciated' Defense or a Trend to Independence and Equality of Arms in
Internationalized Criminal Tribunals?, 15 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF, no. 2 (2008), at 2, available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1014&context-hrbrief.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Jason McClurg, New Defense Counsel Appointedfor Charles Taylor, INT'L ENFORCEMENT
LAW REPORTER (Sept. 2007), available at http://www.rscsl.org/Clippings/2007/2007-08/pc2007-8-
24.pdf. See also Wilson, supra note 298.
302. McClurg, supra note 301.
303. Id.
304. Wilson, supra note 298. See Transcript of Record at 242, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T
(Jun. 4, 2007), http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Transcripts/Taylor/4June2007.pdf.
305. McClurg, supra note 301.
306. Id. See also Wilson,supra note 298.
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team-unlike the previous provisional counsel-was given several months to study
the thousands of pages of disclosure and to prepare for the cross examination of
prosecution witnesses. 30 7 With Taylor's goals to have a top notch defense team, and
adequate time for them to prepare having being achieved, I convinced the suspect to
end his boycott and return to court to participate in his trial. It was a big moment
for the SCSL trial of Taylor. The prosecution held press conferences, painting
Taylor's actions as those of the devious manipulator that he was. But, once he got
what he wanted, this claim was effectively repudiated. Taylor did not engage in any
of the antics or contumacious behavior we have witnessed in other high profile
international criminal tribunal cases like Milogevi"3 °8 at the ICTY. The trial was
adjourned for a few months. This experience suggests the need to keep an open
mind when fair trial complaints are raised by defendants as there will be times, such
as in Taylor, when these concerns have validity and are not aimed at manipulating
the process for political gain.
B. Of Flirtatious Warlords, Super Models, and "Dirty Looking" Stones
In early January 2008, the Taylor case resumed.30 9 The prosecution called its
first of ninety-four witnesses. 310 Ninety-one of those witnesses were so-called crime
base or linkage witnesses, while three were experts.3"' A key highlight to the trial,
at least for the Western media, which had largely ignored the oral evidence phase of
the Taylor case up to that point, was the intrigue surrounding the testimony of British
supermodel Naomi Campbell and American Hollywood star Mia Farrow. An
apparently fearful Campbell testified about receiving rough "dirty-looking stones"
or "pebbles" from an unknown person-a reference to the diamonds that Taylor
gifted to Campbell after "mildly flirting" with her at a dinner hosted in Pretoria by
then South African President, Nelson Mandela, on September 26, 1997.312 Besides
the viva voce witnesses, nearly eight hundred prosecution exhibits were admitted
307. Eric Witte, Court Delays Taylor Trial until January 7, 2008, INT'L JUSTICE MONITOR (Aug.
20, 2007), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2007/08/court-delays-taylor-trial-unti1-january-7-2008/.
308. For references by the Tribunal of Milogevi6 misusing hearings and cross-examinations as a
platform for making political speeches, see Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Initial
Appearance (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2001); Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case
No. IT-02-54-T, Status Conference (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30, 2001);
Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Open Session (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Hearing (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 10, 2004); Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Pre-Defense Conference (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 17, 2004). See Charles C. Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword
Mean Dying by the Sword?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 707, 707-53 (2013) (discussing the issues of disruption
that arose in that case and several others in international criminal law and the implications of the rights
of defendants).
309. Wilson, supra note 298.
310. OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR BY THE SIERRA COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE JUDGMENT 4 (Open Society Justice Initiative ed., 2012).
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312. Transcript of Record at 45819-20, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T (Aug. 10, 2010),
http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/CharlesTaylor/2010-08-10.
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into evidence, five of which were expert reports.313 The crux of the prosecution case
took just over a year, closing finally on February 27, 2009. 3
For its part, the defense case opened on July 13, 2009.311 Twenty-one witnesses
were called. 316 Taylor, in remarkably lengthy testimony, spent over seven months
on the stand between July 14, 2009 and February 18, 2010. 3 17 It seems highly
uncertain that giving such testimony was a wise decision. Not to be outdone by the
prosecution, the defense tendered about 740 exhibits, bringing to over 1,500 the
documents and photographs relating to Taylor's case.318 In a trial that in fact lasted
a total of 420 days, over the course of four calendar years, closing arguments were
finally heard in February and March of 201 31 9 By that point, the trial chamber had
issued nearly three hundred decisions on interlocutory matters.
320
Though the two last incidents that punctuated the end of Taylor's trial did not
match the kind of high drama that characterized the opening of his case on June 4,
2007, when Taylor refused to attend proceedings and his assigned counsel walked
out of the courtroom, they were dramatic nevertheless. In the first of these, the
responsibility lay with defense lawyers, not their client. They finalized the closing
brief and filed it about two weeks later than the chamber had specified. 321 As a
result, two of the three trial chamber judges rejected the brief, holding that the
defense counsel had forfeited its chance to have the chamber use the brief during its
deliberations.3 22  In stark contrast, in a lucid dissenting opinion, Judge Julia
Sebutinde found that the interests of justice and demands of a fair trial for Taylor
mandated that the chamber accept his brief even if it was late and contravened an
earlier order made by the judges. 323 She offered compelling arguments which turned
on the substantive right of the accused to a fair trial to support her dissent, pointing
out that a procedural irregularity such as a late filing of a brief by an accused person's
counsel is insufficient to displace the fundamental fair trial rights he was guaranteed
under the Statute of the SCSL.
3 24
313. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-l-T, Judgment Summary, 11 5 (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/Iibrary/report/2012/charles-taylor-judgement-
summary_20120426.pdf.
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Of course, on one level, the argument could be made that such a position
encourages defense lawyers to flout court orders. At the same time, the other side
of the issue is to consider the weight of failure to comply with this particular order
for the defendant. Certainly, as officers of the court, the majority court could have
chosen to show their approbation by sanctioning counsel by withholding fees, fining
them, or reporting them to their national bars for failure to abide by its deadlines.
This might have been the better approach as it would also recognize that the interests
of the defendant were substantially different, in such an instance, from those of his
lawyers.
In any event, given the majority ruling, both Griffiths and Taylor refused to
come to court, with counsel stating that he would not participate in any "farcical" 325
closing arguments until the defense final brief was accepted.326 The Taylor defense
thereafter appealed the majority trial chamber decision.3"7 And, sure enough on
March 3, 2011, the Appeals Chamber unanimously overturned the erroneous
majority ruling.3 28 The appellate court found it only fair that the trial judges receive
the final brief alongside that of the prosecution.3 29 This was duly done. The final
defense oral arguments took place just days later.33° The chamber then retired for
deliberations until they scheduled the judgment day. That prompted a minor
controversy because the day happened to be the one before Sierra Leone's national
anniversary. 33' The defense unsuccessfully argued for a date change to avoid the
specter that a Taylor conviction would be perceived as a gift to Sierra Leoneans for
their national day celebrations. 3
32
On April 26, 2012, just over a year after the conclusion of the prosecution and
defense cases, the long awaited verdict in the Taylor case was issued. 333 Trial
Chamber II, sitting in The Hague and comprised of Judges Richard Lussick, Julia
Sebutinde, and Teresa Doherty, issued a unanimous judgment.33 4 As was widely
325. Transcript of Record at 49290, 49294-95, Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-T (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.scsldocs.org/transcripts/Charles Taylor/2011-02-09.
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http://www.scsldocs.org/documents/view/6483- 18783.
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reported thereafter, the judges found Taylor guilty of five counts of crimes against
humanity, five counts of war crimes, and one count of other serious violations of
international humanitarian law.335 Most of the acts were perpetrated by the RUF
rebels acting in concert with mutinying elements of the Sierra Leone Army known
as the AFRC in the period between November 30, 1996 and January 18, 2002.336
Taylor was convicted as a secondary perpetrator (i.e. as a planner, aider and abettor)
of murder, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, acts of terrorism, pillage, outrages
upon personal dignity, violence to life, health, and physical or mental well-being of
persons.337 He was also found guilty of conscripting or enlisting children under
fifteen years of age into the service of armed forces, or groups, and using them to
participate actively in hostilities. 338 In an interesting twist, the judges refused to use
JCE and the prosecution failed to prove Taylor's command responsibility-both
modes of liability that everyone had expected would be crucial to the outcome of the
case.
C. Dissension on the Bench: A Regular (Not) Alternate Judge?
But if the Trial Chamber was trying to avoid its significant conviction from
being overshadowed by doctrinal or other debates about the shifting JCE theories or
criminal participation that the prosecution advanced against Taylor from the
beginning through to the end of trial, this was not destined to be. On this occasion,
the seeds of the final trial drama came from within the judicial chamber itself. After
the presiding judge concluded delivery of the oral summary of the unanimous three-
judge verdict convicting Taylor, and as the judges were rising to leave the
courtroom, Alternate Judge Sow, who had been the fourth judge sitting on the case,
attempted to make a public statement that he called a "dissenting opinion." To him,
the prosecution evidence was insufficient to convict Taylor.3 39 He then insinuated
that a grave procedural irregularity had occurred in that the trial chamber reached its
guilty findings without serious deliberations. 34" The curtain was drawn. Judge
Sow's microphone was cut off, and in the subsequent published transcript of that
day's hearing, his statement was not included because the hearing was considered
closed.
This unfortunate incident immediately triggered another firestorm of
controversy among legal commentators. These turned largely on the propriety of
Sow's decision to make a statement, given the established norm of silence by
335. Id.; OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, BRIEFING PAPER: THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR BY
THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE APPEAL JUDGMENT (2013), available at
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339. U.C. Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center, Special Report on Rule 98 Pleadings in the
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evidence/.
340. See OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 335.
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
alternate judges in international criminal courts. Of course, the SCSL Statute 34 1
provided for alternate judges and its rules mandated that reserve judges be present
for deliberations, but clarified that they "shall not be entitled to vote"' 342 on the
outcome of the trial. This makes sense because the alternate judge should be able to
step in at a moment's notice to ensure the continuity of a trial if, for whatever reason
such as grave illness, death or sudden mental infirmity, one of the three regular
judges were unable to continue sitting. 343 That, of course, was never the situation
during the Taylor case.
Some commentators, like William Schabas, seemed sympathetic to Sow's
decision to speak.31 Others, such as Michael Bohlander and I, faulted Sow for
speaking out.3 45 As I argued more fully elsewhere, Judge Sow was certainly entitled
to formulate his views on the sufficiency, or lack thereof, of the prosecution evidence
against Taylor. He was probably also equally entitled to share those views with his
judicial colleagues during the chamber's private deliberations. But it was improper
to express those opinions in public, keeping in mind that the rules do not contemplate
a substantive role for him in determining whether Taylor was guilty or not guilty.
346
Indeed, given the various limitations imposed by the SCSL Statute and the Rules,
Sow's statement amounted to a public statement or comment. Unlike his contention,
his remarks did not assume the legal character of a "dissenting opinion"-at least as
that term is understood in international criminal courts.
Furthermore, and even worse, in addition to violating basic provisions of the
statute and rules, his statement was inappropriate because it threatened to undermine
public confidence in the fairness of the Taylor case and to tarnish the credibility of
the SCSL's process. 347 Of course, the argument could always be made in defense of
Alternate Judge Sow that he might have taken up the unusual role of a judicial
"whistleblower" because the regular judges engaged in highly irregular practice.
Say, for instance, that the chamber failed to comply with its own rules of procedure
by not engaging in meaningful deliberations on the accused's criminal culpability-
as required by the hierarchically superior SCSL Statute. This odd situation would
found a stronger claim to justify his far reaching public allegation. It might also
have been easier to accept this if he had provided concrete evidence that could be
independently verified by third parties. And, whatever the case, he would likely
have gained greater sympathy from independent observers for his unusual move if
341. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 12, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
342. Special Court for Sierra Leone R. P. & EVID. 16bis.
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he had provided a reasoned opinion explaining his legal and factual conclusions
about the Taylor case. He did not, at least publicly.
Not surprisingly, although I was uncomfortable with information that later
emerged about aspects of the disciplinary process that was subsequently used to
declare Judge Sow unfit to sit as a judge, he seemed to have invited some sanction. 348
He later gave a media interview elucidating his views. But additional substance that
would have justified his decision to speak out still appeared lacking. 349 It was an
unfortunate end to his otherwise important service during the bulk of the historic
Taylor trial. He was rumored to be the only judge to not miss a single day of hearings
during a four-year period.
In any event, on May 30, 2012, the Trial Chamber (now sitting without Judge
Sow) sentenced Taylor to fifty years imprisonment.350 Both the prosecution and the
defense appealed. 351 The prosecution alleged four errors while the defendant raised
forty-five grounds. 35 2 The bulk of the prosecution appeal asserted that the trial
chamber should have, in addition to finding Taylor guilty of planning as well as
aiding and abetting, also convicted him for ordering and instigating the commission
of crimes in Sierra Leone. 353 They also contested the trial chamber ruling that
evidence regarding certain locations not mentioned in the indictment could be
admitted, and finally, sought an increase in his sentence from fifty to eighty years,
which in their view better reflected the gravity of his crimes and overall criminal
culpability. 354
The defense appeal raised numerous issues. These tended to center on the
chamber's evaluation of the evidence, some of is factual findings that the RUF/
AFRC operational strategy, which was known to Taylor and conceived with
substantial help by him, marked a deliberate terroristic campaign against Sierra
Leonean civilians.355 They also claimed that the chamber had misapplied the law of
individual criminal responsibility, that Taylor's fair trial rights were violated in the
entry of cumulative convictions, and further, that the trial judges erroneously used
improper aggravating factors such as his head of state status while ignoring
348. See Charles C. Jalloh, Why the Special Court for Sierra Leone Should Establish and
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favorable mitigating factors in arriving at his manifestly unreasonable sentence. 35 6
They also used some of Judge Sow's contentions to challenge the guilty verdict.
357
Finally, as with the other controversies that came to be associated with the pre-
trial and trial phases of his case, during the appeal phase, the delivery of the
judgment in the Taylor case in September 2013 was marked with some rancor-at
least among some international criminal lawyers-about the proper legal standard
for aiding and abetting as a mode of responsibility in international criminal law.
Other developments at the ICTY, especially in the Perigic358 case, had suggested
that aiding and abetting required that the accused person's contribution to the
commission of the crimes could be punished only if the abettor specifically directed
his assistance towards the commission of the offenses in issue.359 This was
significant for the Taylor case since, with the exception of his involvement in
planning a few incidents, his conviction turned primarily on the trial chamber
determination that he had aided and abetted the RUF's commission of crimes in
Sierra Leone.
In their judgment released in September 2013, the SCSL Appeals Chamber
denied nearly all the substantial defense appeals save for minor reversals of
convictions entered against Taylor regarding one or two locations in Kono in Sierra
Leone.36° They also rejected the Perigic articulation of the legal standard for aiding
and abetting liability, finding it inconsistent with customary international law.
36 1
Any practical assistance by an aider-abettor which had a substantial effect on the
commission of crimes will incur individual criminal responsibility. 362 Regarding the
sentence of fifty years, it was within the trial court's discretion to decline to factor
into mitigation Taylor's insincere expressions of remorse.3 63 Save for one exception,
they also rejected all the prosecution's appeal.364
Overall, taking the totality of the circumstances, including the gravity of
Taylor's conduct, the Appeals Chamber upheld his conviction and the sentence.
Within a few days afterwards, Taylor was transferred to the United Kingdom to serve
out his sentence. 365 Although under standard tribunal practice he would be eligible
for release after serving about one third of his sentence, at the age of seventy years
old when he was convicted, it is unlikely that Taylor will see the light of day outside
356. Id. at 63.
357. See generally Prosecutor v. Taylor Case Report, supra note 354.
358. Prosecutor v. Momdilo Perii6, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Judgment (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/perisic/acjug/en/130228judgement.pdf.
359. Id. 1f 16.
360. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Judgment, 11 15 (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A- 1389.pdf.
361. Id. 11473-81.
362. ld.
363. Id. 111 689-96. See Kevin J. Heller, The Taylor Sentencing Judgment: A Critical Analysis, II
J. OF INTL. CRIM. JUST. 835-855 (2013) (commenting on the Taylor sentence).
364. Id.
365. Liberia's Charles Taylor Transferred to UK, BBC (Oct. 15, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24537834.
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HMS Falkland where he has been housed in a hospital for his own safety. Thus ends
the story of one of Africa's most notorious warlords.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has showed that Taylor's status as the only non-Sierra Leonean to
be tried by the SCSL, for acts he did not personally carryout in Sierra Leone, his
stature as a sitting head of state at the time of his indictment, the transfer of his trial
from Freetown to the Hague and his imprisonment in the United Kingdom were the
key reasons why the case will be remembered as particularly controversial. But, as
this article also showed, the Taylor case had a penchant for generating controversy-
sometimes because of mistakes made by tribunal officials or decisions made by the
accused and his counsel. Indeed, at each step of the three main stages of the trial
process before the SCSL-pre-trial, trial, and appeal-the case generated its own
legal and political controversies: whether in relation to the timing of his indictment
as possibly obstructing peace negotiations aimed at ending Liberia's devastating
civil war; or, whether as an incumbent head of state international law conferred
immunity from prosecution on him; or, whether he should be allowed to live in
Nigeria unmolested or to be tried in Freetown or The Hague. These controversies
often posed unprecedented political, legal and even diplomatic and other practical
challenges for the prosecution, the judges, and tribunal administrators. These types
of challenges, which occur at the intersection of international law and international
politics, should thus be expected to be part of the experience required in the
management of trials of other former heads of state or government in other
international criminal courts.
The Taylor case concluded about a year ago with the final appeals chamber
judgment issued in September 2013. It is still somewhat premature to definitively
assess the full impact of the trial for Sierra Leone and his native Liberia, all of which
are now enjoying relative serenity in the Mano River Basin of West Africa compared
to the tumultuous decade of the 1990s. Yet, as the dramatic last finale for the SCSL
which concluded his trial and then closed its doors in December 2013, the case was
a major milestone. Partly because nearly all the other SCSL indictments related to
suspects who were present in Sierra Leone, they were swiftly arrested and
transferred to the custody of the tribunal. Much like the other aspects of his trial,
when it came to Taylor, matters were markedly different. In fact, although the first
actual indictee of the SCSL with the case number 2003-001, he was the last person
to be tried by the SCSL. This was obviously not scripted. However, the coincidence
of the delayed arrest and trial after the Freetown cases had been completed gave the
effect of a crescendo to one of Beethoven's concertos. Here, finally, was the Sierra
Leone tribunal's most important case involving its most important accused.
From the prosecution's perspective, the conviction of Taylor was a success,
even if a somewhat qualified one.366 And, from the perspective of the defendant
366. William A. Schabas, Charles Taylor Judgment Suggests a More Modest Level of Participation
in the Sierra Leone Conflict, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2012/04/charles-taylor-judgment-suggests-more.html.
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who had insisted on his innocence, it was a major loss. For the judges, it was the
court's longest and most voluminous trial, with the most public spotlight and perhaps
even the most external and internal pressure to get things right. Yet, they shifted
through mountains of oral and documentary evidence and issued a reasoned opinion
that generally satisfied the requirements of a fair trial under the law. Interestingly,
the Taylor case was the only one in the SCSL where the bench was unanimous on
all issues-three judges at the trial as well as five in the appeals chamber; a total of
eight judges. There were no formal dissents, as there were in all the other AFRC,
RUF, and CDF cases.
Finally, in terms of wider significance, since World War II, there have been
several international tribunal prosecutions of former heads of state or government.
At Nuremberg, German Admiral-turned-head of state Karl Doenitz who stepped in
to replace Adolf Hitler after his suicide was prosecuted. In the ICTY, former
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milogevi6, was tried but died of illness before his
judgment could be rendered. At the ICTR, Rwandese politician Jean Kambanda,
who was prime minister during the genocide, pled guilty to orchestrating genocide
and crimes against humanity at the ICTR on May 1, 1998. At the ICC, former
President Laurent Gbagbo (Ivory Coast) will soon be on trial while Sudan's
President Al Bashir remains at large, despite an indictment containing genocide and
crimes against humanity charges against him. Viewed against this backdrop, the
historic nature of Taylor being the first former president since Nuremberg to have
been indicted, to contest the charges, and to be fully tried and then convicted before
an international criminal court becomes self-evident. If nothing else, the case
affirms that when there is political will, no immunity will attach to a current or
former president when he is tried before an international court for international
crimes. Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor may thus go down in history as a
sizeable drop in the anti-impunity bucket, whose ripples will be felt by future African
warlords and rebel leaders as well as many other heads of state or government further
afield. The implications of Taylor are certainly clear for the leaders of States that
are in the habit of aiding and abetting rebels and providing arms, ammunition and
other logistics to rebel groups for personal, political, economic or other gains.
Although not free of difficulty, given all the legal and political controversies that
surrounded it, the trial may even prove to be a giant step towards the idea that no
man or woman-no matter how powerful-is above the reach of international
criminal law. At least sometimes. 367
367. 1 say sometimes both to signal the lack of accountability for others from more powerful states
which are undermining the presumed neutrality and thus legitimacy of modem international criminal law,
but also to clarify that even within the context of Sierra Leone and Liberia, impunity seems to have
prevailed for the crimes in Liberia. For the thoughtful suggestion that it might have been better to take a
more regional instead of country specific approach to transitional justice in both Sierra Leone and Liberia,
see Matiangai Sirleaf, Regional Approach to Transitional Justice? Examining the Special Courtfor Sierra
Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Liberia, 21 FL. J. OF INT'L. L. 2 (2009).
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ENTRENCHING SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE
DESIGN OF THE GLOBAL AGENDA AFTER 2015
AMERICO B. ZAMPETTI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the dawn of the 21st century, the Millennium Development Goals
("MDGs")' have largely dominated the development discourse. The new concept
of "sustainable development goals" ("SDGs") was launched at the 2012 Rio
conference on Sustainable Development. 2 The General Assembly of the United
Nations was called on to develop them. Due to the proximity in time with the
conclusion of the MDGs framework in 2015, the project to define such goals has
been subsumed in the design of a new, broad U.N. development agenda, which is to
be adopted by heads of state and government at a U.N. Summit (the "Summit") in
September 2015. 3
This article aims to elucidate the importance of the conceptual framework for
such development agenda and the related goals and sees an opportunity for the
Summit to entrench some crucial elements of sustainable human development and
the allied capability approach at the international level. In particular, the emphasis
that the capability approach places on ends, rather than means, on well-being rather
than simply income and wealth, and the close association of human development
with human rights makes this approach particularly relevant for the ongoing
discussion at the United Nations.
This article starts with Sections II and III reviewing, on the basis of the MDGs'
experience, plausible understandings of what international goals are, and what they
can aim to achieve, as policy and cooperation instruments. Or, in other words, what
are their perceived nature and purpose(s). Sections IV and V look at the MDGs'
ideational foundation as one possible explanation of why international
commitments, such as the MDGs, can achieve considerable impact and success in
delivering on their functions.
On the basis of the existing experience and of the ongoing debates at the United
Nations, the article explores the normative questions that need to be addressed in the
design of the new global agenda. These questions essentially relate to the
* Head of the economic section of the European Union delegation to the U.N. The views expressed are
strictly and solely personal.
1. The MDGs are contained in U.N. Secretary-General, Road Map Towards the Implementation
of the United Nations Millennium Declaration: Rep of the Secretary-General, 1180, U.N. Doc. A/56/326
(Sept. 6, 2001).
2. To see the outcome document of that conference, see G.A. Res. 66/288, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/66/288 (July 27, 2012) [hereinafter The Future We Want].
3. The Summit has been called in G.A. Res 68/6, 1[ 26, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/6 (Oct. 9, 2013).
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interpretation of the normative core of sustainable development as set out and
understood through state practice at multilateral level, how this core is grounded in
a shared notion of human dignity, and whether such understanding promises to
provide a firm basis for action (Section VI). A consensus on the normative core
would indeed provide a solid and ethically grounded foundation for a universal
agenda, thus promoting sustainable human development across people, countries,
and generations. The contention is that understanding the meaning and purpose of
international goals-setting, and the source of their compliance pull, can help in the
process of designing and then successfully implementing the new agenda, and thus
contribute to moving the world towards sustainable human development (Section
VII).
II. A BIT OF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS
After some considerable debate, the concept of SDGs, first proposed by
Colombia in 2011 during the negotiations leading up to the 2012 Rio conference,
was retained in the conference outcome document (in the part setting out the
"Framework for Action and Follow-up").4 The agreement on the notion came late,
which explains its positioning in the outcome document after the substance of
thematic and cross-sectoral issues was already addressed.' The document does not
define what the SDGs are, or what exactly they are meant to achieve, it only sets out
some of the characteristics they should have.6 The existing experience with goals-
setting at the United Nations, and especially the experience of the MDGs, of which
the SDGs are considered the immediate successors, can provide useful lessons.
The establishment of development-related and sectoral goals has a long
tradition at the United Nations.7 The classic, and arguably most successful, example
relates to the goal of eliminating smallpox, which was set by the World Health
Assembly in 1966 and achieved by 1977.8 Many other objectives were set over time,
and especially in the U.N. conferences of the 1990s, such as those dealing with
children, education, environment, women, population, urbanization, and social
development.9 In the debates of the second half of the decade, a sub-set of the
objectives established in such conferences, summarized and partly recast, started to
be referred to as "development goals."" Such refraining and distillation took place
4. The Future We Want, supra note 2, 104.
5. Late in the negotiations there were attempts at defining such goals, a task that proved impossible
to realize in the limited time that remained before the conclusion of the conference. For an informed
account of the conference, see FELIX DODDS, JORGE LAGUNA-CELIS & LIZ THOMPSON, FROM RIo+20
TO A NEW DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: BUILDING A BRIDGE TO A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2014).
6. The Future We Want, supra note 2, 1 246-47.
7. Richard Jolly, Global Development Goals: The United Nations Experience, 5 J. OF HUM. DEV.
69,69 (2004).
8. Id. at 70.
9. ld. at 69-70.
10. A 1996 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") report stated:
"[m]any goals have been formulated through the series of recent United Nations conferences addressing
subjects important to development .... These conferences have identified a number of targets to measure
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within the relevant international organizations, especially in the United Nations, the
World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), with the contribution of the related epistemic communities and civil
society. II  The "development goals" finally found their way, not without
considerable debate and controversy, in the 2000 Millennium Declaration,' 2 which
incorporated the majority of them (albeit with some noticeable differences). ' 3
The Millennium Declaration is a rather unusual document, which departs from
the tradition of long, and often convoluted, U.N. documents that by their nature
include formulaic passages, compromises, and obfuscation of underlying
disagreements. The Millennium Declaration, on the contrary, is relatively terse and
clear, but also wide-ranging and visionary. In its first part devoted to "Values and
Principles" it displays a "constitutional" tone. " The following sections, while short,
provide a rather clear sense of direction and set specific, and in some cases time
bound, objectives in the areas of peace and security, human rights, environment, and
development, among others.15
These objectives were further elaborated upon in 2001 in a U.N. Secretary
General report requested by the General Assembly as a follow-up to the Summit.' 6
The Secretary General's report was meant to set out in detail how the Millennium
Declaration commitments could be implemented and fulfilled.' 7 Goals were set in
all areas, but in the field of "development and poverty eradication" specifically,
these were named the "millennium development goals" and were said to "highlight
some of the priority areas that must be addressed to eliminate extreme poverty. '
18
the progress of development in particular fields. They reflect broad agreement in the international
community, arrived at with the active participation of the developing countries. The selection of an
integrated set of goals, based on these agreed targets, could provide valuable indicators of progress. We
are suggesting several such indicators in the fields of economic well-being, social development and
environmental sustainability. The particular indicators we have chosen reflect our judgment of their
importance in their own right and as meaningful proxies for broader development goals. Our selection
does not indicate any diminished commitment to other goals accepted by the international community, at
international conferences or elsewhere." DEV. ASSISTANCE COMM., OECD, SHAPING THE 21ST
CENTURY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 9 (1996); see also David Hulme, The
Making of the Millennium Development Goals: Human Development Meets Results-based Management
In an Imperfect World (Brooks World Poverty Inst., Working Paper No. 16, 2007); INT'L MONETARY
FUND, OECD, UNITED NATIONS & WORLD BANK GRP., A BETTER WORLD FOR ALL: PROGRESS
TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2000).
11. See DEv. ASSISTANCE COMM., supra note 10, at 19.
12. U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000)
[hereinafter Millennium Declaration]. Heads of States and Governments adopted it at the Millennium
summit.
13. For instance, access to reproductive health was in the end omitted from the Declaration and the
MDGs. Millennium Declaration. Id.
14. ld. part 1.
15. Id. parts 1l-VIII.
16. See Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration,
supra note 1.
17. Id. 1I2.
18. Id. 1180. For an insider's account of the genesis of the MDGs, see Michael W. Doyle, Dialectics
of a Global Constitution: The Struggle Over the UN Charter, 18 EUR. J. OF INT'L REL. 601 (2012).
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In particular, the Millennium Declaration set out the goal to "to halve, by the year
2015, the proportion of the world's people whose income is less than one dollar a
day."' 9 The focus on poverty eradication had already been firmly established at the
1995 Copenhagen Social Summit, albeit in more ambitious but also open-ended
fashion.2" The actual formulation, which was retained as Target 1 in the MDG
framework, is definitively less ambitious (halving instead of eradicating poverty)
but time-bound (by 2015), and is essentially the same as the one set out in a 1996
OECD Development Assistance Committee document.21 The MDGs also set out
several other objectives (especially in the areas of health and education), which are
necessary to address basic needs and foster human development in developing
countries.
22
The MDGs as such (with the goals/targets/indicators construction) were
informally discussed but never formally agreed by governments. 23 The MDGs were
established essentially through consultation among members of the U.N. Secretariat
and representatives of other international organizations. The experts established
specific targets and selected relevant indicators with a view to developing a
comprehensive evaluation framework for the MDGs. 24 The Secretary General report
was only "noted with appreciation" by the General Assembly in 2002 with no
mention of the MDGs. 25 They were formally endorsed, ex post facto, after a few
years when a sense that they could actually be at least partly successful emerged.26
19. See Millennium Declaration, supra note 12, 19.
20. Commitment 2 adopted at the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit stated: "[w]e commit ourselves
to the goal of eradicating poverty in the world, through decisive national actions and international
cooperation, as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind." World Summit for
Social Development, Copenhagen, Den., Mar. 6-12, 1995, Report of the World Summit for Social
Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 166/9 (Apr. 19, 1995).
21. DEV. AsSISTANCE COMM., supra note 10, at 9.
22. Id. at 10.
23. During the negotiation of the 2005 U.N. World Summit Outcome, the United States voiced
strong opposition to inclusion of reference to the MDGs in the document. In September 2005 the then
Assistant Secretary of State K. Silverberg clarified the U.S. position in an interview stating that the United
States continues to "strongly support" the goals it agreed to in the Millennium Declaration, such as
reducing world poverty by half by 2015 and reducing instances of HIV/AIDS. "Sometimes people use
[the term] MDGs to mean other things, in particular of a list of targets and indicators that were in a
document the [U.N.] secretariat produced" following the Millennium Declaration. "The United States
did not negotiate that document or agree to it and neither did many other states. It is solely a document
of the secretariat." Confusion about the U.S. stance on the MDGs was a result of erroneous reports
presented by some media about the meaning of the term Millennium Development Goals. "The outcome
[final summit] document clarifies the term MDGs, which means goals in the Millennium Declaration."
Kathryn McConnell, U.N. Document Clarifies Development Goals, State's Silverberg Says, lIP DIGITAL
(Sept. 16, 2005), http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/
2005/09/20050916110129akllennoccm0.3649256.html#axzz3LAMxFVEw (alterations in original).
24. Experts were also subsequently involved in supporting implementation of the MDGs, see UN
Millennium Project, MILLENNIUM PROJECT, http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/index.htm.
25. In U.N. practice, noting with appreciation a document connotes no opposition, but no full
embrace either. See Jan Vandemoortele, The MDG Story: Intention Denied, 42 DEV. & CHANGE 1, 6
(2011).
26. At the 2005 U.N. follow-up summit whose outcome document stated at paragraph 17: "[wle
strongly reiterate our determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the development goals and
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Their functions thus need to be gleaned from sparse textual references and ensuing
practice.
As noted the Millennium Declaration exhibited some novel characteristics of
clarity and simplicity, as well as a renewed sense of purpose for the United Nations.
However, it is fair to say that at the time of its adoption, and despite the excitement
at the turn of the millennium, few would have expected that the objectives it
included, and the derivative MDGs, would turn out to be, or at least be perceived, as
successful, as they have been.
27
III. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL GOALS: AN INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH
Many international documents, both mandatory and not, establish goals
expressed with some precision, including by way of numerical levels (e.g.
percentages of growth or reduction) and are accompanied by timelines. The MDGs
are a prime example of this approach, and arguably among the most successful. The
set of accompanying targets and indicators made them even more specific,
actionable, and measurable.
However, the actual nature of goals and targets, such as the MDGs, has never
been fully established in an internationally agreed-upon document. 28 The 2001
Secretary General report clearly stated the aim to "harmonize reporting," which
apparently gave rise to the goals/targets/indicators apparatus.29 However, the report
also stressed the importance for the goals/targets to "focus national and international
priority-setting," and to "trigger action."30 In order to do so, the report also noted
that the goals/targets need to be "limited in number, be stable over time and
communicate clearly to a broad audience."'" These references speak to three
objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and summits, including those agreed at the
Millennium Summit that are described as the Millennium Development Goals, which have helped to
galvanize efforts towards poverty eradication." 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 17,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/l (Sept. 16, 2005).
27. On the importance of the MDGs in addressing some of the most pressing world's problems, see
JEFFREY D. SACHS, COMMON WEALTH: ECONOMICS FOR A CROWDED PLANET (2008). The extent of
their success, while widely recognized by many experts and government representatives, is not without
qualification. Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and
Development Debate Seen through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 755,
(2005); Ashwani Saith, From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in translation,
37 DEv. & CHANGE 1167-99 (2006); THOMAS POGGE, POLITICS AS USUAL: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE
PRO-POOR RHETORIC 57-71 (2010); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & Alicia Ely Yamin, The Power of Numbers: A
Critical Review of MDG Targets for Human Development and Human Rights, 56 DEV. 58, 58-65 (2013).
28. See Goal, Targets and Indicators, MILLENNIUM PROJECT,
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
29. Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, supra
note 1, at Annex 1.
30. Id. at Annex 1 3.
31. Id.
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distinct, but not incompatible, understandings of the goals/targets as policy and
cooperation instruments. 32
The first understanding (which was probably among the main objectives
pursued by the Secretary General in 2001 when setting out the MDGs) relates to the
establishment of an evaluation framework.33 Clearly spelled out goals and targets,
accompanied by indicators, allow governments and other stakeholders to monitor
progress towards broad objectives such as those set out in the Millennium
Declaration. This framework also creates some transparency, and some limited
accountability (i.e. clarifying who does what, in which area and with what results)
through regular, institutionalized review, as it has been done with modest success
within the U.N. Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC"), 34 and by means of
periodic progress reports prepared by the U.N. Secretariat.35
The second understanding is to see the goals/targets as communication and
messaging tools to frame issues, increase awareness, signal commitment, and
catalyze and galvanize action.36 The 2012 Rio document recognized this function
when it noted that the MDGs were "a useful tool.., for mobilization of stakeholders
and resources."37  As a result of their specificity, the goals/targets/indicators
approach moves beyond generic rallying calls, and has proven to be a powerful
advocacy instrument. This also allows for some non-institutional accountability
through social pressure and naming and shaming in the court of public opinion,
which has proven to be a critical force to promote implementation of the MDGs.
The third understanding is to consider the goals/targets/indicators as a
management tool, or even more ambitiously as a governance tool.38 This is in line
with the drive for reform in the public sector worldwide, which has focused attention
on the measurement and improvement of performance, the delivery of better results
and the means of achieving them. The uptake of strategic management concepts and
practices39 developed in the private sector with the aim to clarify objectives, set
goals, develop indicators, and collect and analyze data on results has become a
32. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Global Development Goal Setting as a Policy Tool for Global
Governance: Intended and Unintended Consequences 1-3 (Int'l Policy Ctr. for Inclusive Growth,
Working Paper No. 108, 2013).
33. Id. at 9.
34. The 2005 World Summit Outcome document mandated the Economic and Social Council with
ensuring the follow-up of the outcomes of the major U.N. conferences and summits, including the
internationally agreed development goals, and to hold annual ministerial-level substantive reviews to
assess progress, also drawing on the work of its functional and regional commissions and other
international institutions. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 26, 155.
35. The annual MDGs reports and MDG Gap Task Force reports related to MDG 8. See MDG Gap
Task Force, U.N. DESA: DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ANALYSIS DIVISION,
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdggap/.
36. For instance, by simplifying the issue of poverty in terms of income poverty (albeit to the
exclusion of key non-material elements of poverty, such as lack of voice, vulnerability and insecurity)
MDG I has certainly been successful in focusing attention on it.
37. The Future We Want, supra note 2, 1 245.
38. See GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND
RANKINGS (Kevin Davis et. al. eds., 2012); Fukuda-Parr, supra note 32, at 3.
39. See e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING FOR RESULTS 217 (2nd ed.1986).
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central orientation for public sector management. In many countries-at least since
the 1990s-establishing performance goals and indicators, assessing progress in
achieving goals, as well as reporting periodically on such progress, has become
established policy aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of
government.
40
Performance (or results-based) management has also been adopted at the
international level, in the United Nations and many international agencies. While
this approach is generally used at the level of the individual organization or process,
quantification, goal setting and use of indicators can be, and are, also used as broader
governance instruments through which policy priorities are set, objectives defined
and clarified, budget and resources allocated, and progress monitored.4' For most
organizations, the setting out of goals and outcomes (results) is linked to the general
vision and mission of the organization. 42 Similarly, goal setting for public policy is,
40. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR (1993); OECD, PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND RESULTS-ORIENTED
MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 3 (1994). In some cases this approach
has been enshrined into law, as in the case of the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.
See John C. Dembach, Targets, Timetables and Effective Implementing Mechanisms: Necessary Building
Blocks for Sustainable Development, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 79, 93 (2002); Hulme,
supra note 10. Entrenching a numerically expressed goal in legislation is obviously no guarantee for
success. For instance in the Dominican Republic the right to education is constitutionally affirmed and
Law 66-97 of 1997 mandates that annual public spending has to attain a minimum of 16% of total public
expenditure or 4% of GDP, whichever is higher. However, it took over 15 years and a sustained social
movement to finally achieve the implementation of the target in the 2012 budget. See ECOSOC.
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant:
Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Dominican
Republic, Nov. 1-19, 2010, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/DOM/CO/3; Observatorio del Presupuesto en Educacidn,
Macro Visidn del Presupuesto de la Educacidn Preuniversitaria 2013: Consideraciones sobre las
prioridades presupuestarias de la asignacin del 4% del PIB, EL OBSERVATORIO DEL PRESUPESTO
EDUCATIVO (Foro Socioeducativo, Rephblica Dominicana), June 2013.
41. "Specific objectives also focus efforts of governmental and nongovernmental actors over the
long term. Political and other leaders come and go, but properly established targets and timetables remain
in place. Goals are a management tool for focusing the efforts of administrative agencies, corporations
and other organizations, and even national governments and the international community. Goals become
the basis around which budgets are developed and implemented; personnel are hired and allocated;
programs are created, modified, or harmonized; and rewards and punishments are meted out." Dembach,
supra note 40, at 99.
42. Companies often have a mission statement, which "tells the people in the company what their
values are, and what effectiveness means for the company and for their own work. Like all effective
mission statements, it makes a team out of what otherwise would be a mob, with each employee doing
his or her own work rather than focusing on a common purpose. Without an effective mission statement,
in other words, there will be no performance .... [T]he effective mission statement is not a statement of
financial goals .... The mission statement has to express the contribution the enterprise plans to make to
society, to economy ... It has to express the fact that the business enterprise is an institution of society
and serves to produce social benefits.... Mission statements that express the purpose of the enterprise in
financial terms fail inevitably, to create the cohesion, the dedication, the vision of the people who have
to do the work so as to realize the enterprise's goal." PETER F. DRUCKER, DRUCKER ON ASIA: A
DIALOGUE BETWEEN PETER DRUCKER AND ISAO NAKAUCHI 128 (1997) [hereinafter DRUCKER &
NAKAUCHI].
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or surely ought to be, underpinned by the agreed values and political choices of the
underlying society (which brings us to the later section on the constitutional
understanding of the goals).
The Rio text does not provide a definitive answer on which of the three
understandings outlined above is specifically intended or should prevail. The
document states that the goals "should be action-oriented, concise and easy to
communicate, '43 thus stressing their expected advocacy function. They are "to be
assessed and accompanied by targets and indicators,"" suggesting their importance
as an evaluative framework.
The text also notes that "the goals should address and be focused on priority
areas for the achievement of sustainable development., 45 This would appear to hark
back to the existing-albeit incomplete and open to contestation-understanding of
sustainable development (and what that really means in policy terms), as contained
in earlier documents going back at least to the 1992 Rio conference and Agenda
21,46 as well as the 2012 Rio outcome document itself, and indicates that the
priorities for the achievement of sustainable development are in good measure
already set. In this account, the definition of the goals/targets/indicators would just
be a quasi-technocratic (evidence-based) establishment of "what works" in the
various areas and what the best metric to measure progress is. 47
However, this rather technocratic approach does not appear to prevail due to
the expectations for, and the interest in, the process of designing the SDGs that have
arisen since the adoption of the Rio document. This process has led to a wide
consultation and debate within the General Assembly, 4 8 and also, and perhaps even
more significantly, at national and regional level, and within civil society since
2013. 4' For an international system that is often criticized for the absence of
demos,50 the debates that the post-2015 agenda has generated have been particularly
43. The Future We Want, supra note 2, 11247.
44. Id. 250.
45. Id. 11247.
46. See U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14,
1192, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.I (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992).
47. On the problems related to such a technocratic approach, see Charles Sabel & Sanjay Reddy,
Learning to Learn: Undoing the Gordian Knot of Development Today, 50 CHALLENGE 73, 73-95 (2007).
48. See U.N. Secretary-General, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming all
Lives and Protecting the Planet, Synthesis Report of the Secretary-General on the Post-2015 Sustainable
Development Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/69/700 (Dec. 4, 2014).
49. Post-2015 Process, U.N. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM,
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015.
50. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law - Governance, Democracy and
Legitimacy, 64 ZAORV. 547, 547-62 (2004).
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vibrant,5' approximating to some extent what Habermas refers to as the "global
public sphere" or Sen by "government by discussion."
52
For any country, group of countries, constituency within or outside
governments, or interest group, the fact that an issue area (and the related objectives)
of specific concern or interest acquires the status of an internationally agreed goal
(or at least of an associated target) is considered highly desirable. It is a recognition
of priority, a sanctioning of the legitimacy of the related policies and actions, a
guarantee that the issue will remain under the policy spotlight, and an enhanced
probability that funds will be allocated (at the national and regional level, through
international cooperation and in the budget of international agencies). This
heightened expectation of the pay-off from "making the list" appears to explain, at
least in part, the wide interest that the SDGs' process has elicited and the flurry of
potential candidates for goals and targets that have been put forward. The many
months of difficult deliberations within the General Assembly working group tasked
to elaborate them have produced a "proposal" for a set of seventeen goals and 169
targets that is testimony to these expectations.
53
A multi-level impact on policy and agenda-setting was the ambition expressed
in the 2001 Secretary General report for the MDGs. 54 An ambition that has been in
51. People around the world have expressed their views in many different ways. Countless NGOs,
from large international ones, such as OXFAM, Human Rights Watch and WWF, to small local ones are
participating in the debates. The U.N. Development Group organized an unprecedented consultation and
global conversation and millions of people, especially young persons, took part in these processes,
through national, thematic, and on-line consultations and surveys. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT GROUP, A
MILLION VOICES: THE WORLD WE WANT (2013); MY WORLD: THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL SURVEY
FOR A BETTER WORLD, http://vote.myworld20l5.org/. These were also mirrored in THE GLOBAL
PARTNERSHIP FOR YOUTH IN THE POST-2015 AGENDA, THE GLOBAL YOUTH CALL, available at
http://www.un.org/youthenvoy/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-GlobalYouth Call.pdf. National
Parliaments have shown significant interest. See HOUSE OF COMMONS ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT
COMMITTEE, CONNECTED WORLD: AGREEING AMBITIOUS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN 2015
(2014), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20 415/cmselect/cmenvaud/452/452.pdf. The European
Parliament adopted a resolution on 25 November 2014 on the EU and the global development framework
after 2015. European Parliament Resolution on the EU and the Global Development Framework after
2015, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA-PROV 0059 (2014, available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2014-
0059&language=EN&ring-A8-2014-0037). The Inter-Parliamentary Union has also debated the new
agenda. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, Quito Communique, 128th Assemb. (2013), available at
http://www.ipu.org/conf-e/128/quito-comm.htm. The private sector has also shown heightened interest
in the discussion and has actively participated through the International Chamber of Commerce, other
business coalitions and through the U.N. Global Compact. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
52. See Ji rgen Habermas, The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation
Problems of a Constitution for World Society, in EUROPE: THE FALTERING PROJECT 109, 124, 109-31
(2009); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 324 (2009) [hereinafter SEN, JUSTICE]
53. See G.A. Res. 68/309, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/309 (Sept. 10, 2014); Rep. of the Open Working
Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, Aug. 12, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/68/970
[hereinafter Rep. on Sustainable Development Goals].
54. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 1, 1181 ("It is crucial that the millennium development goals
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good measure realized, as acknowledged in the Rio document,55 as well as by many
commentators.56 However, beyond agenda-setting, the assessment of the impact that
the increased policy priority engendered by the individual MDGs ultimately
produced on the ground and in the life of the concerned people (which is indeed
what really matters) remains quite complex, despite the efforts spent at refining
indicators and gathering data.
In conclusion, by examining the Rio text, looking at the MDGs' experience,
and considering the heightened expectations of stakeholders in governments, civil
society, and the private sector, it appears that a possible shared understanding is for
international goals to work-at the same time-as a policy priority-setting
instrument (with purchase on resource allocation, both nationally and
internationally), an evaluative and accountability framework and an advocacy tool.
Of course, the priority-setting function is particularly complex. Already in the
case of the MDGs, it has given rise to significant criticism, 57 and controversy has
not diminished in the discussions surrounding the setting of goals aimed at achieving
sustainable development, a much broader concept than development per se and
surely not confined to environmental protection. And one that, while at the center
of at least three major U.N. conferences (Rio 1992, Johannesburg 2002 and Rio
2012), as well as countless references at the United Nations, in other international
fora and documents and domestic law, 58 remains to be fully defined, understood and
unpacked from a policy perspective (and to use a term of the U.N. vernacular,
"operationalized").
In addition, the 2012 Rio text's description of the SDGs grafts the requirements
of an advocacy tool, which needs to communicate simple and short messages, onto
a process of priority setting, which requires context and explanation.59 This may
lead to some unintended consequences, such as the crowding out of important
elements and an excessive simplification of complex issues, as it was the case for
the MDGs (e.g. with the reduction of"poverty" to "income poverty").6 Similarly,
the design of the evaluation framework may lead to distortion as action and attention
become national goals and serve to increase the coherence and consistency of national policies and
programmes.").
55. The Future We Want, supra note 2, 245.
56. See EUROPEAN REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT 2013, POST 2015: GLOBAL ACTION FOR AN
INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (2013).
57. Fukuda-Parr, supra note 32, at 13, specifically laments that numerically expressed goals and
targets "remove much of the ambiguity that is embedded in the concept of poverty as a dehumanizing
condition, but they also remove the very concept of poverty as an affront to human dignity and a denial
of human rights. They simplify the complex human condition, abstract it out of local realities and theories
and reify an intangible concept into a tangible, measurable condition."
58. For instance, the concept of sustainable development is recalled in the Preamble of Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in Article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as
many national constitutions and other legal texts. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 11.
59. See generally The Future We Want, supra note 2.
60. Millennium Declaration, supra note 12, 19.
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may tend to be concentrated on the elements subject to measuring and verification
(through statistical indicators).61
Finally and most significantly, the importance that the MDGs have had over
time and their (at least partial) success on the ground cannot be explained solely by
their instrumental nature and the fact that they were expressed with simple and clear
numerical references. As Watkins noted, "the MDGs are more than hitting
numerical targets. They enshrine principles based on human rights, equity and social
justice."62
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE GOALS: ENHANCED LEGITIMACY AND COMPLIANCE PULL
From a strictly formalistic perspective documents such as the Millennium
Declaration, the results of U.N. conferences, as well as the expected outcome of the
planned 2015 Summit (which should incorporate the SDGs as part of the new agenda
post 2015) have the status, and exhibit the same legal features, of General Assembly
resolutions, even if they may have different designations (declarations, plans of
action, agendas and the like).63 As such, they pertain to the realm of "soft law" and
are not formally binding on states or individuals.64 This point was clearly
acknowledged in the 2012 Rio outcome document which characterizes the SDGs as
"aspirational."65
However, U.N. resolutions, while soft, may still possess considerable legal and
political authority, to the extent that they often represent widely held expectations
that affect in a variety of ways the actual behavior of economic and political actors,
as well as broader civil society.66 This is a reason why they are so intensely debated
61- Saith, supra note 27, at 1174 (arguing that statistics can be misused or selectively used and
manipulated, and outcomes misrepresented (with averages hiding individual realities) leading to
"perverse incentives and behaviour").
62. KEVIN WATKINS, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: THREE PROPOSALS FOR
RENEWING THE VISION AND RESHAPING THE FUTURE 5 (2008), available at http://www.astrid-
online.it/rassegnalRassegna-25/30-04-2008/WATKNS-Relaz-ProgressiveGovemanceSummit-
05 04 08.pdf.
63. Jose Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as Lawmakers, 31 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 591, 602 (2008).
64. Interestingly, despite the non-binding character of the source, states still often consider
qualifying their consensus necessary especially when the issues in discussion are of particular sensitivity.
See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Population and Development, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development, Sales No. E.95.XIII. 18. Similarly, the Report of the Open
Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals has been accompanied by several reservations. See
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals
Addendum: Explanations of Position and Reservations on the Report, U.N. Doc A/68/970/Add.l (Oct.
27, 2014).
65. The Future We Want, supra note 2 1 247.
66. BENEDETTO CONFORTI & CARLO FOCARELLI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 407 (4th ed. 2010) ("It is worth emphasizing that the hortatory nature of recommendations-
and more generally of so-called soft law-is far from insignificant in international relations. The
hortatory function of recommendations should not be seen as a pure and simple 'entrustment' of the
international organs of an improbable 'good will' of States. The point is that in the absence of a world
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and negotiated. Even apart from an eventual transformation of their status into
binding rules, 7 and an argument can be made that some of the Millennium
Declaration commitments have acquired customary international law status,6 8 "soft
law" standards may serve to lend increased legitimacy to actions, policies and rules
that conform to them. The most important role of non-binding instruments, such as
U.N. declaration and recommendations, "lies not so much in the production of legal
effects . . . as in the impetus they give to the transformation of international law in
a manner more consistent with the values and interests shared by the community of
all States and their peoples.-
69
While the record of implementation of the Millennium Declaration
commitments and the derivative MDGs is mixed,7" it is clear that-at least some of
them-have exercised considerable influence on the actual behavior and policies of
the relevant actors (in particular by increasing the acceptability and desirability, if
not the sense of obligation, associated with MDG-induced policies).7"
Viewed from a broad realist perspective, it would be easy to dismiss the
pronouncements contained in documents such as the Millennium Declaration or the
Rio outcome as either exercises in futility, smokescreens or at best self-serving
efforts in boosting reputation. However, while the issue of reputation is certainly
important in international relations, "soft" commitments seem to matter beyond that.
Even formally non-binding international commitments exhibit an autonomous
"compliance pull," whereby states feel compelled-at least to an extent-to respect
them even when they otherwise have an incentive to ignore or break them and free-
ride.72 Indeed complete failure to act upon "soft" commitments, or worse acting in
authority superior to the States it is of the utmost importance for each State, and for other international
organs ... to know what behavior is approved and even solicited, rather than condemned, by the generality
of the States without materializing into a positive rule, possibly because of the resistance of one or a few
more powerful States.").
67. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE'S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (8th ed.
2012) ("Even when they are framed as general principles, [U.N. General Assembly] resolutions ...
provide a basis for the progressive development of the law and the speedy consolidation of customary
rules."); see also South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 248, 289 (July 18) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Tanaka) (arguing that when trying to prove the existence of a certain customary norm of
international law, General Assembly Resolutions can be used as evidence of general practice. He also
observed that the General Assembly can accelerate the formation of customs by providing a forum where
a state "has the opportunity, through the medium of an organization, to declare its position to all members
of the organization and to know immediately their reaction on the same matter.").
68. Alston, supra note 27, at 771.
69. CONFORTI & FOCARELLI, supra note 66, at 408.
70. See, e.g., Mac Darrow, The Millennium Development Goals: Milestones or Millstones? Human
Rights Priorities for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 15 YALE H.R. & DEv. L.J. 55, 70 (2012).
71. Xuan Li, Soft Law-making on Development: The Millennium Development Goals and Post-2015
Development Agenda, 10 MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L. 362, 364 (2013).
72. Kal Rustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and
Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 541 (Walter Carinaes et al. eds.,
2002).
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a way that hampers other states' action in pursuit of common commitments, may
entail significant political costs.73
The strength of the compliance pull is in good measure linked to the extent to
which specific commitments, rules or regimes are regarded as legitimate. Following
Franck, legitimacy, which can be viewed as the quality of prescriptions making
states abide by them voluntarily,74 is dependent on a number of dimensions related
to textual clarity and validation through adherence to the "standards that define how
rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied.""5 On both accounts, the Rio call for
the SDGs to be "concise and easy to communicate" and established by the U.N.
General Assembly by means of an "inclusive and transparent intergovernmental
process . . . open to all stakeholders,"76 if fully realized, would enhance their
legitimacy. But perhaps even more importantly, legitimacy derives from
"coherence." "Rules, to be perceived as legitimate, must emanate from principles
of general application."77 Thus, the degree of legitimacy depends in large part on
the "connectedness between rules united by underlying principles ... manifest[ing]
the existence of an underlying rule-skein which connects disparate ad hoc
arrangements into a network of rules 'governing' a community of states, the
members of which perceive the coherent rule system's powerful pull towards
voluntary compliance." 78 It is this link between rules and higher-order principles
that leads states to comply, in good measure, with the rules, even when their
contingent interests would indicate a different course of action.79 This respect for
the fundamental structure of the international society and of its legitimate rules
creates a sense of community, which in turns leads to a tendency to disapprove of
and often sanction free-riding.8" Among the higher order principles there are
73. From a legal perspective it has been convincingly argued that recommendations entail an
obligation for states, rather an important one from an accountability perspective, to take their content into
consideration in good faith and to provide an explanation in case no compliance is intended. Voting
Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Conceming Territory of South-West Africa,
Advisory Opinion, 1955 I.C. J. Reports 95, p. 117-9 (Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht) ("What has
been challenged-and, I believe, properly challenged-is its right simply to ignore the recommendations
and to abstain from adducing reasons for not putting them into effect or for not submitting them for
examination with the view to giving effect to them. What has been questioned is the opinion that a
recommendation is of no legal effect whatsoever. A Resolution recommending ... a specific course of
action creates some legal obligation which, however rudimentary, elastic and imperfect, is nevertheless a
legal obligation and constitutes a measure of supervision. The State in question, while not bound to
accept the recommendation, is bound to give it due consideration in good faith.").
74. THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990) (defining
legitimacy partially as "a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards
compliance on those addressed normatively").
75. Id. at 184.
76. The Future We Want, supra note 2, 1 247-48.
77. FRANCK, supra note 74.
78. Id. at 180-81.
79. Americo B. Zampetti, Democratic Legitimacy in the World Trade Organization: The Justice
Dimension, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 107 (2003).
80. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 13
(1977) ("A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
certainly some that derive from international human rights,8 ' but arguably and
increasingly also the values and principles set out in part I of the Millennium
Declaration and the shared understanding of justice that can be derived therefrom. 82
These principles lend a particular compliance pull to the commitments, rules
and policies linked to them. They provide the normative justification and the sense
of moral obligation that leads the relevant actors to conform to a provision or support
an action. As Hurrell put it:
Rules and norms of this kind do not develop as a result of a distinct
interplay of state interests or because of the functional benefits which
they provide. Rather they depend on the common moral awareness that
works directly, if still in fragile and uneven ways, on the minds and
emotions of individuals within states. 83
It would appear that the compliance pull of the MDGs is directly linked to the
wide embrace and ethical purchase of the values and principles set out in the
Millennium Declaration and the connectedness of the objectives included in the
Millennium Declaration with such values and principles.
V. UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL GOALS: A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW
This leads us to a different way of looking at the Millennium Declaration and
the set of goals derived therefrom and to think of them as normative materials that
contribute to the (re)constituting of the international community.84 This can help
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the workings of common
institutions.").
81. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 1 33-34
(Feb. 5) ("[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-A-vis another State .... By their very nature
the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes .... Such obligations
derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including
protection from slavery and racial discrimination."); Rep. of the tnt'l Law Comm'n, 53 Sess., Apr. 23-
June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ch. 1, art. I (recognizing the category of erga omnes
obligations). On the risks related to the variable normativity that this type of concepts pose to international
law, see generally Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
413 (1983).
82. Millennium Declaration supra note 12, [ 2 ("We recognize that, in addition to our separate
responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of
human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the
world's people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the
future belongs.").
83. Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in
REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49, 65-66 (Volker Rittberger & Peter Mayer eds.,
1993); see also IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER tN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL 7 (2007) (describing legitimacy as "an actor's normative belief that a rule or
institution ought to be obeyed.").
84. There are several important constitutionalizing trends in the international community, including
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elucidate the higher compliance pull that they at times exhibit. If we make a parallel
with a generally accepted account of a democratic constitution, which aims at
defining the form and the limits of government, and also at setting out "the goals for
which the government is empowered to act,'" it is possible to regard a text such as
the Millennium Declaration as a contribution to the objective of entrenching the
goals that the international community set for itself. The Millennium Declaration
spells out in quite some detail a set of principles that are often found in domestic
democratic constitutions.86 For instance, Paulus considers that the Millennium
Declaration contributes to the building of the constitutional principle of solidarity
into the international system.87 Indeed, the whole first part of the Millennium
Declaration sets out some very important values and principles that on the basis of
a long normative accretion within the United Nations, one made of countless
resolutions, declarations and conference documents, could be consensually
considered by the world leaders assembled in New York in the year 2000 as
"essential to international relations in the twenty-first century"-a constitutive
approach, at least on its face.88 The Millennium Declaration can then be understood
as serving the constitutional function of elaborating on the values and aims of the
international community.89 It is an expansion of the provisions of the Preamble and
of article 1 of the Charter (especially article 1(3), but also of article 55) giving them
further meaning and content.90 Such an elaboration is important and necessary as
governance at the global level expands, perhaps not so much by rational and
the trend towards conferring a higher legal status to same part of human rights and humanitarian law and
the limits they imposes on domestic law, and the trend towards enhanced multilateral law-making powers
and adjudicative procedures within international organizations. See e.g., Anne Peters, Are We Moving
Towards Constitutionalization of the World Community?, in REALIZING UTOPIA - THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 118, 118-135 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2012).
85. Stephen Holmes, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189, 189-90 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andris Saj6 eds., 2012); INDIA
CONST. art. 37-38 (incorporating socio-economic rights as "directive principles" rather than explicitly
enforceable rights). Even liberal constitutions principally designed to limit the power of government and
regulate public authority, such as that of the United States, can be interpreted by giving pre-eminence to
the substantive goals stipulated in its preamble and especially the promotion of the "general welfare."
See generally SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
86. Millennium Declaration supra note 12,116 (addressing specifically freedom, equality, solidarity
and tolerance).
87. Andreas L. Paulus, The International Legal System as a Constitution, in RULING THE WORLD?
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 69, 106 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff &
Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
88. Millennium Declaration supra note 12, 116.
89. See Bardo Fassbender, Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on the Place of the U.N.
Charter in the International Legal Order, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 133, 137 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman
eds., 2009).
90. While it is well known that no organ of the United Nations has the formal power to interpret
the Charter, "[i]t is however unreasonable to think that the interpretation of the Charter would not be
affected by the passage of time and by practice.... [T]his is the core of the thesis according to which the
Charter should be regarded as a constitution, namely like an act that while remaining formally unaltered,
or nearly so, acquires new meanings over time adapting its principles to changed social circumstances."
See CONFORTI & FOCARELLI, supra note 66, at. 21,
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considered design,91 but in good measure as a result of the reduced ability of
individual nations to cope with global challenges, the increased cooperation
requirements for the provision of global public goods, as well as the growing
realization that the international community is no longer an aggregate of relations
among sovereign countries,92 but also a genuine community of both states and
individuals,93 ("We the peoples of the United Nations" of the Charter's Preamble)
with shared and universal objectives, interests and concerns. 94 Together with the
growing body of human rights law, the elaboration of values and principles in the
Millennium Declaration and the derived goals are part of the "transition from
international to cosmopolitan norms of justice," which "whatever the condition of
their legal origination, accrue to individuals as moral and legal persons in a
worldwide legal society. 95
However, it is also clear that the (re-)constitution of the international
community remains contested, and norm-making and goal-setting at the United
Nations is often met by skepticism.9 6 States continue often to use the organization
in a naked realist fashion.97 The normative production of the organization, as well
as of many of the agencies in the U.N. system, is frequently maligned or ignored,
including due to an excessive, often formulaic production of texts, a sort of
"inflation" in norm-making. The participation of civil society is still largely opposed
by several states. But, as in all long-term processes, the matter is one of trends. And
the trend appears to be moving in the direction of transcending the old state-centric
paradigm in favor of a different understanding of the international community, more
democratic, more conscious of its shared values and objectives.98
91. Clearly the development of regionalism in many part of the world and the unique experience of
the European Union are very significant trends.
92. See Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (speaking on the partial demise of sovereignty in the face of
globalization).
93. See Samantha Besson, Whose Constitutionalism(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism and
Democracy, in RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 381, 395 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); see also HABERMAS, supra
note 52, at 119 ("Today any conceptualization of a juridification of world politics must take as it starting
point individuals and states, as constituting the two categories of founding subjects of a world
constitution.").
94. On the idea of common interest, see W. M. REISMAN, THE QUEST FOR WORLD ORDER AND
HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIVE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL
COMMITMENT 126 (2012).
95. SEYLA BENHABIB, ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 16 (Robert Post, ed. 2006).
96. However, even a realist as Kissinger recognizes the importance for the international community
to have shared goals. HENRY KISSINGER, WORLD ORDER 2 (2014) ("Thus while 'the international
community' is invoked perhaps more intensively now than in any other era, it presents no clear or agreed
set of goals, methods, or limits.").
97. Francis Deng, Idealism and Realism: Negotiating Sovereignty in Divided Nations 11 (2010),
available at http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/DHLecture 2010.pdf.
98. For the move from a state- to a humanity-centric approach in international law, see RUTI G.
TEITEL, HUMANITY'S LAW (2011).
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This consciousness and the need of ethical justification through open and public
reasoning translates in a diminished ability of states to decide behind closed doors
and in a much larger reliance on discourses in their cooperative (and particularly in
institutionalized) relationships in order to arrive at a common understanding of the
desired or required behavior in any given situation. 9  The United Nations is one of
the main fora for this purpose, where the discussion stage is often more important
than the decision stage. In many areas of international relations, including those
related to economic, social and environmental fields, the use of force has lost much
its relevance;.. 0 due to globalization and interdependence, even "soft" power is
increasingly difficult to use, and national interests are increasingly difficult to
identify.' As a result discourse and persuasion have become even more important
instruments of state interaction and coordination.
In their discourses, especially in multilateral settings, which often now involve
various types of formal and informal interactions with civil society, states argue for
a preferred course of action, and they do so primarily in terms of the perceived
legitimacy of their positions.0 2 Their arguments are more convincing, and their
positions more acceptable, the more they are grounded in general (constitutional)
principles and shared understandings-or, in other words, the more legitimate they
are perceived. Higher-order principles, such as justice, equity, and human rights,
lend moral justification and hence legitimacy. The emerging understanding that the
principle of sustainable development has also acquired this higher status is of
particular salience for the design of the new global agenda and the SDGs.
According to Judge Weeramantry, sustainable development is a principle with
normative value, which demands striking a balance between development and
environmental protection. 103 But it is not merely that. "It is one of the most ancient
of ideas in the human heritage."'" As a result, and due to its wide and general
acceptance by the global community, the principle forms "an integral part of modem
99. ANDREAS HASENCLEVER, PETER MAYER & VOLKER RITTBERGER, THEORIES OF
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 176 (1997) ("A practical discourse is a debate conducted by members of a
community aiming at establishing or re-establishing a consensus on common norms of conduct as well
as on their interpretation and proper application in concrete situations.").
100. The international use of force has certainly diminished over time. A different conclusion may
be drown when considering the use of violence as a direct attack to basic human needs, such as the needs
of survival, well-being, identity and meaning, and freedom. See Johan Galtung, Cultural Violence, 27 J.
PEACE RES. 291, 293 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of the category of "structural violence" where
the issue of allocation of resources becomes fundamental. "The archetypal violent structure . . . has
exploitation has his centerpiece. This simply means that some people, the top-dogs, get much more (here
measured in needs currency) out of the interaction in the structure than others, the underdogs.").
101. See Joseph S. Nye, The Decline ofAmerica's Soft Power, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May/June 2004),
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power.
102. Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to "Legalization ": Richer Views of Law
and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743, 749 (2001) ("Legal claims are legitimate and persuasive only if they are
rooted in reasoned argument that ... attend[s] to contemporary social aspirations and the larger moral
fabric of society.").
103. Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 88 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion
of Vice President Weeramantry) [hereinafter Gabdikovo-Nagymaros,Weeramantry].
104. Id. at 110; see also C. G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALISING INTERNATIONAL LAW 431 (2004).
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international law."' 5 "It reaffirms in the arena of international law that there must
be both development and environmental protection, and that neither of these rights
can be neglected."'0 6  Anchoring the new agenda and the SDGs in a shared
understanding of what sustainable development normatively means, including
through reference to internationally agreed-upon texts, would lend them
considerable compliance pull.
While it remains true that states often make only rhetorical reference to
principles to conceal their interests and still amply use bargaining and sometime
coercion, it is also true that most of the time they engage in serious discourse in order
to justify their actions and do so out of the "sense of obligation" they perceive. 107
This stresses the important role of ethical ideas in international relations, in
particular because of the constitutive function these ideas fulfill for the international
society, and also in light of the role they play in shaping the identity of states, and
groups of states, and their conception of the self as it relates to other actors.lO The
self-understanding of states and their behavior and policies are inter-subjective and
iterative processes, which are much influenced by ideas, rules, and institutions. It is
in this sense that "soft" commitments, such as those of the Millennium Declaration,
have a powerful meaning and guide action. They are (or at least they ought to be)
indicative of the emerging of "shared understandings" and expectations among
states. And as such they do matter in the process of international policy- and rule-
making.
The new agenda and the related SDGs, if firmly grounded in higher order and
common principles and in a shared ethical understanding, will acquire enhanced
impact as a governance tool for priority setting and policy shaping (with influence
on resource allocation). While remaining, at least formally, outside the "juridical
paradigm of implementation,"'0 9 the new agenda and goals will nonetheless provide
a valuable instrument for advocacy, evaluation, accountability and social
mobilization." l0 As a result ethical grounding would still go a long way towards
achieving the requisite legitimacy and compliance pull for them to make a real
difference for humanity.
105. Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros,Weeramantry, supra note 103, at 89.
106. Id. at 95.
107. Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 72.
108. See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 384, 387 (1994) ("Identification is a continuum along which actors normally fall between the
extremes, motivated by both egoistic and solidaristic loyalties.").
109. CHARLES R. BEITZ, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (2009) (under a juridical paradigm of
implementation human rights are expected "to be embodied in domestic law and enforced in domestic
courts or, in the case of rights not easily made justiciable, . . .[to] be accepted as priorities for state
policy.").
110. It may well be that social mobilization is the critical factor in catalyzing change. See Richard
Falk, The Global Promise of Social Movements: Explorations at the Edge of Time, 12 ALTERNATIVES
173, 173 1987); Mary Robinson, Advancing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: The Way Forward,
26 HUM. RTS. Q. 866 (2004); see generally NEIL STAMMERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(2009).
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VI. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
As argued above, international goals of the kind included and derived from the
Millennium Declaration can be conceived both as (more modest) public policy tools
and, more significantly, as the expression of a consensus over the broader values and
objectives of the global community. Their constitutive character for the
international community does not derive from a formal (higher) status of the legal
source-on the contrary they are generally incorporated in a non-binding
instrument-but rather from the heightened legitimacy they command because of
the depth of engagement in, and the inclusive character of, the deliberative process
and the ensuing consensus they represent both among states and people (the full
scope of the international community), as well as the ethical ground on which they
stand.
The political authority and legitimacy of the new agenda and the SDGs will
directly derive from the principle of sustainable development," ' which has acquired
broad acceptance since the influential World Commission on Environment and
Development report (so-called Brundtland report) of 1987.' 12 The report famously
defines sustainable development as follows: "Sustainable development is
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs."'' 3
It also goes on to say:
The satisfaction of human needs and aspirations is the major objective of
development. The essential needs of vast numbers of people in
developing countries for food, clothing, shelter, jobs-are not being met,
and beyond their basic needs these people have legitimate aspirations for
an improved quality of life. A world in which poverty and inequity are
11. At least two decades of discussions at the United Nations contributed to the forging of the
concept. In the late 1960s the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" started to emerge with a
view to designating some localities as belonging to all humanity and available for everyone's use and
benefit. The idea of heritage clearly points to the need to take account of the intergenerational perspective.
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea declares the seabed and ocean floor to be the "common
heritage of mankind," whose resources cannot be claimed, appropriated, or owned by any state or person.
These resources belong to mankind as a whole. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 136, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 397; Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable
Development, 8 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 19, 19 (1992). Laura Horn, 'Sustainable Development'-Mere
Rhetoric or Realistic Objective?, 30 U. TAs. L. REV. 119, 128 (2011). At the same time in the 1960s and
1970s concerns for environmental degradation had been growing leading to the 1972 U.N. Conference
on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Quite importantly Principle I of the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration already stated that "[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being." U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972); see generally FELIX DODDS,
MICHAEL STRAUSS, & MAURICE STRONG, ONLY ONE EARTH: THE LONG ROAD VIA RIO TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (2012).
112. World Comm'n on Env't and Dev., Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Mar. 20, 1987).
113. Id. atch. 1,1127.
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endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises. Sustainable
development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all
the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life." 
4
Soon thereafter, the principle of sustainable development was at the center of
the 1992 Rio conference. Among the set of principles adopted at the conference,
Principle 1 tellingly states: "Human beings are at the centre of concerns for
sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in
harmony with nature."' 5 Since then the principle has been reaffirmed in countless
instances at the United Nations and in many other fora, even though there is no
settled or synthetic definition of the principle." 6
Very importantly, around the same time the principle of sustainable
development entered the international discourse in the United Nations, another
powerful concept, that of "human development," started to gain acceptance
internationally. "' This latter approach, originally championed by Sen and Haq, "18
moves the focus of development from the attainment of economic growth and
material welfare, as generally measured in per-capita gross domestic product, to a
focus on freedom, human well-being, and life achievements. What ultimately count
are not the means: income, or resources, but the ends: the well-being, and quality of
life of people. This approach was preceded, already in the 1970s, by an attention to
114. Id. at ch. 2,11l4.
115. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug.
12, 1992).
116. At the 2002 Johannesburg summit, states agreed: "Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable
patterns of production and consumption and protecting and managing the natural resource base of
economic and social development are overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for,
sustainable development." World Summit on Sustainable Dev., Johannesburg S. Aft., Aug. 26-Sept. 4,
2002, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4,
2002). The same elements were reaffirmed at the 2012 Rio conference. Around the same time, the
International Law Association noted: "[T]he objective of sustainable development involves a
comprehensive and integrated approach to economic, social and political processes, which aims at the
sustainable use of natural resources of the Earth and the protection of the environment on which nature
and human life as well as social and economic development depend and which seeks to realize the right
of all human beings to an adequate living standard on the basis of their active, free and meaningful
participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom, with due regard
to the needs and interests of future generations." ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of
International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, 2 April 2002, 2 POL. L. & ECON. 211, 212
(2002); see NiCo SCHRIJVER, THE EVOLUTION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: INCEPTION, MEANING AND STATUS 231 (2008).
117. See e.g., U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990 (1990)
(noting this is the first effort to produce an annual report on the human dimension of development),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/219/hdr 1990 en complete nostats.pdf, see
generally MAHBUB UL HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1995).
118. See Amartya Sen, Equality of What? (May 22, 1979), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN
VALUES, available at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/sen8O.pdf; AMARTYA SEN
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); see generally MAHBUB UL HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT (1995).
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the fulfillment of basic human needs. " 9 And indeed, the basic needs and human
development approaches were largely reflected in, and recognized by, the
international community through the Millennium Declaration and the subsequent
uptake of the MDGs. 12 ° The concern with environmental degradation also advanced
and was incorporated as one of the values set out in the Millennium Declaration-
"respect for nature"-and through MDG 7, which aims at ensuring environmental
sustainability. 121
At the 2012 Rio conference and in the run-up to the September 2015 Summit
(at the deadline of the MDGs framework), a wider and stronger confluence of the
basic needs and human development approach and the sustainable development
notion is taking place around the common concern over the centrality of the human
being, human dignity, and humanity's relation with nature and planet earth. 122 The
various elements constituting this complex normative principle are far from new and
indeed have very deep roots. 123 However it is only now, after a long gestation period,
that a consensus seems to be in the making to set this enhanced understanding of
development as a cornerstone of international cooperation and action. This could
give rise to a constitutional moment for the international community if the latter
manages in 2015 to articulate a renewed set of shared values and goals, which
governments and people will be called upon to uphold and promote. The promise is
even greater as the SDGs, as called for by the 2012 Rio outcome document, are
meant to be "global in nature and universally applicable to all countries," 24 and thus
no longer address global challenges exclusively in a "North-South," aid-based
context, but try to define what actions should be collectively and cooperatively
undertaken by the international community to move towards the future as it "ought"
to be for all.
If the new agenda and the SDGs are to acquire enhanced constitutional
legitimacy and compliance pull, and hence also be successful as an instrument for
priority setting, advocacy, evaluation, accountability, and social mobilization, they
need to be firmly steeped in a shared understanding of sustainable development as a
normative principle. In a sense countries are called upon to set out with some clarity
and agree on the crucial, foundational values, principles and objectives that should
define the future they collectively want (to paraphrase the title of the 2012 Rio
1 19. INT'L LABOR ORG., EMPLOYMENT, GROWTH AND BASIC NEEDS: A ONE WORLD PROBLEM 31
(1976); PAUL STREETEN ET AL., FIRST THINGS FIRST: MEETING BASIC HUMAN NEEDS IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 8 (1981).
120. DES GASPER, THE ETHICS OF DEVELOPMENT 157 (2004).
121. Millennium Declaration, supra note 12, 1 6.
122. For a compelling examination of sustainable development for a policy perspective see JEFFREY
D. SACHS, THE AGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015).
123. These go back, inter alia, to the teachings of Buddhism, to Aristotle and the Stoics, as well as
the ancient wisdom of indigenous people. See generally C. G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALIZING
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); ULRICH GROBER, SUSTAINABILITY: A CULTURAL HISTORY 8-9 (Ray
Cunningham trans., Green Books 2012); Martha Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities:
"Perception "Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARVARD L. REV. 5, 10-52 (2007) [hereinafter Nussbaum,
Constitutions and Capabilities].
124. The Future We Want, supra note 2, 11247.
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outcome document)."2 5 From that consensus (which needs to involve the wide
deliberation now taking place within civil society), 126 legitimate and coordinated
priorities for action can then be derived and implemented at international, but above
all, on the ground, at national and local levels. A shared understanding of sustainable
development is already at least partly set out in the relevant international documents,
such as the Millennium Declaration and various U.N. conferences outcome
documents, but should be confirmed and elaborated upon in 2015, not least through
the SDGs themselves.
Starting again from the 1987 canonical definition of the Brundtland report,
sustainable development entails at least adopting the twin objectives of: (a)
achieving societies where the needs of all individuals are met (and poverty is thus
eradicated), which could be understood as societies where a decent life (with secured
access to an adequate level of well-being in its various components)-a life worth
of human dignity for all-is guaranteed, and (b) achieving this objective in such a
way that the needs and decent lives of future generations are also guaranteed (while
respecting the limitedness and frailty of the earth or what is often referred to as the
"planetary boundaries"). 12 7
The crucial normative claim is that all human beings, regardless of the physical
and social conditions in which they are or will be born, are entitled to live a decent
life.' 28 This locates sustainable development within the conceptual outlook of
human development, and justifies adopting the wider perspective often referred to
as "sustainable human development."' 29 Specifying the parameters of a "decent life"
or a life of dignity requires looking at the appropriate constituent elements and
metric, whether basic needs, freedoms, capabilities, resources, Rawlsian primary
goods or well-being. 3 ' While the theoretical differences between these various
dimensions are important, it is also true that there is a good deal of common ground
around the notions of dignity, '31 human flourishing, 3 2 and quality of human lives to
125. Id.
126. See supra note 51.
127. See generally Johan Rockstrm et al., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating
Space for Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY & Soc'Y 32 (2009) (on the notion of planetary boundaries).
128. See Brundlandt Report, U.N. World Committee on Environment and Development: Our
Common Future, 54, Annex to U.N. Doc. A/42/427 1987) ("every human being, those here and those
who are to come has the right to life, and to a decent life").
129. In describing the concept of sustainable human development the 1994 Human Development
Report states: "Human beings are born with certain potential capabilities. The purpose of development
is to create an environment in which all people can expand their capabilities, and opportunities can be
enlarged for both present and future generations. The real foundation of human development is
universalism in acknowledging the life claims of everyone." See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994,
supra note 117, at 13.
130. G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989).
131. Human dignity is as foundational and complex a concept for the international community as it
is for many domestic constitutional systems. See generally MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND
MEANING (2012); GEORGE KATEB, HUMAN DIGNITY (2011); Mathias Mahlmann, Human Dignity and
Autonomy in Modern Constitutional Orders, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370-96 (Michel Rosenfeld & Andras Saj6 eds., 2012).
132. See generally THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN Rights 27-51 (2008) (on human
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which all these dimensions contribute.' 33 These notions are all consonant with the
Kantian admonition to treat humanity as an end never as a means only. The notions
of dignity and freedoms have very strong roots in the Preamble of the Charter, as
well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which affirm "the dignity and
worth of the human person," and call for equal rights and the promotion of "social
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."' 34  The Millennium
Declaration includes "freedom" among the fundamental values stating that "men and
women have the right to live their lives and raise their children in dignity, free from
hunger and from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice."' 35
Sustainable human development thus embodies a concept of development that
goes far beyond economic or income growth to include the development and well-
being of the human person as a main objective and desired outcome, superseding the
concept of "welfare" as generally understood in the utilitarian and welfare
economics tradition. "The idea of human development focuses directly on the
progress of human lives and wellbeing. Since wellbeing includes living with
substantial freedoms, human development is also integrally connected with
enhancing certain capabilities-the range of things a person can do and be in leading
a life."' 36 Hence, sustainable human development is not only the acquisition of more
goods and services, but also the larger freedom to choose (including how best to use
goods and service), and the empowerment, the opportunity (or capability) to lead the
kind of life one values. 1
37
flourishing).
133. See generally Mozzafar Qizilbash, Development, Common Foes and Shared Vailes, 14 REV.
OF POL. ECON. 463 (2002). Sen sees an important difference between needs and freedoms: "Certainly,
human beings do have needs and it is good to have them met. But should people be seen only in terms of
their needs (something human beings share with other animals), and not in terms of the importance of
their freedom to decide what they want (including what needs to fulfil), to live the way they would like
(whether or not the chosen lifestyle is seen as a need), and to do what they have reason to want to do
(even if the reason is not one of fulfilling needs)? There is a big issue of individual choice here." Amartya
Sen, The Ends and Means of Sustainability, 14 J. HUM. DEV. & CAPABILITIES: A MULTI-DISCLINPLINARY
J. FOR PEOPLE-CENTERED DEV. 6, 10 (2013). On the quality of lives, see JOSEPH STIGLITZ, AMARTYA
SEN, & JEAN PAUL FITOUSSi, THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
REVISITED: REFLECTIONS AND OVERVIEW 1, 39 (2009), available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitoussi.fr/documents/overview-eng.pdf ("[W]hat really matters for citizens, [is] their well-being, or more
generally, the quality of their lives ... [which] includes in effect the full range of factors that make life
worth living, reaching beyond its material side.").
134. Clearly these roots reach President Franklyn D. Roosevelt's seminal 1941 State of the Union
Message to Congress where he laid out the vision of the post-war international society ("In the future
days which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human
freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression-everywhere in the world. The second is
freedom of every person to worship God in his own way-everywhere in the world. The third is freedom
from want.. -everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear.. -anywhere in the world.
That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own
time and generation."). See TERRY GOLWAY, AMERICAN POLITICAL SPEECHES 77 (2012).
135. Millennium Declaration, supra note 12, 1] 6.
136. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, at 19 (2000),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/261/hdr_2000 en.pdf.
137. Capabilities are thus the substantive freedom to achieve alternative "functionings"
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In terms of the scope of the normative claim sustainable human development
entails the universality of the "dignity of life" claim, placing the lives of
contemporaries on the same plane as those of future generation. "Ethical
universalism is basically an elementary demand for impartiality-applied within
generations and between them. It is, in the present context, the recognition of a
shared claim of all to the basic capability to lead worthwhile lives."' In addition,
decent lives are to be secured in a world that is limited and subject to ecological
constraints that can severely curtail or negate the opportunities of people, including
crucially the opportunities to move out of poverty in its various dimensions, and to
significantly improve the quality of people's life.
Sustainable human development is predicated upon the realization of the close
integration and inter-linkages of the economic, the social and the environmental.
Well-being (in terms of actual achievements) involves and requires a variety of
enabling components (freedoms and opportunities, 39 such as the freedom from
hunger, the ability to secure adequate shelter and to live in a healthy environment)
that are plural and incommensurable, although often mutually supporting (since e.g.
while we cannot compensate for the lack of educational opportunities with larger
access to health services, often better education leads to better health and vice-
versa). Similarly the natural world provides a set of-in many cases indispensable
and incompensable-ecosystem services (since e.g. we cannot compensate the lack
of clean water with more clean air), which are necessary for sustaining and
improving the opportunities for well-being of both present and future people. 4 °
combinations. Indeed, "living may be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated 'functionings,' consisting
of beings and doings. A person's achievement in this respect can be seen as the vector of her functionings.
The relevant functionings can vary from such elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in
good health, avoiding escapable morbidity, and premature mortality, etc. to more complex achievements,
such as being happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community and so on." See
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY RE-EXAMINED, 139-55 (1992).
138. See Sudhir Anand & Amartya Sen, Human Development and Economic Sustainability, 28
WORLD DEV'T 2029, 2030 (2000).
139. Sen discusses the concept of opportunity in details. He notes: "[i]n contrast with the utility-
based or resource-based lines of thinking, individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a
person's capability to do things he or she has reason to value. A person's advantage in terms of
opportunities is judged to be lower than that of another if she has less capability- less real opportunity-
to achieve those things that she has reason to value. The focus here is on the freedom that a person
actually has to do this or be that-things that he or she may value doing or being." See SEN, JUSTICE,
supra note 52, at 231-32.
140. "Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These include
provisioning services such as food, water, timber, and fiber; regulating services that affect climate, floods,
disease, wastes, and water quality; cultural services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual
benefits; and supporting services such as soil formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling... The
human species, while buffered against environmental changes by culture and technology, is
fundamentally dependent on the flow of ecosystem services." MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT,
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS I , v (2005), available at
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.356.aspx.pdf. In many cases there is a need
for: "separately maintaining the quantity or quality of many different environmental resources. It is
motivated by a concern that we may not be able, for instance, to deal with the worsening of the atmosphere
by increases in the amounts of physical capital, or more generally, that even if we could, there is a high
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Nature' 4 ' thus provides a set of key functions of an intrinsic,142 existential value (as
the natural habitat within certain climatic conditions is a necessary condition for and
an integral feature of human life), 143 as well as of an instrumental value as inputs to
generate valuable opportunities for well-being.144 Sustainable human development
recognizes that a decent life for all needs to be realized within the boundaries of the
planet where economic, social, and environmental systems are interconnected.
145
The notion of sustainable human development, and its central normative claim
of seeking a decent human life for all, also needs to account for the patterns and
degree of uncertainty about the trade-offs, so much so that it is worth focusing on each of the key resources
separately." See STIGLITZ, SEN, & FITOUSSI, supra note 135, at 53.
141. The constitution of Ecuador sets out what are referred to as "the rights for living well"
('derechos de buen vivir"), including the rights to water, food, and a healthy environment and it also
interestingly recognizes the "rights of Nature" (articles 71-74). See generally Marco Aparicio Wilhelmi,
Nuevo Constitucionalismo, Derechos y Medio Ambiente en Las Constituciones de Ecuador y Bolivia, 9
REVISTA GENERAL DE DERECHO PUBLICO COMPARADO 1, 1-24 (2011). These rights are linked to the
principles declared in the 1982 World Charter for Nature the concept of Harmony with Nature as
recognised in Principle I of the 1992 Rio Declaration, and more broadly to the spiritual value attributed
to "Mother Earth" by various indigenous peoples. G.A. Res. 37/7, 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28,
1992). The issue of "harmony with nature" was further addressed in the 2012 Rio outcome document.
The Future We Want, supra note 2, 1J 39. We recognize that the planet Earth and its ecosystems are our
home and that Mother Earth is a common expression in a number of countries and regions and we note
that some countries recognize the rights of nature in the context of the promotion of sustainable
development. We are convinced that in order to achieve a just balance among the economic, social and
environment needs of present and future generations, it is necessary to promote harmony with nature. Id.,
1 40. We call for holistic and integrated approaches to sustainable development which will guide
humanity to live in harmony with nature and lead to efforts to restore the health and integrity of the
Earth's ecosystem, as well as in annual General Assembly resolutions on "Harmony with Nature."
142. The debate over the intrinsic v. instrumental value of nature is a complex one. While it is often
noted that the human development/capability approach is anthropocentric, it is also true that Nussbaum
in her core list of capabilities promisingly opens up to a limited extent to other species and "the world of
nature." See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 34
(2013). See also Peter Burdon, 'The Rights of Nature: Reconsidered' (2010) 49 Australian Humanities
Review 69. Sustainable Human Development is more capacious in this regard as it posits the
interconnectedness of the economic, social and environmental systems and the incommensurability of
(most of) their components for well-being across generations.
143. Nature and climate even have an existential value for states, in particular island and low-lying
countries whose territorial integrity is endangered by climate change, but also for states in general as all
can be threatened by cataclysmic disasters.
144. "[P]eople are integral parts of ecosystems and that a dynamic interaction exists between them
and other parts of ecosystems, with the changing human condition driving, both directly and indirectly,
changes in ecosystems and thereby causing changes in human well-being. At the same time, social,
economic, and cultural factors unrelated to ecosystems alter the human condition, and many natural forces
influence ecosystems.... [T]he actions people take that influence ecosystems result not just from concern
about human well-being but also from considerations of the intrinsic value of species and ecosystems."
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 140. See generally Jrr6me Pelenc, Minkieba Kevin
Lompo, Jdrrme Ballet & Jean-Luc Dubois, Sustainable Human Development and the Capability
Approach: Integrating Environment, Responsibility and Collective Agency, 14 J. HUM. DEV'T AND
CAPABILITIES: A MULTi-DISCLIPLINARY J. FOR PEOPLE-CENTERED DEV'T 77, 77-94 (2013).
145. See generally Marius Christen & Stephan Schmidt, A Formal Framework for Conceptions of
Sustainability-A Theoretical Contribution to the Discourse in Sustainable Development, 20
SUSTAINABLE DEV'T 400,400-10 (2012).
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
levels of distribution of benefits (i.e. the elements constitutive of a decent life, a life
worth living). Different distributive rules can be considered, but the common thread
is to combat inequalities, which at least would require achieving a minimum set of
substantial freedoms (capabilities) or opportunities, including the opportunities to
satisfy the basic needs, up to a threshold which secures a life of dignity. 146 In this
respect, equitable access to ecosystem services also needs to be guaranteed, together
with the protection of the ecological systems. 147
Determining what the relevant freedoms and opportunities are is open to
contestation, but it is essential to move from the level of principles to that of practice
and real outcomes. Nussbaum insists on the need for that move, and considers that
it is important to list "those human capabilities that can be convincingly argued to
be of central importance in any human life, whatever else the person pursues or
choses."'148 Agreeing on a list of the necessary components of a life worth of human
dignity, the components of well-being, around which cooperative actions can be
organized, would certainly be a major advance for the international community.
The capabilities approach, as elaborated by Sen and Nussbaum,'49 provides a
rich way to better understand the sustainable human development imperative to
achieve societies in which the needs of all individuals are met, opportunities are
available and their dignity secured; societies that also preserve opportunities for
posterity. As Nussbaum puts it, "a world in which people have all the capabilities
on the list is a minimally just and decent world."' 5 °  It is indeed a critical
constitutional function to "secure for citizens the prerequisite of life worthy of
human dignity-a core group of 'capabilities'-in areas of central importance to
human life."'' This should also be a crucial concern from the perspective of
international constitutionalism.
The international efforts to agree on the new global agenda at the United
Nations can in good measure be understood as the elaboration of a list of key human
entitlements for a decent life for all (and a shared understanding of some necessary
means and actions to achieve them). These efforts, if successful, would essentially
mean achieving what would amount to an overlapping, minimum consensus, 152 thus
146. Nussbaum defends such a sufficentarian approach, which demands equality for all in the
distribution of the central capabilities up to a threshold. Other even stricter equalitarian rules are also
possible but would appear less likely to muster international consensus.
147. See generally Brenda Holland, Nussbaum, Rawls, and the Ecological Limits of Justice: Using
Capability Ceilings to Resolve Capability Conflicts, in CAPABILITIES, GENDER, EQUALITY: TOWARDS
FUNDAMENTAL ENTITLEMENTS (Martha Nussbaum & Flavio Comin, eds., 2014).
148. See generally MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES
APPROACH 74 (2000).
149. Among the many contributions, see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY,
NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); SEN,
JUSTICE, supra note 52.
150. See Martha Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract. Capabilities and Global Justice, 32
OXFORD DEV. STUDIES 3, 12 (2004) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract].
15 1. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 123, at 7.
152. Rawls maintains that people, notwithstanding their diverging "comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral doctrines," may still reach an "overlapping consensus" on a political conception
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further entrenching the "constitutional value" of sustainable human development for
the international community, and defining what it ought to mean for all people in
the world. Nussbaum's attention to the need to set thresholds in terms of the
opportunities (or capabilities) that societies (and the international community) ought
to secure for justice to prevail is thus quite consonant with the current international
debates and the search for a list of goals to advance the sustainable development of
all.
From the broad normative principle of sustainable human development, which
essentially defines a core of universal (intra- and inter-generational) justice,
priorities for policy, and action can then be derived and designed. Such priorities
would instrumentally aim at the realization of an agreed set of desired outcomes
("goals") that aim at guaranteeing the realization of the normative standard, or in
other words, that would work towards a more just future for the world where all can
enjoy a decent life. It would thus be important to distinguish between the justice
imperative (the guarantee of a decent life for all, present and future generations), the
related desired outcomes (goals), and the policies, actions, and instruments to be
prioritized in order to reach them and bring individuals and societies closer to such
desired outcomes according to a specified timetable. This would mean prioritizing
the means, not the ends.1
53
VII. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A UNIVERSAL SUSTAINABLE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
Multilateral negotiations are almost by definition messy and often incoherent.
When discussing profound issues ofjustice, while marred by political and economic
considerations (sometime ideological or parochial), the result may be suboptimal.
But this situation does not appear so different from the struggles that characterize
domestic policy- and law-making. This is why the design of the new development
agenda to be agreed upon in 2015 at the United Nations (including the set of desired
and prioritized outcomes (the SDGs)) has proved far from easy. Leaving aside
politics, and looking at conceptual issues, many questions remain, and many will
most likely not be answered through U.N. deliberations. The text that will
of justice. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72, 385-96 (1996). Sustainable human
development engages many elements which bear on aspects of relevance for such doctrines. This is why
only an overlapping (rather than a complete) consensus can be sought. A complete consensus is very
difficult in a domestic context. It is virtually impossible and probably undesirable in an international
context. Donnelly convincingly argues that human rights integrate an overlapping consensus at the
international level. See generally Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM.
RTS. Q. 281, 281-306 (2007).
153. The end encompass realizing the opportunity for all to live a life worthy of human dignity in
all its components (across which trade-off are generally not possible). Means relate to policies, actions
and resources needed for people to be capable to, and ultimately functionally realize, the requisite
components of well-being. Most of these capabilities can also be expressed as entitlements, which are
enshrined in international human right law. For the relations between capabilities and rights and the
preference for the former, see Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and
Social Justice, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 33, 33-59 (2003).
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eventually be adopted will require an exercise of interpretation and further
consideration in many fora, both at the national and international levels. The depth
of the entrenchment of sustainable human development will derive from the strength
and justification of the arguments used in these debates.
The search for an agreement at the United Nations on the new global agenda
and the set of goals is an attempt at reaching an overlapping consensus defining the
international community's shared understanding of the necessary components of
well-being, thus elaborating on the central normative claim of sustainable
development: the guarantee of a life in dignity for all. 154 Or what Nussbaum defines
as "a minimal conception of social justice in terms of the realization of certain
positive outcomes, what people are actually able to do and be."' 55 The proposal
elaborated by the General Assembly working group 156 appears to locate and ground
consensus on several important issues, which will essentially define minimum
entitlements and thresholds (sometimes expressed in numerical levels) to be realized
in the next fifteen years and beyond.
154. In a similar vein the Secretary General stressed that U.N. member states in defining the post-
2015 development agenda must heed the world peoples' "calls for peace and justice, eradicating poverty,
realizing rights, eliminating inequality, enhancing accountability and preserving our planet. The world's
nations must unite behind a common programme to act on those aspirations. No one must be left behind.
We must continue to build a future of justice and hope, a life of dignity for all." See U.N. Secretary
General, A Life of Dignity for All: Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals
and Advancing the United Nations Development Agenda Beyond 2015: Report of the Secretary-General,
UN doc. A/68/202 (July 26, 2013).
155. Nussbaum, Beyond the Social Contract, supra note 150, at 8.
156. Rep. on Sustainable Development Goals, supra note 53, lists the following sustainable
development goals (also accompanied by 169 specific targets): "Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms
everywhere; Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable
agriculture; Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; Goal 4. Ensure
inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; Goal 5.
Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable
management of water and sanitation for all; Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and
modem energy for all; Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and
productive employment and decent work for all; Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive
and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among
countries; Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; Goal 12.
Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate
change and its impacts* (*acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change is the primary international, intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to
climate change); Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for
sustainable development; Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems,
sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt
biodiversity loss; Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide
access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; Goal 17.
Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable
development." Of course these objectives do not exhaust the set of components of well-being, and indeed
many can only be defined and pursed at the domestic or local levels. For instance some of the central
capabilities set out by Nussbaum could only be partly or auxiliary addressed at international level, for
instance the one related to "emotions."
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As for the metric of sustainable development for the new agenda, a broader
concept of well-being appears to prevail. Poverty is understood as deprivation with
many dimensions, not just lowness of income. Indeed, income growth does not
always or automatically translate into individual achievements in terms of wellbeing.
Although income inequality is of crucial importance, 57 it does not exhaust all
deprivations that lead to poverty, including unemployment, ill health, lack of
education, and social exclusion. Hence, the emphasis is placed on the broader notion
of social and economic (not just income) opportunities. The importance of
accounting for special needs and vulnerabilities is also recognized. 158 Similarly
there is a (modest) acknowledgment of the need to foster empowerment and
agency.
On the scope of sustainable development, ethical universalism seems firmly
grounded with repeated references to the need to cover "all people." However, the
relation between universalism and national partiality is likely to remain in large
measure unresolved. Thematically the scope of the proposal is also broad and in
line with the integration and interconnectedness that is a conceptual hallmark of
sustainable human development. As a result the set of desired outcomes (goals) are
also seen as integrated and internally consistent, mutually supportive, but non-
commensurable as they define and make explicit what the emerging overlapping
consensus on the components of a decent life for all mean and require. The desired
outcomes are "for all," are universal in nature, while the means will need to be
adapted. For instance, there should be no prevalence of consideration for economic
aspects over environmental ones, or vice-versa. This is one of the core normative
features of sustainable development, which aims to "steering a course between the
needs of development and the necessity to protect the environment." 160 Integrated
policymaking is one of the instruments to ensure this reconciliation.
The pattern of distribution of the benefits, of the components of well-being,
agreed as shared goals, appears to respond to the logic of thresholds.' 61 Interestingly,
the proposal makes reference to the importance to implement social protection
systems and floors.' 62 The internationally-agreed normative framework for social
157. See Rep. on Sustainable Development Goals, supra note 53. This is recognized with a
prioritarian approach in proposed Target 10.1, "[b]y 2030, progressively achieve and sustain income
growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate higher than the national average."
158. See id. at Target 1.5 ("By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable
situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other
economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.").
159. See id. at Target 16.7 ("Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-
making at all levels.").
160. Gabikovo-Nagymaros,Weeramantry, supra note 103, at 87.
161. See Rep. on Sustainable Development Goals, supra note 53 at Target 3.4 ("By 2030, reduce by
one third premature mortality from non-communicable diseases through prevention and treatment and
promote mental health and well-being." Implying health policy actions are required to achieve that
minimum.)
162. See id. at Target 1.3 ("Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and
measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the
vulnerable.")
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protection floors 163 is based on a set of universal minimum guarantees, which
"should allow life in dignity."' 164
While the overall design for the new global goals appears internally consistent
and ethically grounded, trade-offs are bound to arise when prioritizing policies and
instruments for implementation at all levels (from local to global), and for collective
action. Beyond the obvious respect for regional, national, and local conditions and
priorities, the general standard (i.e. dignity for all) aims to ultimately guarantee
achieving minimum thresholds for all and in all areas. Defining what the minimum
thresholds are will in good measure be a matter for further deliberation at domestic
level within the parameters set by the global goals. However, when the objectives
pursued by the goals (as further specified by targets) overlap with the objects
covered by internationally-agreed human rights and environmental law, the new
agenda, and the derivative goals will need to be interpreted consistently with the
provisions of the respective regimes. As sustainable human development shares the
same normative core-human dignity for all-with the human rights regime, the
new agenda and its goals need to be understood and interpreted as "taking the
realization of rights as a fundamental objective to be pursued."' 65  The agreed
interpretation of the relevant rights and obligations should be upheld and used to
guide implementation of the agenda. 16
6
163. See Int'l Labour Org. ("ILO"), Recommendation No. 202: Recommendation Concerning
National Floors of Social Protection, at 5 (2012), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB: 12100:0::NO::Pl 2100 ILO CODE:R202.
Article 5 states "social protection floors" to comprise at least the following basic social security
guarantees: "(a) access to a nationally defined set of goods and services, constituting essential health care,
including maternity care, that meets the criteria of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality; (b)
basic income security for children, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, providing access to
nutrition, education, care and any other necessary goods and services; (c) basic income security, at least
at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income,
in particular in cases of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability; and (d) basic income security,
at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for older persons." See generally ILO, World Social
Protection Report 2014/15: Building Economic Recovery, Inclusive Development and Social Justice
(2014); Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Extreme Poverty and Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. A/69/297 (Aug. 11, 2014), (focusing on social protection floors). See also Joseph Stiglitz,
Social Protection without Protectionism, in THE QUEST FOR SECURITY: PROTECTION WITHOUT
PROTECTIONISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Joseph Stiglitz & Mary Kaldor, eds.,
2013).
164. See Recommendation No. 202, supra note 163, at 8.
165. See Amartya Sen, Rights as Goals, in EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION: ESSAYS IN FREEDOM
AND JUSTICE 12, 22 (Stephen Guest & Alan Milne, eds., 1985). On the notion that some human rights
are indeed very close to goals, just formulated differently, see James W. Nickel, Goals and Rights:
Working Together?, in MALCOLM LANGFORD ET AL., THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 42 (2013) ("Many human rights are fairly abstract with
the consequence that their associated duties are also abstract. Perhaps some international human rights
are actually important political goals that are dressed up to look like rights. If some human rights are
really goals then they do not just overlap with goals: they are goals that are merely formulated differently.
For example, the commitment clause of the ICESCR calls upon participating countries to use fully their
available resources to achieve progressively the realisation of its rights (ICESCR Article 2).")
166. For instance, countries which have ratified some or all the relevant human rights instruments
are clearly obligated to fulfill the right to education. As it is the norm with the majority of obligations
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All components of the agenda, because of their interconnection, need to be
simultaneously addressed. Implementation will, however, need to be adapted to take
into account the diversity of conditions prevailing in different localities and for
different people, for instance with rich or middle-income countries giving relative
priority to changes in life-styles and fragile countries to institution-building. Policy
targets will also need to be tested for relative cost-effectiveness, considering that
certain policies and actions may be, while desirable, not strictly necessary, or
comparatively too costly or not sufficiently effective to achieve a desired outcome,
and may deprive the needed resources to help the pursuit of other similarly important
targets. In addition, policy target and actions should be prioritized when they
contribute to the realization of multiple desired outcomes. 67
Implementing an agenda and a set of goals essentially aimed at transforming
the world and making sustainable development a reality, what we argued to be an
emerging constitutional principle of the international community, will certainly be a
daunting task. As noted in devising the new global agenda, the international
community is not engaged in a law-making exercise and the result of the ongoing
negotiation process will remain outside the "juridical paradigm of
implementation."' 68 While the agenda and the goals will not engender specific legal
obligations (perhaps beyond the good faith obligations not to undermine the
implementation of the agenda and explain total inaction), a "political" responsibility
for acting upon goals and targets will arise. And the more the agenda will be
considered by both peoples and states to be grounded in shared views, values,
aspirations, and common interests, the stronger the demand for action will be.
The very nature of the exercise, a U.N. process, would see countries as
primarily responsible for the implementation of the new global agenda, including
the SDGs. In this context, the perspective presented by Young in terms of shared
responsibility (which is also one of the values of the Millennium Declaration) is
particularly apposite. She stresses that in relation to structural injustice (and indeed
a world where sustainable development does not prevail cannot be called just),
related to economic, social and cultural rights the realization of the right to education must be achieved
over time, progressively, subject to the availability of resources. See International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2(l), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), However, this should not be interpreted as depriving states parties'
obligations of all meaningful content as progressive implementation is no excuse for inaction.
Progressive realization means that states parties have a specific and continuing obligation "to move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible" towards the "full realization" of the right" and to take steps,
which should be "deliberate, concrete and targeted." (General Comment 3, International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (1990),
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doe. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.6 at 14 (2003),
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/epeomm3.htm). In addition some core obligations are of
immediate application: States must ensure non-discrimination and equality in all forms of education and
they must provide compulsory primary education that is available to all free of charge.
167. By way of example a possible target to prioritize educational policies that require the inclusion
in the curricula of sustainable development education may be considered as instrumental in achieving the
goal of ensuring quality education, as well as the goal of fostering sustainable consumption patterns.
168. See generally Falk, supra note I 0.
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responsibility is essentially shared and "can be discharged only through collective
action. It is a political responsibility because it involves enjoining one another to
reorganize collective relationships, debating with one another how to accomplish
such reorganization, and holding one another to account for what we are doing and
not doing to undermine structural injustice."'69  It will definitively require an
enhanced sense of community by states and peoples, which should include
reviewing the institutional arrangements that organize international cooperation. 7 0
While all states bear the primary responsibility to take the necessary steps to
move towards the realization of the desired outcomes (goals) for the benefit of their
people, as well as of humanity as a whole, issues of available resources and
respective capabilities are also relevant, and call for a measure of differentiation.
17 1
Countries which specifically contribute to a problem may need to bear an enhanced
responsibility to address it, as was set out in 1992 Rio principle 7 in the area of
environmental degradation. 172  Countries which are in a position to assist and
cooperate with other states in the implementation of particular policies should do so
under a general duty of solidarity (again a principle set out in the Millennium
Declaration). 173  This, however, remains a contested area. When looked from a
169. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE 153 (2011). Young deals mainly with
the domestic case, but she briefly considers the international issues as well.
170. Indeed, when announcing the need for the world to free itself from want, President Roosevelt
went on to say: "[t]he third is freedom from want, which, translated into world terms, means economic
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants - everywhere
in the world." GOLWAY supra note 134, at 77. A similar requirement was set out in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in article 28 which states: "[e]veryone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doe. A/RES/217(Ill), art. 28, (Dec.
10, 1948). About 60 years later addressing institutional arrangements for cooperation seems to remain a
necessary component of any new global agenda.
171. This partly engages the argument for "historical justice." Sen notes: "The argument takes the
form of presenting the case for making the already industrialized countries pay some kind of a price-of
a 'fine'-for their polluting roles in the past. I am quite sceptical of this argument .... Also it must be
recognised that when the old industrialized countries polluted the world, the understanding of pollution
and its lasting effects were little known. Furthermore, people in Europe and America today were not
even born when their ancestors polluted the atmosphere. No, that is not a fruitful line of analysis. Rather,
the important issue is that today-right now-the developed countries take up an unequally large share
of what are called 'the global commons'-the common pool of air, water and other natural space that we
collectively can share. The present-day unequal sharing of the global commons, resulting from historical
differences, is a contemporary fact that has to be taken into account in looking for a plausible contract
about how to share the burdens of environmental control among different countries today .... What had
to be addressed-and still has to be-Is to face fully the hard question of sharing the benefits and costs
of having a friendly environment today-and in the future. See Amartya Sen, Sustainable Developments
and our Responsibilities, 98 NOTIZIE DI POLITEIA, 129, 134 (2010).
172. Rio Declaration, G.A. Res. 66/288, 247, U.N. DOC. A/RES/66/288 (July 27, 1992).
173. "Solidarity is neither charity nor welfare; it is an agreement among formal equals that will all
refrain from actions that would significantly interfere with the realization of common goals and
fundamental interests. Solidarity requires an understanding that every member of the community must
consciously and constantly conceive of its own interests as being inextricable from the interests of the
whole." See R. St. J. Macdonald, The Principle of Solidarity in Public International Law, in ETUDES DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN L'HONNEUR DE PIERRE LALIVE 293 (Christian Dominicd et al. eds., 1993).
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narrower redistributive perspective an overlapping minimum consensus can at best
be located (but with many developing states demanding for more) in a moral duty of
assistance. 7 4  To move beyond that will require much further deliberation.
Nonetheless, the interdependence that sustainable human development exposes
should lead to further reflection and deliberation on how to reconcile the interests of
states and their respective peoples and the interest of the international community
and humanity. Increasingly these interests tend to coincide. Climate change,
biodiversity loss, health pandemics, migration flows, and so on affect all or have
such vast set of repercussions that strict national compartmentalization is no longer
meaningful.' 75 As a result, cooperation can no longer be based only on seeking to
fulfill national interests, but needs to be based on a heightened sense of human
fellowship and global partnership. For states and for people even more, "[a] central
part of our own good, each and every one of us, is to produce, and live in, a world
that is morally decent, a world in which all human beings have what they need to
live a life with human dignity."'
76
Ultimately, it will be the legitimacy and ethical strength of the new global
agenda, as well as the increased recognition by states of the mutuality and
commonality of interests and concerns that will reinforce the sense of political
responsibility and determine the level of implementation of the new global agenda,
as well as the resources made available to it. And this is crucially prompted by social
awareness and mobilization.' 77 As Young put it: "the state's power to promote
justice depends to a significant extent on the active support of its citizens in that
endeavor."' 78  Transparency and accountability mechanisms will be particularly
important to ensure not only that assistance is provided, but also that all countries
and relevant actors, including from the private sectors and civil society at large,
promote the realization of the agenda and the derivative goals, domestically as well
as internationally.
174. On the difference between a duty of assistance and (re-) distributive justice, see RAWLS, supra
note 152, at 105-20 (1999).
175. "When different nations led more separate lives, it was more understandable -though still quite
wrong - for those in one country to think of themselves as owing no obligations, beyond that of non-
interference, to people in another state. But those times are long gone." See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD
197 (2004).
176. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 123, at 12.
177. "Social movements in general are energized by ... ethical passion, which enables people to
experience the more active knowledge associated with formed awareness. That was the case in the
movement against nuclear weapons. Emotions related to individual conscience were pooled into a shared
narrative by enormous numbers of people. In earlier movements there needed to be an overall theme,
even a phrase, that could rally people of highly divergent political and intellectual backgrounds .... Could
the climate swerve come to include a 'climate freeze,' defined by a transnational demand for cutting back
on carbon emissions in steps that could be systematically outlined? With or without such a rallying
phrase, the climate swerve provides no guarantees of more reasonable collective behavior. But with
human energies that are experiential, economic and ethical it could at least provide-and may already be
providing-the psychological substrate for action on behalf of our vulnerable habitat and the human
future." Robert Jay Lifton, The Climate Swerve, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 24, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/opinion/sunday/the-climate-swerve.html?_r-0. Human dignity for
all could be the rallying phrase for the new agenda.
178. YOUNG, supra note 169, at 169.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, anchoring the forthcoming universal sustainable human
development agenda and the related SDGs in a common understanding of what
sustainable development is and requires, and grounding it in shared, albeit thin,
account of justice, would lend to the new framework and goals considerable
compliance pull. The 2015 Summit holds the promise to be a constitutional moment
capable of establishing a common vision for the international community, but, as is
often the case, the risk of political fudge or bickering at the United Nations may
squander the opportunity. A deeper understanding of the issues at stake should help
the process.
THE EAGLE AND THE DRAGON: A REVIEW OF COOL WAR: THE
FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION*
ANDREAS KUERSTEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The image on the cover of Noah Feldman's latest bookl-a dragon rising below
a soaring eagle-is an apt representation of the rise of China in a world that has been
dominated by the United States since the end of the Cold War.2 The rapport between
these two countries will likely determine their courses and that of international law
and relations in general for decades to come. Will they interact more or less
cooperatively? Or will they slip into the chilled, zero sum, and vicious competition
that characterized the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship? In Cool War: The Future of
Global Competition ("Cool War"), Feldman presents a situation closer to the latter
scenario, along with predictions for how and where this contest will play out and
strategies for how relations can and should be managed under modem and evolving
international law and institutions.
In reviewing Feldman's book, it is important to place it within the scholarship
and debates taking place over the impact of the U.S.-China relationship on
international law, politics, and the international system generally. Feldman occupies
a position warning of coming conflict-though not necessarily military-in a
bipolar world. This view stands farther along the line of change from present
circumstances than those predicting continued U.S. dominance and a Chinese
collapse 3 or a more peaceful bipolar structure managed effectively by international
institutions.4 Feldman does not, however, go so far as those foreseeing a coming
Chinese unipolar world5 or a world without superpowers at all.6
NOAH FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION, xi (2013).
Andreas Kuersten is a Legal Fellow with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Office
of General Counsel, International Section. The views expressed in this paper do not represent those of
the U.S. Government and are solely those of the author.
1. NOAH FELDMAN, COOL WAR: THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COMPETITION (2013).
2. The depiction on the cover appears popular among books analyzing modem U.S.-China
relations. See, e.g., AARON L. FRIEDBERG, A CONTEST FOR SUPREMACY: CHINA, AMERICA, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY IN ASIA (2011); JAMES STEINBERG & MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, STRATEGIC
REASSURANCE AND RESOLVE: U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014).
3. See JAMES R. GORRIE, THE CHINA CRISIS: How CHINA'S ECONOMIC COLLAPSE WILL LEAD TO
A GLOBAL DEPRESSION (2013); GORDON G. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001).
4. See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS, AND TRANSFORMATION
OF THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER (2012).
5. See MARTIN JACQUES, WHEN CHINA RULES THE WORLD: THE END OF THE WESTERN WORLD
AND THE BIRTH OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER (2d. ed. 2012).
6. See Barry Buzan, A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism, 25 INT'L REL.
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In presenting his vision and prescriptions for the future, Feldman organizes the
book into three sections: "Cool War," 7 "The Sources of Chinese Conduct,"8 and
"Global Competition."9 The first two seek to outline the situation between the
United States and China and provide a glimpse of the machinery of Chinese
leadership and motivations. The third section then uses the information presented
in earlier sections to construct various predictions for how the Cool War will play
out and recommendations for both sides on how to manage the coming
confrontation.
Feldman professes his purpose as being to provide a clear and realistic view of
present and future U.S.-China relations as well as ideas for the mitigation of
confrontation.10 While Cool War makes some interesting and provocative points,
its analysis and recommendations appear aimed more at fighting the predicted Cool
War than mitigating it. The work is therefore contradictory as to one of its stated
purposes. Feldman also remains tightly focused on comparing the present day to the
Cold War and his evaluations present these eras as becoming fundamentally
identical but for some nuances as to the influences keeping the sides from open and
more destructive conflict. Just as the United States and U.S.S.R. had to skirt around
military encounters and nuclear weapons in their confrontation, the United States
and China must do the same while also heeding their dense economic entanglement
and interdependence. Thus, rather than offering recommendations for conflict
management, Feldman presents the key factors that will influence present and future
U.S.-China relations and methods for each side to proceed to their advantage.
Furthermore, the work as a whole lacks necessary degrees of nuance and
extrapolation. It would have benefited greatly from additional length and
cohesiveness given its complicated and important target material. As a result, while
clearly crafted by a professor with enviable knowledge of government and
international affairs, readers are ultimately left with a book that takes a narrow and
somewhat disjointed look at the future of U.S.-China relations and pushes for
aggravating policy from both sides while claiming to advance the opposite. While
Cool War is still an interesting and unique read due to its pragmatic combination of
political theory and cross-Pacific analysis, it is unlikely to be a defining work on the
coming era of international politics or U.S.-China relations.
II. COOL WAR
Feldman begins by presenting how unique the U.S.-China relationship is in
history and exactly what the Cool War entails. From there he moves on to showing
3 (2011); CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, No ONE'S WORLD: THE WEST, THE RISING REST, AND THE COMING
GLOBAL TURN (2013).
7. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 3-51.
8. Id. at 55-98.
9. Id. at 101-66.
10. Id. at xiv ("Reducing the grave dangers of global conflict would serve the United States but
also China and the world more generally. The purpose of this book is to start figuring out how we can
do so, before it is too late.").
VOL. 43:3
THE EAGLE & THE DRAGON
the powerful reasons for the United States and China to engage in both collaboration
and confrontation. While it lacks some relevant detail, this section provides a good
general impression of the motivations for each actor to pursue both courses of action.
Generally, the phrase "Cool War" captures a situation between countries that
entails strong competing incentives for cooperation and conflict. Such a
circumstance naturally brings to mind the Cold War, and Feldman begins his book
by comparing modem times to this great standoff' '-a theme he continues
throughout the book. As outlined by Feldman, the Cool War appears to be Cold
War-light: a clash of powerful competing states, but one with additional factors
militating towards cooperation.
The situation between the United States and China has, as Cool War
acknowledges, important differences from that between the United States and
U.S.S.R. The Cold War foes engaged in little cooperation but for their talks,
negotiations, and private maneuvers aimed at averting cataclysmic direct conflict.12
Feldman asserts that a main reason for this lack of collaboration was the relative
absence of trade between these states.' 3 This stands in stark contrast to the deep
economic entanglement that characterizes U.S.-China relations. 4 China owns
approximately $1.3 trillion in U.S. debt'5 while the United States is China's largest
trading partner with approximately $560 billion in bilateral trade in 2013.16 Where
the United States and U.S.S.R. existed in almost completely separate economic
systems, the United States and China inhabit the same one and, moreover, engage
with one another to a phenomenal degree within it.
Whereas direct conflict was unsound during the Cold War because of the
mutually assured destruction ("MAD") made possible by nuclear weapons, the
United States and China would additionally face "mutually assured economic
destruction" ("MAED") were they to engage in conflict.' 7 MAD necessarily
11. The first sentence of the book asks "[a]re we on the brink of a new Cold War?" Id. at xi.
12. See, e.g., ROGER E. KANET & EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ, THE COLD WAR AS COOPERATION:
SUPERPOWER COOPERATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (1991) (analyzing Cold War
cooperation between the United States and U.S.S.R. and finding that such interaction was almost entirely
aimed at averting direct physical confrontation).
13. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 7.
14. Id.
15. Max Fisher, This Surprising Chart Shows Which Countries Own the Most U.S. Debt, WASH.
POST (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/10/this-
surprising-chart-shows-which-countries-own-the-most-u-s-debt/ (presenting an interactive chart showing
which countries currently own U.S. debt and how much). This situation brings to mind the famous quote
from the great American industrialist, John Paul Getty, "[i]f you owe the bank $ 100 that's your problem.
If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem." J. Paul Getty Quotes, BRAINY QUOTE,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/j/jpaulgett 129274.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2015).
16. Trade in Goods with China, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5700.html#2013 (last updated Apr. 2, 2015). See also Top 10 Trading Partners of the
Chinese Mainland, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 19, 2014, 8:21 AM),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2014-02/19/content_17290565.htm (putting the figure for
U.S./China trade in 2013 at approximately $520 billion, but still listing the U.S. as China's largest trading
partner).
17. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 12.
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encompasses MAED, but MAED does not necessarily encompass MAD. While
MAD still exists today as a disincentive to conflict, MAED is a relatively new beast,
and Feldman argues that this supplementary risk makes both conventional and
economic warfare irrational for both actors and provides a strong inducement for
cooperation. 8 History is replete with destructive confrontation between established
and rising powers, but "never before has the dominant world power been so
economically interdependent with the rising challenger it must confront."'19 The
numbers speak for themselves in terms of the debt and trade at stake, and this
situation provides a powerful motivation to avoid confrontation.
Feldman's analysis of the forces for cooperation in the U.S.-China relationship
is well articulated and commonsensical. It does, however, miss a key aspect of
economic entanglement that may contradict his assertion that it is a purely
cooperative factor. As noted above, economic entanglement creates a situation
unique to the Cool War. Given the lack of economic connection between the United
States and U.S.S.R. during the twentieth century, both could feel free to engage in
economic actions against one another.2" Yet this lack of connection also meant that
both were more limited in terms of these actions than if they had engaged in robust
trade. Conversely, the abundance of economic interaction between the United States
and China means both are invested in the economic success of the other and are
disinclined to act negatively in this manner.2' Nevertheless, were they motivated to
harm the other, their interconnectedness offers more of a chance to do so should their
calculus determine that the benefits outweigh the costs, and states may be more
willing to push the envelope when it comes to economic action as opposed to that
involving kinetic weaponry.2 2 These sorts of maneuvers can have a punishing
impact while sparing risk in terms of intensification and violence.
23
18. Id. at 8-13.
19. Id. at 15.
20. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 6 (3d ed. 2007)
(concluding U.S. sanctions against the U.S.S.R. were not especially effective nor material in bringing
about the latter's collapse). See also James Gibney, Sanction Russia? Reagan Tried it With no Luck,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2014, 8:52 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-17/sanction-
russia-we-ve-tried-this-before (presenting a specific example of the ineffectiveness of U.S. economic
action against the Soviet Union).
21. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 8.
22. Examples of this are the United States' sanctions regimes against both Russia and Iran. These
measures were undertaken in place of physical responses to Iran's nuclear program and Russia's
intervention in Ukraine. See, e.g., Rick Noack, Will Sanctions Work Against Russia? lran's Experience
Offers a Few Clues, WASH. POST (July 31, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/3 I /will-sanctions-work-against-russia-
irans-experience-offers-a-few-clues/.
23. See Leah McGrath Goodman & Lynnley Browning, The Art of Financial Warfare: How the
West is Pushing Putin's Buttons, NEWSWEEK (April 24, 2014, 6:06 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/05/02/art-financial-warfare-how-west-pushing-putins-buttons-
248424.html (outlining the crimpling effect economic attacks can have on enemies while avoiding the
"unwanted collateral damage" and risk that goes along with soldiers, guns, and bombs).
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A recent example of this is the United States' economic action against Russia
for its intervention in Ukraine's province of Crimea.24 The strategy of economic
rather than direct military engagement is meant to coerce Russia into abandoning its
expansionist aims while avoiding, among other things, physical confrontation, more
substantial diplomatic damage, and intense retaliation.25 The United States and
China's economic entanglement therefore provides a further chilling effect on
expansive conflict on top of that provided by MAD, but also increases the likelihood
of direct harmful measures being undertaken short of a physical clash. This situation
makes the sources of cooperation put forth in Cool War slightly less black and white.
Yet even with these incentives to avoid conflict, Feldman laments, "[i]f only
the world were so simple."26 Standing in the way of cooperation are numerous
factors pushing toward confrontation.27 First among these in Feldman's mind are
the forces of political realism. 8 This theory generally holds that international
society is inhabited by states existing in anarchy with no guarantees of security.2 9
This situation requires them to engage in constant competition and conflict in pursuit
of their own national interests and power since they are the only guarantors of their
own safety in an unpredictable and ungoverned world.
30
China's overall rise coupled with the United States' relative economic decline,
Feldman argues, changes the international balance of power.3' China's desire for
security in a tough neighborhood will lead it to seek to take advantage of this
transformation.32 Furthermore, beyond security, both the United States and China
24. These actions have included a litany of economic sanctions against key Russian individuals and
businesses. See Ukraine-Related Designations. 3/20/2014, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 20,
2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/pages/20140320 33.aspx. See also Ukraine-Related Designations: 4/28/2014, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-
Enforcement/Pages/20140428.aspx.
25. See Peter Feaver & Eric Lorber, The Problem with Obama's Strategy of Graduated Escalation
Towards Russia, FOREIGN POLICY (Mar. 25, 2014, 4:16 PM),
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 14/03/25/problemobama-strategy-graduated-escalation-tow
ards russia (arguing economic rather than military action by the United States limits the extent of the
conflict while allowing it to take initiative and put pressure on Russia).
26. FELDMAN, supra note I, at 15.
27. It must be noted that every state engages in competition-to some degree-with every other
state. Thus, "[c]ompetition is inevitable in the U.S.-China relationship, just as it is in any relationship
among states .... The United States competes and occasionally has serious disagreements with even its
closest allies." STEINBERG & O'HANLON, supra note 2, at 4. What are important are the reasons and
degrees to which competition between the United States and China escalates beyond this normal
interaction.
28. Feldman, supra note 1, at 17-19.
29. See, e.g., Political Realism in International Relations, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/ (last updated Apr. 2, 2013) (defining political
realism in international relations as "a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and
conflictual side" where "states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own
national interests, and struggle for power" on "a sphere without justice").
30. See id.
31. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 19.
32. See, e.g., ANDREW J. NATHAN & ANDREW SCOBELL, CHINA'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY (2012)
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have interests in remaining the sole superpower and challenging that role,
respectively. Feldman claims these "reasons are both psychological and material"
in terms of perceptions of strength providing domestic and international support and
respect as well as favorable trade and other more quantifiable benefits. 33 This
situation "gives China the means, opportunity, and motive to alter the global
arrangement in which the United States is the world's sole superpower."
34
According to realist doctrine, this is an opportunity that no state will pass up, and,
"[u]nder the circumstances, a shooting war is not unavoidable-but conflict is." 3
5
Pushing in the same direction as the forces of realism, Feldman continues, are
the influences of nationalism and ideology.36 As China's power grows on the
international stage 37 the government and citizenry may demand more assertiveness
to go along with its stature. 38 Additionally, should China's economic growth slow
from the tremendous pace it has sustained over the last few decades, 39 the
Communist Party may resort to nationalism to maintain legitimacy. 40 In turn, "[a]s
the United States continues to struggle economically, we can expect increasing
nationalism from its citizens and the politicians who represent them" since this
"deflects attention away from the internal causes of problems and toward external
sources of trouble."'4' Both of these nationalisms will be focused on the other
respective state and will act as powerful variables driving toward conflict.
In general, the forces of political realism and nationalism appear safe bets to be
placed in the category of confrontational forces. Concerns for security and pride
will likely tend toward asserting oneself against a powerful other, and Feldman
presents these issues well. In terms of ideology, however, Feldman provides a less
than full picture of the situation. He contends there is a "one-sided war of ideas"
being pushed by the United States in which it submits China to ideological pressure
while China applies none in return.42  Where China is presented in terms of
"ideological pragmatism," the United States is portrayed as more evangelist and
unable to accept China's lack of democracy, law, and human rights.43 What results
is an antagonistic relationship in which China seeks to conduct foreign policy
(putting forth, generally, that China's core interest is security since it resides in an unpredictable region
of the world filled with powerful actors while simultaneously dealing with areas of discontent within its
borders).
33. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 25-28.
34. Id. at 19.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 32-34.
37. See, e.g., China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower, PEW RES. CTR. (July 13, 2011),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/13/china-seen-overtaking-us-as-global-superpower/ (analyzing data
showing that global opinion sides with China replacing the United States as the global superpower).
38. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
39. Data: China, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/china (last visited Apr. 20,
2015).
40. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 33.
41. Id. at 34.
42. Id. at 35.
43. Id. at 38-39.
VOL. 43:3
THE EAGLE & THE DRAGON
without reference to the internal structure or actions of other states while the United
States continuously pressures China to change and even challenges the Communist
Party's legitimacy.'
However, China's stance in favor of strict nonintervention in the internal affairs
of other states and favoring of stability and economic growth over human rights is
an ideology.4 5 Furthermore, it is one that China presents to and encourages around
the globe through its actions on the United Nations Security Council,46 trade
policy,47 and general diplomacy 4 8 Just as the United States and western states push
for internal change within China on numerous fronts and for China to take tangential
issues into account when engaging in international trade,49 China pushes back that
44. Id.
45. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ideology (last visited
Apr. 20, 2015) (defining "ideology" as: "a: a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or
culture; b: a manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture c: the
integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program"). See also Elizabeth C.
Economy, The Game Changer: Coping with China's Foreign Policy Revolution, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 142,
146 (2010) (putting forth that foreign countries are excited by what they see as "the China model," which
stands as an alternative to the models of the West); Sonya Sceats & Shaun Breslin, China and the
International Human Rights System, CHATHAM HOUSE 1, 42 (2012), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Intemationa %2Law/r 101 2-sceatsbre
slin.pdf ("China's insistence that each state must define its own human rights priorities does not apply
only to itself. The key here is not what China does, but instead the idea that countries should 'nationalize'
supposedly universal values to fit their own experiences.").
46. See, e.g., Security Council-Veto List, UNITED NATIONS,
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto (last updated Apr. 20, 2015) (cataloguing veto use by
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and showing China's increased use of this mechanism
in the past decade). China also arguably has had a policy of abstaining from U.N. votes where pressuring
states to engage in certain actions is at issue. Christopher Holland, Chinese Attitudes to International
Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty, and Intervention, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. ONLINE
FORUM 1, 10 (2012), available at http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/l202/07/Christopher-Holland-
China-the-Security-Council-and-lntervention.pd f.
47. How a government governs is of little concern for China in deciding to conduct trade with a
state. See Economy, supra note 45, at 146 ("The willingness of the Chinese government and its state-
owned enterprises to do business anywhere, anytime, and at any price has become legendary."). See also
China's Big Investment, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 5, 2005, 12:00 AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia-july-dec05-china 7-05/ (quoting Sierra Leone's ambassador to
China saying: "They just come and do it. We don't start to hold meetings about environmental impact
assessments and human rights and bad governance and good governance.").
48. See Principles of China's Foreign Policy, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china 1950_forpol principles.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015)
(explaining China's foreign policy decisions "derive from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.").
49. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU): 2013 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT (2013), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220402.pdf
(providing the official U.S. view of human rights in China and stating that China's record in this regard
is severely negative); Tim Collard, Op-Ed., China-UK Human Rights Dialogue Builds Bridges to
Understanding, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:46 PM),
http://www.scmp.com/comment/article/149443 /china-uk-human-rights-dialogue-builds-bridges-
understanding (asserting that western pressure on China over its internal affairs is a "well-understood part
of the bilateral relationship").
2015
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
these countries should not be concerned with the internal affairs of others.5" The
ideological conflict is therefore two-sided, with the United States' "responsible
sovereignty" on one side and China's "pure sovereignty" on the other. This situation
serves to make ideology an even more potent force pushing towards confrontation
than Feldman presents.
With the cooperative forces of MAD, MAED, and favorable debt and trade
figures pushing against the confrontational influences of realism, nationalism, and
ideology, Feldman outlines the interesting balancing act that the Cool War entails.
These are the general factors policy makers on both sides of the Pacific must be
aware of and navigate in managing relations going forward.
Sidelight on Taiwan
Beyond sources of cooperation and confrontation, Feldman offers what he
considers a likely scenario for how China may establish itself as a superpower. Key
to displaying and asserting this status, he puts forth, is Taiwan.5 Since the
Kuomintang fled to the island following the Chinese Civil War, China has had a
deep interest in its reabsorption.52 Feldman contends that this can be done while
simultaneously establishing China as a global superpower through a gradual military
buildup resulting in "a situation where the United States would not consider war as
a serious option."53 Essentially, China would ratchet up the cost of war in the eyes
of the United States to the point where it was no longer tenable.
This tactic, Feldman insists, has been used by China in the past, in the case of
Hong Kong. In that situation, British "Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher intended
to maintain some sort of British administration even after her country's ninety-nine-
year 'lease' on Hong Kong expired in 1997.", 4 But "China's military capacity meant
the British could not seriously contemplate fighting China the way Britain had
fought (and defeated) Argentina."55  Similarly, if China increased its military
capacity, promised the "one country, two systems" solution it applied to Hong Kong,
and the United States was able to save face with its allies and the world by claiming
"Taiwan was in a basic sense different from the rest of Asia," this, to Feldman, could
resolve the situation around the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan would accept reabsorption
and this would simultaneously "mean that China was on a par with the United States
50. See Christopher Bodeen, US Envoy Says Rights Talks With China Yield Little, YAHOO! (Apr.
28,2014,7:37 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/china-media-us-human-rights-pressure-fail-074704992.html
("As China is a sovereign nation, there is zero possibility of it allowing the U.S. to dictate its political
development.... We also are opposed to the United States using human rights as a pretext for interfering
in China's internal affairs."). See also Sceats & Breslin, supra note 45, at 45 ("China frequently invokes
the principle of non-interference or non-intervention to challenge the legitimacy of criticisms of its human
rights record or to register its objections to similar criticisms directed at its allies.").
5 1. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 20.
52. See, e.g., Michal Roberge & Youkyung Lee, China-Taiwan Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-taiwan-relations/p9223 (last updated Aug. 11 2009)
(outlining a concise history of the modem Chinese-Taiwanese relationship).
53. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 22.
54. Id. at 21.
55. ld.
VOL. 43:3
THE EAGLE & THE DRAGON
as a global superpower." 56 In establishing this hypothetical as plausible, Feldman
asks a simple question: "Would the president of the United States go to war with
China over Taiwan absent some high-profile, immediate crisis capable of mobilizing
domestic support?- 57 The costs of physical conflict would be too high, he concludes,
and, given the scenario above, the United States would likely accept Chinese
reabsorption of Taiwan. 5
8
The prediction above-or recommendation for China's Taiwan policy-is a
bold one. The situation across the Taiwan Strait is one of the most contentious in
the world, and, as such, has many layers. Feldman's analysis is interesting and offers
a highly plausible general scenario. He is convincing in arguing that the
maintenance of America's place and security guarantees in Asia is key to any U.S.
acceptance of Taiwan's reabsorption into China. The United States would be highly
interested in ensuring that its Asian allies remained confident in its promises of
protection and that a costly and dangerous arms race did not develop. A problem
with Feldman's examination, however, is that he sees the state of affairs across the
Taiwan Strait as involving only two actors: the United States and China. 59 He
completely ignores the agency of Taiwan. In addition, there is an argument for
possible Chinese restraint in the face of U.S. absence and Feldman's likening of
Taiwan's possible reabsorption by China to Hong Kong's transition appears
problematic.
Feldman ventures that, "[a]fter the United States signaled its inability or
unwillingness to defend Taiwan, the people of Taiwan would, presumably, publicly
acquiesce in their own reabsorption into China's sovereign sphere." 60 But Taiwan
is not simply a pawn sitting between the United States and China. It has consistently
exercised its autonomy in pushing the situation in directions it wishes and forcing
the two larger powers to react.61 Furthermore, it is-functionally, if not legally-its
own state, and significantly more Taiwanese support independence when forced to
choose between that and unification. 62 This support is influenced by the threat of
56. Id. 22-23.
57. Id. at 22.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 20-23.
60. Id.at 22.
61. Shelley Rigger, Taiwan in U.S.-China Relations, in TANGLED TITANS: THE UNITED STATES
AND CHINA, 293, 293 (David Shambaugh ed., 2013) ("Taiwan's capacity to deliver game-changing
initiatives keeps American and Chinese policy makers in a reactive mode much of the time."). An
example of this is the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96. This was largely triggered by the actions of
then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui and his influence in getting the U.S. Congress to override then
President Clinton's opposition to issuing him a visa to speak at Cornell University. China reacted
aggressively, the United States was forced to display its military commitment to Taiwan, and the two
larger powers engaged in a very tense exchange. See, e.g., Robert S. Ross, The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait
Confrontation, 25 INT'L SECURITY 87 (2000).
62. Chris Wang, Taiwanese Prefer Independence Over Unification: Survey, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 31,
2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/10/31/2003575806 ("[Tihe poll found that
most respondents favored independence over unification if they were asked to choose between just those
two options, with 71 percent supporting independence and only 18 percent supporting unification with
China.").
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Chinese retaliation against any such declaration, and even more would endorse
independence without such coercive influence.6 3 Segments of Taiwan's population
have also shown their willingness to engage in violent protest against strengthening
economic ties between the island and China. 64 In addition, China's recent limitations
on democracy in Hong Kong and resulting civil unrest, despite the "one country,
two systems" assurances it gave at the time of Hong Kong's reabsorption, have
probably increased resistance in Taiwan to closer relations with the mainland.65 It
is therefore not a given that Taiwan and its people would accept Chinese rule
peacefully if overtly coerced, whether this means militarily defending themselves or
the public reacting violently against their own government under a "one country,
two systems" arrangement or an installed government from the mainland.
There is also an argument to be made that China may exercise restraint in a
situation where it knows the United States will not provide security for Taiwan.
Much of China's discomfort and anxiety concerning the island comes from fears that
Taiwan will declare independence and the mainland will be forced to undertake
brash and damaging action-damaging to both others and itself.66 During calm
times, China has shown a willingness to allow its connection with Taiwan to develop
slowly and peacefully.67 Should the United States remove itself from the equation,
63. See Yuan-Kang Wang, Taiwan Public Opinion on Cross-Strait Security Issues: Implications
for US Foreign Policy, 7 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 93, 99-100 (2013) (citing the 2011 Taiwan National
Security Survey that found that "65.7 percent of respondents opposed independence if it would cause a
war with China. Without China's threat of war, however, independence enjoys widespread support among
Taiwan's public."). See also Emerson Niou, The China Factor in Taiwanese Politics, 63 J. Soc. ScI. 55,
61 (2011) ("[M]any people are attracted to the idea of Taiwan becoming an independent country but only
if China [will] not use force to stop that from happening."); Emerson M.S. Niou, A New Measure of
Preferences on the Independence-Unification Issue in Taiwan, 40 J. ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 91 (2005)
(showing that a large percentage of Taiwanese would support Taiwan declaring independence if China is
guaranteed not to use force against it).
64. See, e.g., Austin Ramzy, Taiwan Stands Behind Use of Force Against Protesters, N.Y. TIMES
(March 24,2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/world/asia/taiwan-defends-use-of-force-against-
protesters.html?_r=-0 ("At least 174 people, including 119 police officers, were wounded" in violent
protests against "[t]he China trade bill").
65. See, e.g., Benny Avni, Be'ing's Crushing of Democracy in Hong Kong Sends Chills Through
Taiwan, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 20, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/31/beijings-
crushing-democracy-hong-kong-sends-chills-through-taiwan-278455.html ("[Tihe clash between
democracy defenders and guardians of Communist doctrine is reverberating in many of China's provinces
and is dimming its hope of peacefully annexing the independent island of Taiwan and uniting it with the
mainland.").
66. See Jia Qingguo & Alan D. Romberg, Taiwan and Tibet, in DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHUNA
RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS 176, 177-78 (Nina Hachigian ed., 2014) ("The Chinese
government believes that the best way to resolve the Taiwan problem is through peaceful dialogue,
consultation, and negotiation. However, it has repeatedly announced that it is ready to fight a war to
defend China's territorial integrity if Taiwan moves toward independence.").
67. An example of this is China not objecting to Taiwan's participation as an observer at the World
Health Assembly in 2009, the first time the latter was granted observer status at a U.N. body since it lost
its seat at the United Nations to China in 1971. Roberge & Lee, supra note 52, at Significance of the
Rapprochement. Another example is the early 2014 cross-strait diplomatic encounter between China and
Taiwan, the first since 1949. Michael Pizzi, What's Next for China-Taiwan Relations?, AL JAZEERA
(Feb. 15, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/15/what-s-next-for-
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the risks of unilateral independence to Taiwan and China would move in opposite
directions, significantly increasing for the former and decreasing for the latter.
China would therefore face much more freedom of action and may not necessarily
engage in explicit coercion. It would have the peace-of-mind to let things develop
in a more or less mutually pleasing and peaceful fashion. China also likely has little
desire to absorb a restless territory-to go along with Tibet and Xinjiang-when it
could have an appeased one. In addition, peaceful transition would help China's
image in the region, which has taken a hit as a result of its forceful rhetoric and
actions in the South China Sea and island dispute with Japan.68 Taiwan would not
necessarily have to simply "acquiesce" to Chinese reabsorption, but could engage in
meaningful negotiations and population pleasing actions to make the process as
seamless as possible.
Finally, Feldman's likening of the situation across the Taiwan Strait to that of
Hong Kong's reabsorption is puzzling. These two circumstances are quite different.
Hong Kong was firmly under the rule of a recognized and influential world power:
the United Kingdom.69 There was also an agreement between China and the United
Kingdom setting a date for the resumption of Chinese sovereignty.70 The United
Kingdom was therefore naturally far less inclined to fight for continuing control over
Hong Kong than for the Falkland Islands, which were permanently claimed against
the competing claims of Argentina.7' While then Prime Minister Thatcher may have
entertained notions of maintaining British dominion over Hong Kong, the
appeasements offered by China were more likely meant to streamline the region's
peaceful reintegration rather than avoid a war with the United Kingdom.
Taiwan, on the other hand, has existed in opposition to China and the
Communist Party since the Chinese Civil War. The Kuomintang fled their defeat at
the hands of Mao Zedong and the communists and continued the international entity
of the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan.72 Unlike the United Kingdom,
which had sovereign control over Hong Kong, the United States makes no claim of
ownership over Taiwan. The United States does not even maintain an explicit
security guarantee for the island.73 Rather, it conducts itself under the foreign policy
chinataiwanrelations.html.
68. See, e.g., Seth Robson, China's Aggressive Tactics Turning off Asian Neighbors, STARS &
STRIPES (June 25, 2013), http://www.stripes.com/china-s-aggressive-tactics-tuming-off-asian-neighbors-
1.226581 ("[A] series of clashes over territorial disputes and Beijing's tendency to economically punish
those who get in its way have encouraged many Asian nations to reassess their choices-an increasingly
aggressive Chinese dragon or a more distant and relatively benign America.").
69. See Hong Kong Profile, BBC (Dec. 3, 2014,), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-
16526765.
70. See id.
71. See Key Facts: The Falklands War, BBC,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457033/html/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
72. See Roberge & Lee, supra note 52.
73. See, e.g., DEAN P. CHEN, US TAIWAN STRAIT POLICY: THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY
(2012) (analyzing the origins of the U.S.'s stance of "strategic ambiguity" toward Taiwan, under which
it does not make explicit its commitment to defend the island nor state that it will not do so in the event
of Chinese aggression).
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doctrine of "strategic ambiguity" whereby it maintains that it "does not endorse
unification or independence; instead, it emphasizes that whatever relationship
develops in the Strait, it must come about through a peaceful process. '74 Such a
stance creates the possibility that the United States will militarily ensure Taiwan's
security without explicitly establishing this. Furthermore, there is no agreement in
place for the peaceful reabsorption of Taiwan into China. Hong Kong is a region
that alternately belonged to different recognized states by international agreement
with an established transfer mechanism. Taiwan, by contrast, is a separate and self-
governing entity that belongs to no framework for Chinese reabsorption, and was in
fact founded on hostility to the mainland. The two situations are starkly different
and Feldman's likening of them appears inaccurate and unconvincing.
It is still conceivable, however, that the Taiwan scenario presented by Cool War
could occur, but this is because it is simple and underdeveloped. It is true that the
display and threat of U.S. force has been a dominant factor in maintaining the
separation of Taiwan and China." Under current national trajectories-the rise of
China and the relative decline of the United States-the day may very well come
when the United States no longer finds it advantageous to continue this stance. The
subtraction of U.S. military might from the equation would fundamentally alter the
situation and could result in, as Feldman predicts, Taiwan publicly acquiescing to
Chinese reabsorption. But it could also result in, among other things, continued
separation, more substantial negotiation, protest, or violence-public or military.
Feldman offers no argument for his prediction of acquiescence to reabsorption due
to military pressure other than "because China can" and "Taiwan would have to."
76
As noted above, there are numerous factors that make such a rudimentary argument
unconvincing.
III. THE SOURCES OF CHINESE CONDUCT
The second main section of Cool War attempts to provide a glimpse into the
inner workings of the Chinese government. The title of this part of the book leads
one to believe that Feldman intends to explain the sources of Chinese foreign policy.
Feldman also hints at this by stating that "[i]t is not possible to understand the
dynamics of a cool war unless we have a more sophisticated understanding of the
Chinese Communist Party."77 The section, however, actually does nothing of the
sort. Rather, it is best understood as an argument for the rationality and likely
longevity of the Chinese system. There are faint mentions of broad foreign policy
motivations, but these are not expounded upon.78
74. Rigger, supra note 61, at 305.
75. Such actions were key in diffusing each of the Taiwan Strait Crises in 1954-55, 1958, and 1996-
97, respectively. See Taiwan Strait Timeline, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT'L STUDIES,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/programs/taiwan/timeline/pt4.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2015).
76. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 22.
77. ld. at xiii.
78. Id. at 98 ("The Chinese leadership is highly rational and self-interested. Its interests are tied to
continued economic growth").
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Feldman begins the section with a lengthy exposition of the events concerning
the fall of former prominent Chinese official Bo Xilai, who was undone by both his
own corruption and that of his wife.79 Feldman asserts that this situation can be
interpreted in one of two ways. First, it can be read as a confirmation of the popular
view that the Chinese leadership is corrupt, immune from the law, and made up of
hereditary elite known as "princelings."80 Alternatively, it can be seen as showing
China creating a durable and legitimate governing structure able to handle these sorts
of destabilizing events.8' Feldman takes the latter view. He emphasizes that the
Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") has developed "[a] mixed or permeable elite;
regular transitions; accountable government; and the emerging, if incomplete, battle
against corruption."82 Together, it is argued, "[these] represent an attempt to create
a durable and legitimate governing structure."83
In terms of China's mixed/permeable elite, Cool War stresses that "[t]he
leadership of the Communist Party is made up of meritocrats and princelings. And
despite their head start over pure meritocrats, those princelings must still display
merit to advance."84 This allows all candidates "a realistic chance to enter the elite"
and avoids a higher risk of conflict and "a classic revolutionary situation" where an
insulated hereditary elite excludes talented individuals from power.85  The
advantages of both family and merit systems are realized as the benefits of being a
princeling and exist without eliminating the potential for skilled but unconnected
individuals to succeed. 86 Chinese leadership also allows for the development of
factions within the CCP, further fashioning a more mixed government.87 Examples
of this are the divides between the princelings and meritocrats and the left and
right.88
The Chinese government has also managed to put in place a reliable method of
power transition. Generally:
Power is being regularly shifted from one generation to the next. Each
cohort of senior Politburo members and Standing Committee members
that is selected comes from a particular age cohort of around ten years.
No matter how talented you are, you must wait your tum. 89
This rotation serves the same general function that elections do in democratic
societies. It incentivizes elites to respect current leaders when they are out of power
79. Bo Xilai Scandal: Timeline, BBC (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
china-17673505 (providing a timeline on Bo Xilai's fall from power). See also Profile: Bo Xilai, BBC
(Sep. 22, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china- 19709555 (providing a profile on Bo Xilai).
80. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 65.
81. Id. at 65-70.
82. Id. at 69.
83. Id. at 70.
84. Id. at 66.
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id. at 76.
87. ld. at 80-82.
88. In China, the left are conservatives who seek to conserve some form of traditional communism
and the right are those who wish to move more in the direction of markets. Id. at 81.
89. Id. at 83.
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because they can expect to attain it in the future.9" Similarly, elites rule with the
expectation of eventually losing power.91 Solving the problem of power transition
is an important factor in a government's stability, and China's method "has shown
that it can operate predictably and effectively.
'
"
92
Though the CCP has not gone so far as to make itself publicly accountable
through elections, limited avenues of government accountability have developed.
The Party engages in a great deal of censorship but does allow what Feldman calls
"selective free speech. ' 93 This entails the government allowing the public to be more
expressive on certain topics than others.94 The benefits of this strategy include: the
providing of information and public opinion to the CCP; the venting of frustrations
by the public that may otherwise express themselves more harmfully; and the
focusing of the public on the speech it is able to conduct rather than that which is
censored.95 In terms of accountability, the limited expression of public opinion is
the most important factor. Feldman holds that "[t]he party must attend to public
opinion so seriously because it knows that it cannot survive as the ruling party
without preserving its legitimacy." 96 Limited free speech serves this function
because "[t]he trick is to find ways to ascertain public opinion without waiting for
serious objections to the system to grow or develop. 97
In order to further cement its legitimacy and longevity, the CCP has also
undertaken its own unique method to combat corruption. Rather than establishing
the rule of law, like in the West, China "operates a Central Discipline Inspection
Commission, and periodically runs anticorruption campaigns in which thousands of
members are investigated and punished." 98 In addition, when party members are
shown to be corrupt, they are visibly purged. 99 This is all meant to keep corruption
from escalating to truly damaging levels and to convince the public the government
cares about stopping it.'0o
Taken together, Feldman's points provide an argument for the durability of the
CCP and an interesting cursory introspection into factors that maintain a
government's rule-a mixed/permeable elite, peaceful transitions, accountability,
and fighting corruption. It does not, however, accomplish what the title of the
section implies: namely, provide explanation for the sources of Chinese conduct.
The four factors noted above provide little insight into how China would handle a
given Cool War situation. If Taiwanese leadership were to once again move toward
independence, knowledge of the Chinese government's permeability, transitions,
90. Id. at 82.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 85.
93. Id. at 90.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 91.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 95.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 94-95.
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accountability, or corruption provides, at best, modest insight into the regime's
mechanisms for formulating a response or what that might be. Similarly, these
factors contribute relatively little to understanding how China might handle the
United States and western states suddenly using the World Trade Organization
("WTO") as a forum for human rights issues. ' 0'
This portion of the book therefore feels incongruous with the rest. Cool War,
overall, professes to present the coming age of international relations, U.S.-China
relations, and their dynamic.0 2 A section on Chinese government structure, foreign
policy formulation, and the domestic actors principally involved in this would have
been highly useful to include. Cool War, therefore, does not deliver a
comprehensive work on the Cool War. Readers are left to turn elsewhere for
information on and analysis of China's leadership and foreign policy complex that
will actually engage in this enterprise.' 03
Yet this section does make a different contribution to Feldman's overall
argument, though not as important as a section on Chinese foreign policy
formulation would have provided. There exists a substantial body of literature
arguing that the CCP will face important impediments in the near future and
seriously questioning its possible longevity and potential."~ Such arguments
fundamentally contradict Feldman's prediction of a Cool War developing between
the United States and China-one staunchly democratic and the other single party
authoritarian. If the CCP were to crumble or institute democracy, these core
differences-or at least their importance-would evaporate and a Cool War would
be difficult to put forth. Feldman is showing that the Chinese government, more or
less as it exists today, has developed innovative measures addressing its weaknesses
and will be around for some time. Though likely unworthy of the large amount of
space allocated to it in the book, this argument is important for establishing the
importance and likelihood of Feldman's core assertions.
101. See infra pp. 117-18.
102. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at xi-xiv.
103. There are a number of works on these subjects. POLITICS IN CHINA: AN INTRODUCTION
(William A. Joseph ed., 2nd ed. 2014); RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF
CHINA'S COMMUNIST RULERS (2010); SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER (2007). See also
DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS (Nina Hachigian ed. 2014)
(presenting the major foreign policy issues between the U.S. and China in the form often conversations
between different American and Chinese specialists).
104. See, e.g., G. John lkenbeiny, The Rise of China, the United States, and the Future of the Liberal
International Order, in TANGLED TITANS: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA, 53, 68 (David Shambaugh
ed., 2013) ("There is little evidence that authoritarian states can become truly advanced societies without
moving in a liberal democratic direction."). See also GIDEON RACHMAN, ZERO-SUM FUTURE: AMERICAN
POWER IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY 283 (2011) (quoting Kishmore Mahbubani as stating, "China cannot
succeed in its goal of becoming a modem developed society until it can take the leap and allow the
Chinese people to choose their own rulers.").
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IV. GLOBAL COMPETITION
The previous sections have outlined the cooperative yet conflictive nature of
the Cool War, the sources of these influences, and the War's likely longevity given
the stability of the Chinese regime. So, what will be the battlefields of the Cool War
and how will the global competition between the United States and China be carried
out? In the final portion of his book, Feldman presents what he thinks will be the
core areas of contention between these great powers. But the absence of key and
obvious points of conflict and a clear focus on prescription rather than explanation
show that Feldman is actually most concerned with providing recommendations for
how each side can non-violently fight the Cool War. In addition, though stated as a
main purpose of this work, °5 little is ultimately offered in terms of suggestions for
how the sides can keep their heated competition from escalating.' 0
6
First and foremost, as with the Cold War, the Cool War will involve a "race for
allies."'0 7 Just as the United States and U.S.S.R. utilized carrots and sticks to load
their respective blocs with members in an effort to legitimize and bolster themselves
while isolating the other, U.S.-China relations will feature a similar dynamic.
Principally, in the near-term, this interplay will take place in the Pacific, where China
does not wish to be contained 0 8 and the United States seeks to maintain its valuable
economic and strategic positions.0 9 Moving forward, Feldman recommends that
China ally itself with those states considered "bad actors" by the West. "0 In this
regard, it possesses an advantage over the United States in its attractiveness to these
states with its authoritarian government and non-interventionist ideology. "' On the
other side, Feldman holds that the United States should develop a "democratic
league" to counter China's rise and pressure it to westernize. 2 Cool War alliances
will, however, be unique in that "security alliances with one side can be reconciled
with economic relationships to the other: indeed, that is the central characteristic of
cool war.""'13
Along with alliances, Feldman asserts that international law and institutions
will take on increasing importance in the Cool War. "4 Since physical confrontation
105. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at xiv.
106. The only true calming recommendations come at the very end of the book where Feldman offers
three ideas for how the Cool War can be managed short of physical conflict. These recommendations,
however, are incredibly vague and more or less simply things to keep in mind when developing one's
own ideas for managing the competition. Id. at 163-64.
107. Id. at 101.
108. Id. at 104. See also James B. Steinberg, Conclusion, in DEBATING CHINA: THE U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONSHIP IN TEN CONVERSATIONS 221, 223 (Nina Hachigian ed., 2014) ("Several Chinese
[experts].. attribute much of the difficulty [in U.S.-China relations] to the perception in China that the
United States is pursuing a policy of containment.").
109. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 104.
110. ld.at108-10.
11. See id. at 108 ("In essence, an invitation to allegiance with China functions as a kind of blank
check on domestic affairs.").
112. Id. at 110-16.
113. Id. at 143.
114. Id. at 119.
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is largely untenable, these mechanisms and forums will be the principal points of
contact and conflict between the United States and China." 5 Feldman claims that
"[t]he irrelevance of the UN Security Council is coming to an end.""' While the
contention that the Security Council has become irrelevant is highly debatable,
117
the body has begun to taken on somewhat of the role it did during the Cold War
when the United States and U.S.S.R. used it as a primary platform to engage one
another and jostle for position."" The debates and decisions of the Council in
reference to the continuing Syrian Civil War are an example of this."" While the
United States and the West push for respect for human rights and government
accountability, China-joined by Russia-advocates respect for state
sovereignty. 120
Beyond the Security Council, Feldman predicts the WTO will also be a key
venue in the Cool War.' 21 It is a powerful organization "devoted to facilitating
international trade" and resolving disputes whose judgments are largely obeyed. 22
Member states may bring claims before the WTO and, if they win, may penalize the
member states that have wronged them.2 3 Members are incentivized to cooperate
with WTO regulations and rulings in order to avoid punishments and gain the
benefits of membership. Both the United States and China have largely bought into
the system 2 4 and its importance in resolving conflict between these two
economically entangled powers will only grow.
Feldman builds on the conflict-management capabilities of the WTO to also
advocate its use by the United States as a tool to compete with China. He begins by
noting that "[s]o long as China continues to violate human rights, there may be no
better ideological tool for the United States to gain advantage." 125 The United States
115. ld. at 128-29.
116. Id. at 119.
117. There are many who disagree with Feldman's provocative contention that the U.N. Security
Council has been irrelevant in recent times. See DAVID Bosco, FIVE To RULE THEM ALL: THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 4 (2009); Jessica Rettig, Why the UN.
Security Council is Still Important, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Oct. 9, 2009, 12:40 PM),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/ 10/09/why-the-un-security-council-is-still-imponrtant;
Martin Sieff, Why the UN Security Council Still Matters, GLOBALIST (Sep. 25, 2013),
http://www.theglobalist.com/un-security-council-still-matters/.
118. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 121.
119. See Factbox: U.N. Security Council Action on the Syrian Conflict, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2014,
11:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/22/us-syria-crisis-un-resolutions-
idUSBREAILORU20140222 (presenting the extensive deliberations and actions of the U.N. Security
Council in response to the Syrian Civil War).
120. Security Council-Veto List, supra note 46. See also CNN Staff, Russia, China Block Syria
From Facing International Criminal Court, CNN (May 23, 2014, 8:10 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/22/world/syria-un/ ("Throughout the conflict in Syria, Russia and China-
both permanent council members-have repeatedly used their veto power to block resolutions tough on
the Syrian regime.").
121. FELDMAN, supra note l,at 121.
122. Id. at 122.
123. Id. at 122-23.
124. Id. at 123-24.
125. Id. at 149.
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"has always used the ideology of human rights as a political tool, deployed when
convenient and ignored otherwise."' 126 The key, however, is linking human rights to
economic interests.127 The WTO, Feldman contends, could be the mechanism for
this. 12' The strategy would involve the United States and other western states
bringing "trade-linked human rights claims before WTO tribunals." 29 An example
Feldman presents is claiming that slave labor or inhuman labor conditions or wages
act as an unfair subsidy for a state's products. 30 Ultimately, the success of such an
endeavor depends on whether China simply leaves the WTO in response or chooses
to stay and fight the challenges within the legal framework. 3'
The argument for using the WTO as a forum for human rights has been made
before,' 32 and it remains unconvincing as put forth in Cool War. While Feldman's
strategic reasoning appears quite novel, it suffers from potential, and severe, risks.
There is a strong case to be made that the WTO functions so well because
contentious issues like human rights are not considered under its purview. Member
states know that their internal affairs will largely remain off the table and only issues
concerning international trade will be addressed. The WTO is therefore considered
an apolitical entity.133 Introducing such a highly politicized issue as human rights
risks degrading the entire system. The WTO may become seen as simply another
soapbox from which to engage in the same political grandstanding and standoffs as
so many other less effective international institutions. By bringing human rights to
the table, the United States and the West risk severely hampering, or outright
demolishing, an institution that offers them incredible benefit without achieving
anything. In this sense, Feldman's recommendation for the United States could
bring about more collateral damage than advantage.
Discussion of international trade does, however, lead to what may be the book's
most prescient subsection: Corporate Cool War. 134 Given the degree of economic
entanglement between the United States and China, businesses native to both sides
will find themselves drawn into the great power competition. Yet many of the
largest and most powerful Chinese companies are state-owned and therefore have
incredible advantages in terms of political and financial backing.' 35 This is doubly
126. Id. at 153.
127. Id. at 159.
128. Id. at 159-61.
129. Id. at 161.
130. Id. at 159.
131. Id. at 160.
132. See, e.g., SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE (2013).
133. Many may assert that this is incorrect since large and wealthy nations are the main arbiters of
WTO law and policy and the ones who engage with it most often. But for the purposes of democracies
versus autocracies and human rights, this statement likely represents the views of most states.
134. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 131-46.
135. See USHA C.V. HALEY & GEORGE T. HALEY, SUBSIDIES TO CHINESE INDUSTRY: STATE
CAPITALISM, BUSINESS STRATEGY, AND TRADE POLICY (2013) (examining the extent of Chinese state
subsidies and strategies for state-owned enterprises and the substantial advantage they provide). See also
Doug Palmer, Rise of China State-Owned Firms Rattles U.S. Companies, REUTERS (Aug. 17,2011, 12:09
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/17/us-usa-china-bigcompanies-
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true when the arena of competition is the Chinese market. Feldman notes that "[i]t
is one thing to compete with another private firm. It is quite another to compete with
a firm that is deeply influenced by the forces that run the country where the market
is located."13 ' China's targeting of foreign corporations with cyber attacks shows
that this disadvantage goes beyond mere business competition.'37 "Any firm that
finds itself on the opposite side of a serious Chinese competitor can now expect to
be subject to governmentally sanctioned warfare."' 38 Put simply, U.S. companies
"will not be allowed to defeat their Chinese competitors."' 39 This also leads to the
situation in which Chinese companies are able to take over U.S. and western
counterparts but the latter cannot do the same in return, and any "[b]ig acquisitions
are, in the cool war context, moves in a grand strategic game."' 14 ' This situation
leads Feldman to push for more U.S. government involvement with U.S. companies
in terms of support and defense since, "[i]n cool war China, economic competition
cannot be separated from political power."' 14 1 The Corporate Cool War is something
wholly novel with no counterpart from the Cold War. It will likely only escalate as
the U.S. government becomes more drawn in through China's aggressive support of
its firms, their expansion, and requests from U.S. companies.
The Corporate Cool War and Feldman's other positions on where U.S.-China
global competition will primarily take place are quite thought provoking, but one
cannot help but notice glaring absences, particularly with regard to areas of
competition that are much more likely to escalate. Some of these include the
mounting revelations of cyber conflict between the two states and China's
contentious territorial standoffs with U.S. allies.
Both the United States and China have powerful hacking units directed against
one another that carry out an incredible number of cyber incursions.' 42 Initially, this
sort of conduct was hidden and handled behind the scenes. 43 In recent years,
idUSTRE77G3Z320110817 ("Lower taxes, less regulation, protected home markets or privileged access
to domestic government procurement markets artificially improve the [state-owned enterprises']
'economies of scale, lowers their operating costs and increases their sales, enabling them to invest in new
technology that increase their competitive advantage at home and abroad.").
136. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 134.
137. See Spencer Ackerman & Jonathan Kaiman, Chinese Military Officials Charged with Stealing
US Data as Tensions Escalate, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2014, 3:58 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/19/us-chinese-military-officials-cyber-espionage
("The US Justice Department indicted five Chinese military officers with stealing data from six US
companies.").
138. FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 137.
139. ld. at 139.
140. Id. at 144.
141. Id. at 140.
142. Matthew M. Aid, Inside the NSA 's Ultra-Secret China Hacking Group, FOREIGN POLICY (June
10, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/10/inside the nsa s ultra secret china hacking group
; David E. Sanger et al., Chinese Army Unit is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-
against-us.html?_r-2&.
143. See David E. Singer, U.S. Blames China's Military Directlyfor Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May
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however, the two sides have openly accused one another of carrying out cyber
attacks.'" The United States has now officially indicted five named members of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army in connection with cyber attacks. Escalating
responses in this arena are worrying because the international legal and general
precedent for handling cyber attacks is non-existent. Can such actions justify armed
responses? If so, what degree of cyber attack is necessary? What other options are
open to an attacked state? With two actors as powerful as the United States and
China testing these waters, there is much to be concerned about under Cool War
conditions.
China's territorial claims against those of U.S. allies in East and Southeast Asia
are another area that should raise concern given the developing Cool War. China
claims islands in the East China Sea against Japan's assertions.145 China makes
similar claims in the South China Sea against those of, among others, the
Philippines.'46 The United States is obligated through treaties to protect both of
these states, and has publicly announced its intent to do so should China go too far.'
47
With increasingly physical interactions between the disputing states, 14 these
situations are most definitely an area where U.S.-China relations will be tested.
The fact that the cyber and territorial disputes contaminating cross-Pacific
politics went unmentioned by Feldman show that he is less concerned with providing
an overview of the arenas of global competition between the United States and China
than recommending nonviolent tactics for each side to carry out. These tactics,
however, appear purely instigative since the collecting of allies, increased political
use of international institutions, politicization of the WTO, and intensification of the
Corporate Cool War are highly unlikely to help reduce tensions. These are very
6 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/world/asia/us-accuses-chinas-military-in-
cyberattacks.html?pagewanted=all& r-0 ("Until now the administration avoided directly accusing both
the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of using cyberweapons against the United
States in a deliberate, government-developed strategy.").
144. See id. (reporting on the U.S.'s open accusation against China of conducting cyberattacks
against it); Jacob Davidson, China Accuses U.S. of Hypocrisy on Cyberattacks, TIME (July 1, 2013),
http://world.time.com/20l3/07/0 I/china-accuses-u-s-of-hypocrisy-on-cyberattacks/ ("China's top
Internet security official stated that China possessed 'mountains of data' on American cyberattacks
against the People's Republic.").
145. Joseph Nye & Kevin Rudd, How to Navigate the East China Sea Dispute Between Japan and
China, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-navigate-the-
east-china-sea-dispute-between-japan-and-china/2014/04/18/953731 a8-c67b- I1 e3-9f37-
7ce307c56815 story.html.
146. Jane Perlez, Philippines and China in Dispute Over Reef, N.Y. TIMES (March 31, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01 /world/asia/beijing-and-manila-in-dispute-over-reef.html.
147. Mark Landler, On a Trip That Avoids Beijing, Obama Keeps His Eye on China, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/27/world/asia/on-a-trip-that-avoids-beijing-obamas-
eye-remains-on-china.html; Cris Larano, Obama Vows 'Ironclad' U.S. Defense of Philippines, WALL ST.
J., (April 29, 2014, 10:11 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702304163604579531562397334946.
148. Japan Reports Latest Incursion by Chinese Ships Around Senkakus, JAPAN TIMES (May 3 1,
2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/3 I/nationaU/japan-reports-latest-incursion-by-
chinese-ships-around-senkakus/#.U4_fki-T6u4; FELDMAN, supra note 1, at 31-32.
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public and alienating actions where each side will have no choice but to stand against
the other in order to save face and protect core interests. Feldman makes an
interesting case for why the Cool War is here, and if his prescriptions are followed,
it will escalate faster.
V. CONCLUSION
In Aldous Huxley's 1962 novel, Island, the protagonist, Will Famaby, refers to
the Cold War as "Cold War L."''I Cool War would have this statement come true as
Feldman grafts a Cold War dynamic on modem day international relations and
advances antagonistic courses of action for both the United States and China. While
there exist incentives for cooperation alongside those for competition, Feldman's
analysis relegates these to obstacles that the two states must steer around in going
after one another. For those who already hold this zero sum view and see the need
to immediately engage in Cool War combat through such tactics as a race for allies
and corporate war, this book is likely affirmative and perhaps builds on one's
parameters for analyzing the world. But for those who do not yet hold such a
prediction for the course of world politics, or who still see a place for basic dialogue
and diplomacy, this work is likely unconvincing. Cool War is still an interesting
read containing a unique and pragmatic, if somewhat disjointed, blend of general
political theory and U.S.-China analysis. But its impact on the debates and
scholarship revolving around the coming era of international politics and U.S.-China
relations will likely be limited.
149. ALDOUs HUXLEY, ISLAND 114 (1962).
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